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PART I
Nature and Analysis of the Problem

PREFACE
The principal aim of this study is to present statistical and
other informational data concerning the numerous labor prob-
lems that arose in the United States during the recent war, and
to outline the development of war labor administration. The
data were gathered during the war period and the study was
completed shortly after the cessation of hostilities. No pretense
is made to discuss the developments that have taken place in the
period of reconstruction, except where it has seemed necessary to
add data to round out certain phases of the presentation. The
conclusions in the final chapter were formulated in the light of
the war experiences of the United States and, altho the months
subsequent to the signing of the armistice have uncovered devel-
opments that may seem to invalidate some of the conclusions
regarding the future relations of capital and labor, the author is
still of the opinion that his analysis has adequate basis in fact
and that future developments will sustain his conclusions.
This opportunity is taken to express the writer's appreciation
of the very valuable criticisms and suggestions made by Pro-
fessor John A. Fairlie of the University of Illinois, who has read
the manuscript. The author is especially indebted to his wife,
Anna E. Watkins, whose constant cooperation has made this
study possible.
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INTRODUCTION
It is now a commonplace observation that the World War
caused unprecedented readjustments in the political and eco-
nomic organization of the belligerent powers, and in its wake
left many unexpected modifications in the social structure of the
civilized world. Perhaps no similarly brief period in the history
of the world has been so pregnant with unique national experi-
ences, and surely none has resulted in more far-reaching polit-
ical, economic, and social readjustment. In almost every depart-
ment of national life the familiar, under the pressure of innumer-
able exigencies of the titanic struggle for national existence, gave
way to the novel both in the realm of the theoretical and the prac-
tical. We found ourselves accepting, as a modus vivendi ad in-
terim at least, theories and policies that, altho not foreign to us,
had not been unqualifiedly endorsed. For the student of his-
tory, whether social, political, or economic, it is much easier to
think of the period of the World War in terms of revolution
rather than of evolution, and to interpret the events of that
time he must accordingly adjust his mental perspective.
To those interested in the development of economic theory and
economic policies the war period was especially rich in interest-
ing experiences, for there was not only widespread disregard of
commonly accepted economic doctrines, but a wider abandon-
ment of customary economic practices. At every turn in the
road of economic reorganization for war the freedom of the in-
dividual was restricted and the power of the state augmented.
As we shall point out later, this unprecedented development of
government regulation took place in all departments of our in-
dustrial organization, but nowhere was that development more
interesting and, at times, more extensive than in the field of
labor. The important place which labor holds in productive
processes necessitated careful consideration of hitherto neglected
problems of industrial relations which became more serious dur-
ing the great emergency. Furthermore, altho the formulation
11 *
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of a constructive labor policy and the organization of a war
labor administration were slow in maturing, when final develop-
ment was reached they were of more than passing interest to the
student of industrial relations. That is why this study of the
labor problem in the United States during the World War has
been made. If the policies and methods of dealing with the
labor situation during the emergency of the last few years con-
tained nothing new and suggestive such a study would be of only
historical value, but it is now generally agreed that our experi-
ences during the war have contributed much toward the solution
of the maladjustment in industrial relations and the problem of
labor administration.
The purpose of this brief study is: (1) To outline the labor
problem during the war; (2) to trace the main lines in the devel-
opment of war labor administration in the United States; and
(3) to point out the value of our war-time experiences in the
creation of permanent labor policies. The first part of the essay
is devoted to an analysis of the elements in the labor problem
during this period, and in the second part are considered admin-
istrative methods and policies, including the adjustment of in-
dustrial disputes. In the concluding chapter are suggested the
lessons that have been learned and the problems of the recon-
struction period, altho most attention is directed to a considera-
tion of the new point of view which is evidenced in the manage-
ment of industry as it affects labor. For upon the spread of a
more amicable and conciliatory attitude between labor and cap-
ital depends, we believe, the establishment of industrial peace.
That the United States, in dealing with the exigencies that may
arise in the realm of industrial relations in future years, will be
able to draw extensively upon the experiences of the war period,
there seems little room for doubt. In those experiences there
may be discovered the long desired solution of our labor prob-
lems, and the pattern for administrative machinery that will
prove adequate for dealing with the perplexing problems of pro-
duction arising out of the employment of labor. It will profit
our people little to have secured the guaranty of justice and
peace in international political relations if within our own
boundaries we fail to establish a solid foundation for fair deal-
ing and amicable relations in industry. In the light of the data
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presented in the following pages it may be possible to formulate
some definite conclusions concerning the practicability of main-
taining industrial peace under normal conditions, since it was
measurably guaranteed under the trying circumstances of a
titanic war. The necessity and desirability of such a peace is
generally recognized; acceptable and effective methods of estab-
lishing it have yet to be devised, unless these means are con-
tained in the labor policies of the last few years.

PART I
Nature and Analysis of the Problem

CHAPTER I
ECONOMIC REORGANIZATION AND THE LABOR
PROBLEM
The outbreak of the great war in the summer of 1914 un-
leashed the forces of one of the most efficiently organized nations
the world has ever known. That efficiency of organization was
characteristic not merely of Germany's military and naval estab-
lishments, but was equally true of her industrial machinery.
The enemies of Germany gradually learned that in order to de-
feat her they must imitate her in military, economic, and polit-
ical coordination. In this case imitation meant not suicide, but
life. Germany's success was due largely to concentration of
authority and coordination of administration in every depart-
ment of her national life. However distasteful such concentra-
tion of authority and coordination of administration might prove
to the more individualistic Latin and Anglo-Saxon mind and
temperament, the necessity, born of war, forced readjustment to
the policies of their autocratic antagonist.
The United States did not escape the necessity of economic and
military reorganization for war. Active participation in the
conflict brought her innumerable complex problems which she
was not immediately able to solve. Three years of molested
neutrality and violated sovereign rights, and the deepening pre-
monition of our people that sooner or later we should become
involved in the European conflict failed to cause very serious
military and economic readjustment for the impending emer-
gency. Industrially, however, it cannot be said that we were
quite so inadequately equipped to assume the burden of war.
Under the stimulus of an enormous European demand for war
materials and other supplies, which resulted in a very high level
of prices, our industrial machinery had quickly and feverishly
reacted, and a fairly complete transition to a war basis had been
effected, so that on April 6, 1917, when we finally declared war
on Germany, our industries were able to assume the burden, at
least to an appreciable extent. Nevertheless, a state of war soon
17
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revealed the inadequacy of even our economic organization to
meet the demands of a great emergency.
It immediately became apparent to our government that pro-
duction of materials must be stimulated and even new sources
of supply created; that there must be greater coordination and
increased efficiency in the distribution of the necessary products ;
and that as a nation we must practice greater economy in the
consumption of essential commodities and more rigid curtail-
ment in the production and consumption of non-essentials. All
these conditions were necessary prerequisites to successful pros-
ecution of the war. To attain these ends, moreover, it was clear
that there must be unprecedented reorganization of industry,
seeming if not actual violation of cherished constitutional rights
and guaranties, and the abandonment of our traditional policy
of laissez-faire. In other words, for the duration of the war in-
dividualism must give way to an extension of governmental
interference. 1 We were to experience, as subsequent events
proved, the greatest extension of government control and regu-
lation in the history of our people.
One fact stood out in unmistakable proportion in the experi-
ences of the European belligerents, namely : that successful con-
duct of the war was largely dependent upon centralization of
control and coordination of administration in industrial organ-
ization. Disregard of the common experience of other bellig-
erents was scarcely to be expected in the United States, and thus,
as in other countries, unrestricted competition and the free play
of economic forces gave way in large measure to public regula-
tion. Our primary task was to marshal all of our military and
economic forces, at whatever cost to traditional methods and
philosophy, for the winning of the war.
1. ECONOMIC READJUSTMENTS
In order more clearly to understand the meaning and appre-
ciate the significance of labor conditions in the United States
i This statement is not intended to imply that the United States has had
in recent decades a purely individualistic policy. Absolute individualism
and strict adherence to the doctrine of laissez-faire have of necessity long
since passed away, for, as Professor Henry C. Adams has pointed out in his
Relation of the State to Industrial Action, public regulation and interfer-
ence must proceed along with the advance of trade and industry under pri-
vate initiative and control.
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incident to the war and the labor policy of our government, it
is necessary at this juncture, even at the risk of repetition of
very familiar facts, to consider briefly some of the economic re-
adjustments effected in this country subsequent to the declara-
tion of war on Germany. A few examples of this industrial
readjustment for war will be sufficient for our purpose here.
America's first official step towards industrial preparedness
for war had been taken as early as August 29, 1916, when Con-
gress passed a law providing for the creation of a Council of
National Defense. 2 This council, however, was not fully organ-
ized until March 3, 1917. 3 The function of this body was the
coordination of the industries and resources of the country for
the national security and welfare, and the ' ' creation of relations
which will render possible in time of need the immediate con-
centration and utilization of the resources of the nation. ' ' Upon
the outbreak of the conflict it became the particular function of
the council to mobilize speedily the nation's economic resources
for the conduct of the war. The objectives of this mobilization
were greater production, more efficient distribution, and more
economic consumption of the essential products. The imperative
need was for ships, munitions, food, fuel, wool, lumber, etc. In
short, the whole field of production, distribution, and consump-
tion of commodities was demanding attention. 4
To aid in the solution of these complex problems the nation
summoned her business experts, and gradually the program of
economic reorganization was effected. To the War Industries
Board of the Council of National Defense was entrusted the task
of fitting our industries for the emergency. The specific func-
tions of this board, according to President Wilson, were as fol-
lows: (1) The creation of new facilities and the disclosing, if
necessary the opening up, of new or additional sources of sup-
ply; (2) the conversion of existing facilities, where necessary,
to new uses; (3) the studious conservation of resources and facil-
2 Public H. B. 17498. This Council consisted of the Secretary of War,
the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of
Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Labor, with
an advisory committee of prominent business men.
s First Annual Eeport of the Council of National Defense, 1917, p. 6.
* Ibid. For the outline of the structure and functions of the Council see
H. R. 17498, or the above report.
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ities by scientific, commercial, and industrial economies ; (4) ad-
vice to the several purchasing agencies of the government with
regard to prices paid; (5) the determination, wherever neces-
sary, of priorities of production and of delivery, and of propor-
tions of any given article to be made immediately accessible to
the several purchasing agencies when the supply of that article
became insufficient, either temporarily or permanently; and (6)
the making of purchases for the allies.5
In response to the demand for greater production and more
economical consumption of food and fuel, Congress, after much
debating and almost unpardonable delay, finally passed the
Lever Act on August 10, 1917. This was an act to provide fur-
ther for the national security and defense by encouraging the
production, conserving the supply, and controlling the distribu-
tion of food products and fuel.6 On the same day that the Act
was passed President Wilson appointed as Food Administrator
Mr. Herbert C. Hoover, who had very efficiently organized the
Belgian Belief work. Mr. Hoover soon organized the Food Ad-
ministration, whose efforts were to be directed to the following :
Guiding trade in the fundamental food commodities so as to
eliminate vicious speculation, extortion, and wasteful practices,
and to stabilize prices in the staples; guarding our exports so
that against the world's shortage we might retain sufficient sup-
plies for our own people and cooperate with the allies to prevent
inflation of prices; and stimulating the conservation of food in
order that exports to our allies might be increased to a point that
would enable them to supply their own armies and feed their
people during the war. 7
On August 23, 1917, Harry A. Garfield, president of Williams
College, was chosen by President Wilson, acting under the au-
thority of the Lever Act, to head the Fuel Administration. Mr.
Garfield set the following tasks for the Fuel Administration:
To secure the largest possible production of fuel ; to guarantee a
just price to the producer and a reasonable one to the consumer ;
to eliminate wasteful consumption of fuel ; to secure a more effi-
s Official Bulletin, March 6, 1918, p. 1.
e Public No. 41 65th Congress (H. B. 4961).
7 Monthly Eeview, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, September, 1917, p.
67. Washington, D. C.
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cient distribution of fuel supply; and to enforce adherence to
these regulations.
8
Under authority of an Act of Congress, approved August 29,
1916, making appropriations for the support of the army for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1917, and for other purposes, it was
possible for the government to make the necessary reorganiza-
tion in the country's transportation facilities. Under authority
of Section 1 of that Act the President, in time of war was em-
powered, through the Secretary of War, to take possession and
assume control of any system or systems of transportation, or
any part thereof, and to utilize the same to the exclusion, as far
as may be necessary, of all other traffic thereon for the transfer
and transportation of troops, material, and equipment for such
other purposes connected with the emergency as may be needful
or desirable.9
After the failure of a pooling scheme in which the railroads
sought, by eliminating wasteful competition, to reorganize their
facilities for more efficient service, it became evident that the
government would sooner or later have to assume control of the
railroads. Under proclamation dated December 6, 1917, Pres-
ident Wilson stated that through the Secretary of War, Newton
D. Baker, the government would take possession and assume con-
trol of the railroads at twelve o'clock noon on December 28, 1917,
and that this would include control of all roads and equipment,
but that for purposes of accounting this possession and control
would date from twelve o'clock midnight, December 31, 1917.
In his explanation of this action the President pointed out that
the order would increase efficiency in the conduct of the war,
and that centralized organization and coordination sooner than
private control and operation would win the war. William G.
McAdoo was appointed Director General of Railroads.10 Mr.
McAdoo's first statement as Director General was that "The
operation of the railroads as a thoroly unified system is of funda-
mental importance to the success of the war.
' ' u
8 H. A. Garfield, Task of the Fuel Administration, published by the U. 8.
Fuel Administration, September 6, 1917, pp. 3, 4.
Public No. 242 64th Congress, H. E. 17498.
10 Official Bulletin, December 27, 1917, p. 1.
" Ibid.
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It was the opinion of many persons that ships would win the
war
;
and it was generally recognized that, if we were to provide
our allies with foodstuffs and other necessities, an American
merchant marine must be built to overcome the submarine men-
ace. To this end the United States Shipping Board, organized
under an Act of Congress approved September 7, 1916, was em-
powered to regulate carriers by water engaged in foreign and
interstate commerce of the United States and to establish and
develop a merchant marine.
12 Pursuant to the authority vested
in it by section 11 of the Act, the board on April 16, 1917,
organized the Emergency Fleet Corporation capitalized at $50,-
000,000. This corporation was organized to construct under
contract vessels for United States commerce; to control produc-
tion and inspection of work on such vessels ; to provide for new
plants and plant expansion ; to supervise the completion of requi-
sitioned vessels and operate commandeered yards; to purchase,
inspect, and arrange for shipments of shipbuilding materials;
and to adjust all legal questions affecting contracts and labor. 13
In addition to these examples of economic readjustment occa-
sioned by war, the list might be extended to include the organi-
zation and functions of the War Eisk Bureau of the Treasury
Department, through which the government became the largest
insurance company in the world ; 14 the War Trade Board, organ-
ized to regulate imports and exports and to prevent trading with
12 39 Stat. L., 728, 729.
is Emergency Fleet News, February 28, 1918, p. 6.
i* The entire life insurance written by all stock and mutual companies,
and fraternal orders, associations, and societies in the United States during
the year 1917 was about $6,000,000,000. In the first six months of its
operation the War Risk Bureau had written insurance for more than 1,700,-
000 soldiers, sailors, and nurses for a grand total of $14,000,000,000, with
an average valuation of $8,500. The government was several hundred per
cent the largest insurance company. Official Bulletin, April 17, 1918, p. 1.
The first year the bureau handled over 8,000,000 individual applications for
insurance, allotments, and allowances, and it cost the government only
$1,500,000 to write $36,250,000,000 of insurance. Chicago Tribune, Novem-
ber 10, 1918. Between October 6, 1917, and April 1, 1920, the bureau had
written individual policies numbering up to 4,616,598, representing a total
amount of insurance of $40,182,535,500. Premiums between these two
dates amounted to $325,000,000, and the claims payable amounted to
$1,100,000,000. Letter from the Treasury Department, Bureau of War
Bisk Insurance, to the author, April 32, 1920.
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the enemy ; the Finance Corporation, the function of which was
to control the fields of credit and capital issues and prevent too
severe drafts upon the nation's financial resources by unneces-
sary and non-essential expansion of industrial enterprises under
private direction. But sufficient illustrations have been cited to
fulfill our purposes here, namely, to point out that the trend of
industrial reorganization for the stupendous emergency was
characterized by concentration of authority and control, and co-
ordination of administration. Throughout the broad field of
production and distribution of essential war commodities public
regulation supplanted the free operation of the economic law of
supply and demand. That this new policy of concentration of
control, coordination of administration, and extension of govern-
ment regulation was necessary under the circumstances there is
little room for doubt.
2. LABOR PROBLEMS
In the above program of industrial readjustment, however,
there was very slight recognition of the serious labor problems
that ordinarily accompany the condition of forced production
incident to a state of war. Altho the labor problem is not likely
to assume a very different aspect in a time of war from that
which characterizes it in times of normal production, neverthe-
less in a time of war its several elements take on a more serious
and intense character. The difference is not one of kind but of
degree, and this condition calls for more flexible and more ade-
quate machinery of control and adjustment.
A casual glance at the labor situation in the United States dur-
ing the recent crisis will show, we believe, that the labor problem
consisted in : (1) An insufficient supply of workmen, skilled and
unskilled, to meet the increased demand for labor resulting from
the feverish stimulation of production. This labor shortage was
made more acute by virtue of (a) the falling off in immigration
which in normal times had been a primary source of unskilled
workmen, and (b) the unprecedented withdrawal of millions of
workingmen from industry to fill the ranks of the army and
navy. (2) A conspicuously great variation in the scales of wages
paid in different industries in the same territory, and still more
in establishments in different sections of the country. (3) A
great increase in labor turnover, due partly to the economic fac-
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tor of competition among employers for laborers, which resulted
in special wage inducements and consequent labor migration,
and partly to certain socio-economic conditions, such as inade-
quate housing and transportation facilities, that were inevitable
wherever rapid industrial expansion took place. (4) An in-
crease in the volume of industrial unrest due to the usual causes,
namely: the desire of laborers to organize and secure recogni-
tion of the union, the necessity of demanding higher wages to
meet the rapidly rising cost of living, and the growing belief
among workmen that eight hours should constitute a day 's work
and that such work should be performed under safe and sanitary
conditions.
These usual causes were magnified by the realization on the
part of the workingmen that, on account of the shortage of labor,
their efforts were indispensable in the successful conduct of the
war (a condition that makes a state of war an opportune time
for the enforcement of labor's demands), and the prevalence
among laborers of the conviction that employers were making
unjustifiably huge profits out of the unfortunate international
debacle. (5) Bad distribution of the labor supply due to the
absence of adequate governmental machinery for the bringing
together of the jobless man and the manless job, and the transfer
of workers from non-essential to essential industries. (6) A ten-
dency toward decreasing labor efficiency which was due, in part,
to the greater independence of workmen who knew that dis-
charge was unlikely to follow the discovery of "loafing on the
job;" and, in part, to the fact that the higher rates of wages
enabled the men to accumulate sufficient surplus to encourage
idling a day or so each week. (7) A tendency to break down
the legal safeguards built around labor, especially in the case of
women and of children. (8) A spirit of cooperation and soli-
darity among the laboring forces, growing out of the conviction
that labor should be given a larger voice in the control of in-
dustrial conditions and in the determination of the economic and
political policies of the nation.
Granting that the above analysis approximates a fair degree
of accuracy, one can say without fear of exaggeration that the
labor problem was one of the most important that confronted our
government in its industrial reorganization for war. The funda-
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mental role played by labor in the production of war materials
necessitated, as a preliminary step in the execution of the na-
tion's war program, formulation of a definite war labor policy
and the creation of adequate executive, judicial, and administra-
tive machinery for handling whatever exigencies might arise in
the labor situation. A satisfactory war labor program, however,
was not evolved immediately, and there was current much severe
criticism of the government for what was characterized as its
dilatory methods in dealing with this important problem. The
following excerpts from a leading newspaper will suffice to reveal
the nature of this criticism.
Any manufacturer could have told the government that the labor prob-
lems would have to be settled at the outset if our war program was to be
carried on without constant interruption and delay. Far-seeing statesmen,
with the example of England close at hand, could have devised a policy that
would at the same time safeguard the rights of labor and insure maximum
production."
The real trouble is that for ten months, ever since the United States
entered the war, the Government at Washington has had no labor policy, no
central organization for dealing with the infinite variety of labor problems
which have arisen.
Meantime, for lack of a labor policy and of a unified plan of handling
labor problems the situation has grown steadily worse. 1 ^
Such criticism was not confined to the daily press, for many
serious students of the labor problem voiced similar opinions,
and as late as November, 1917, one of these pointed out that : "No
system of general adjustment or governmental control has yet
been put into operation for dealing with strikes which may arise,
indeed have arisen in mines, lumber camps, machine shops, and
factories, where munitions and supplies are being produced for
the conduct of the war. ' ' "
It must not be inferred from these criticisms that the govern-
ment had no labor policy during the early months of the war,
for, through the Department of Labor and its subsidiary bureaus
and certain adjustment commissions, it was doing much to re-
lieve the situation. The difficulty lay in the absence of central-
ized control and coordinated administration in dealing with the
is Chicago Tribune, February 17, 1918.
is Ibid., February 3, 1918.
IT Louis B. Wehle, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. XXXII, (No-
vember, 1917), p. 132.
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labor problem. It will be recalled that in almost every other
important phase of industrial reorganization for war a large de-
gree of concentration and coordination had been effected. "When
the United States entered the war there were only a few govern-
mental agencies authorized to deal with labor matters, and even
these were inadequately prepared to handle the serious labor
problems that followed in the subsequent months. The Depart-
ment of Labor was not in sufficiently intimate touch with the
production departments of the government, such as the Quarter-
master's department and the Ordnance department, to enable
it to render the most efficient service in the emergencies that
arose, and this may have been the cause for the development by
those departments of independent methods for the solution of
their own labor problems.
During the early months of our active participation in the war
the opinion was current in labor circles that too little attention
was being paid to the solution of labor problems incident to the
war, and too little recognition given to the rights of labor in the
determination of policies of economic readjustment. It was the
conclusion of these men that "In order to safeguard all the in-
terests of the wage-earner organized labor should have repre-
sentation on all agencies determining and adjusting policies of
national defense. ' ' 18 Samuel Gompers, president of the Amer-
ican Federation of Labor, was a member of the Advisory Council
and chairman of the Committee on Labor of the Council of Na-
tional Defense, but outside of that it can hardly be said that
labor was given much recognition and representation on the
numerous boards and committees that sprang into existence to
effect our economic reorganization for war. On June 27, 1917,
Mr. Gompers wrote the Council of National Defense relative to
the demands of organized labor for more active participation in
the formulation and administration of important national, state,
and local boards having to do with special war work. Labor de-
sired representation co-equal with all other interests. "These
boards and committees," Mr. Gompers pointed out, "are now
composed entirely of business men . . . who control the
placing and expenditure of millions of the nation 's money. As a
is Eeport of the Proceedings of the Thirty-seventh Annual Convention
of the American Federation of Labor, 1917, p. 77.
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matter of precaution, to prevent any charge of discrimination or
suspicion of scandal, representation of all citizens contributing
to the national fund ought to be on the boards or committees.
War contracts must not be allowed an opportunity for private
gains and the accumulation of war profits. As a matter of jus-
tice and democratic principle representatives of employees as
well as of employers ought to determine national economic
policies.
' ' 19
Little representation had been given to labor in the determina-
tion of policies that involved its own interests, except in the reg-
ulation of conditions in the coal mines. By the middle of No-
vember, 1917, however, labor's demands for representation had
been granted and it was given a place on most of the important
national, state, and local boards that had to do with industrial
reorganization for war.20
Representation of organized labor on the various administra-
tive committees did not solve the complex labor problems that
were rapidly taking form and assuming an increasingly serious
aspect. In fact no adequate substitute had been devised for the
much needed coordinated government policy. This desired co-
ordination was not inaugurated until we had been at war almost
a year. The analysis of labor conditions that finally made im-
perative the creation of adequate administrative machinery, and
the examination of the development of methods and policies of
war labor administration are the tasks outlined in the subse-
quent chapters of this study.
*9 Quoted in the American Labor Year Book, 1917, p. 11.
20 Eeport of the Proceedings of the Thirty-seventh Annual Convention of
the American Federation of Labor, 1917, p. 81.
CHAPTER II
THE ATTITUDE OF AMERICAN LABOR TOWARD
THE WAR
The war labor problem in the United States, the genesis of
which has been suggested in the foregoing pages, was the product
of two major sets of conditions. There were, first, certain economic
and social conditions in American industry which even in normal
times had proved a source of irritation to the laboring class, and
which, under the abnormal circumstances of war-time, assumed
a far more serious aspect. Furthermore, there were many try-
ing economic phenomena arising out of the struggle itself. These
economic and social elements in the labor problem are considered
at greater length in later chapters. We are concerned here
primarily with the second major group of conditions, namely:
the mental reactions of the so called proletariat towards the war.
A brief analysis of this psychic element and its relation to eco-
nomic conditions is necessary as a preliminary step to an exam-
ination and clear understanding of the war labor problem in its
more specific aspects.
The rank and file of the working class did not appear to accept
the outbreak and continuation of the World War with any
degree of equanimity or approval, until strenuous efforts had
been exerted by the various governments in belligerent countries
to justify their participation in the conflict. This was as true
of the United States, whose purpose in entering the war was
heralded as purely unselfish, as it was of the other nations whose
benevolent intentions were less clearly defined. The hostile atti-
tude toward the war which was evidenced among the working
class was due apparently to the dissemination within its ranks
of the socialistic and syndicalistic doctrine that all wars are cap-
italistic in origin and purpose ; that commercial rivalry is the
basic cause, the sine qua, non of international struggles. The
economic and commercial rivalry, which developed pari passu
with colonial expansion among the great powers during the clos-
ing years of the nineteenth and the opening years of the twenti-
28
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eth centuries, had focused the attention of the masses upon the
resultant burdensome expenditure for military and naval arma-
ments, and the outbreak of the World War strengthened this
conviction among the more radical groups in human society. As
the war continued, this belief in the commercial character of all
such conflicts gained adherents, despite espionage and sedition
laws which aimed directly or indirectly at the suppression of all
propaganda likely to embarrass the government's war program.
Autocratic and democratic governments alike faced the necessity
of crushing this revolutionary philosophy which from time to
time was responsible for the interruption of production and even
threatened complete disruption of essential war industries.
In this, as in many other experiences common to the warring
powers, the United States had its share. Our entry into the war
brought to light a decided lack of enthusiasm for the struggle,
especially among the great mass of workers. This indifferent, if
not unfriendly, attitude toward the nation's action was due in
part to the widespread propaganda of enemy agents who with
untiring and insidious efforts sought to paralyze America's war
preparations, and to the dissemination of anti-war philosophy
by sincere adherents of the creeds of socialism and syndicalism
who saw in war the breakdown of internationalism and further
strengthening of the power and authority of the capitalistic class.
There was current, of course, the belief that enemy agents
worked out their plans through these radical groups of interna-
tionalists.
1. THE SOCIALIST PAETY AND THE WAR
The attitude of the so-called radical groups toward the war
was clearly expressed in the declaration by the Socialist Party of
the United States, which reads in part as follows :
The Socialist Party of the United States, in the present grave crisis,
solemnly reaffirms its allegiance to the principle of internationalism and
working-class solidarity the world over, and proclaims its unalterable opposi-
tion to the war just declared by the government of the United States.
Modern wars as a rule have been caused by the commercial and financial
rivalry and intrigues of the capitalist interests in the different countries.
Whether they have been frankly waged as wars of aggression or have been
hypocritically represented as wars of defense, they have always been made
by the classes and fought by the masses. Wars bring wealth and power to
the ruling classes and suffering, death, and demoralization to the workers.
Our entrance into the European war was instigated by the predatory cap-
30 LABOR PROBLEMS AND LABOR ADMINISTRATION [244
italists in the United States who boast of the enormous profit of seven bil-
lion dollars from the manufacture and sale of munitions and war supplies
and from the exportation of American foodstuffs and other necessaries.
We brand the declaration of war by our Government as a crime against
the people of the United States and against the nations of the world.1
In addition to the above, the majority report of the St. Louis
convention recommended, among other things, "Conscious, ac-
tive, and public opposition to the war, through demonstrations,
mass petitions, and all other means within our power."
Altho it is generally conceded that enemy propaganda was
partly responsible for the antagonistic reaction of labor to the
war, a scientific analysis of labor unrest must seek a satisfactory
explanation of labor's state of mind in a complexity of causes.
Doubtless enemy propaganda was one of the basic causes of dis-
ruption of industry, but there was ample evidence of the fact
that unscrupulous employers were overworking this explanation
in an attempt to conceal from the public eye the more funda-
mental and permanent industrial conditions which in the final
analysis constitute the primary cause of industrial conflict in
time of war as in time of peace. One need but examine the situa-
tion in the Arizona copper mines, as analyzed in the report of
the President's Mediation Commission, in order to conclude that
not one but a plurality of causes produced the seeming disloyalty
on the part of the workers.
2 The commission, after an exhaustive
study of labor troubles in western states during the autumn of
1917, concluded that it is to uncorrected specific evils, and the
lack of a healthy spirit between capital and labor due partly to
these evils and partly to an unsound industrial structure, that
we must attribute recent industrial unrest. "Sinister influences
and extremist doctrine may have availed themselves of these con-
ditions
; they certainly have not created them.
' ' 3
In any social analysis of the reaction of the lower strata of in-
dustrial society in America toward the war two conditions must
stantly be kept in mind, namely: the heterogeneous character
of our population, especially in recent decades, and the undesir-
able conditions that for many years past have prevailed in Amer-
1 From the Majority Report adopted at the St. Louis Convention of the
Socialist Party, April 7-14, 1917, and ratified by referendum.
2 See Part II, pp. 154-155.
3 Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 25.
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lean industries. It is a familiar fact that since 1882 approxi-
mately eighty per cent of our immigration has come from south-
ern and eastern Europe, whereas previous to that time fully
eighty per cent of our immigrants came from northern and west-
ern Europe. It has been repeatedly observed that the earlier im-
migration brought to us an intelligent, thrifty, skilled, and home-
seeking group of people, while the latter has brought to us a
heterogeneous mass of illiterate and unskilled persons who differ
radically from us in language, temperament, and economic, polit-
ical, social, and cultural ideals, and who, in a large number of
cases, seek not a permanent home but a source of larger income
which will enable them to return in seeming affluence to the
lands from whence they came. Accustomed to oppression and
unschooled in the responsibilities of democratic citizenship, the
greater measure of freedom proffered by the New World un-
leashes emotions and passions long suppressed and encourages
free expression of vaguely formulated ideas and as vaguely com-
prehended ideals. To expect unified patriotic reaction from this
differentiated racial and linguistic composition is to look for the
impossible in social and psychic phenomena, and such loyalty
was not readily forthcoming during the war. The immigrant is
not wholly to blame for his lack of devotion to American insti-
tutions, for a definite plan of Americanization of aliens is as yet
only in its infancy. We have been content to exploit him for
economic and political ends. In our industries he has been called
by a number, and in our community life he has been nothing
more than a "dago" or a "hunkie."
Equally responsible for the absence of a desirable patriotic
reaction among the masses were the conditions of employment in
American industries which, altho better than industrial condi-
tions in many foreign countries, still are far removed from that
state of perfection of which the immigrant dreams as he turns
his face westward to the land of wealth and affluence in the New
World. There is much room for improvement in our industrial
conditions, and it is not strange that a vast number of our work-
ers found little cause for that loyalty which a land of real democ-
racy should inspire. A glance at brief statistical data will
make plain what is meant. A Chicago slaughter-house in 1912
paid eighty-two per cent of its workers less than twenty cents an
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hour, and the average working week consisted of thirty-seven and
one-half hours. Fifty-five per cent of the men received a weekly
wage of $6.37. In the steel industry in the United States in 1910
twenty-nine per cent of the employees worked a seven-day week
with a twelve-hour day, and forty-three per cent worked a
twelve-hour day for six days a week. About fifty per cent of the
workers unskilled received less than eighteen cents an hour.
Eight per cent of the workers earned less than fourteen cents an
hour, and twenty per cent lass than sixteen cents an hour. In
the same year (1910) not one of the twelve basic American in-
dustries paid the average head of a family within one hundred
dollars a year of the minimum required for family subsistence,
and two-thirds of the twelve paid the heads of families less than
$550 a year. Half of the wage workers' families in the United
States had in 1916 an income below the requirements for sub-
sistence.4
For some years much has been said of the unequal distribu-
tion of wealth in America, and the workers, knowing the facts
regarding this inequality, have often listened eagerly to social-
istic and syndicalistic reformers. The United States Commission
on Industrial Relations observed: "The conviction that the
wealth of the country and the income which is produced through
the toil of the workers is distributed without regard to any stand-
ard of justice is as widespread as it is deep-seated. It is found
among all classes of workers and takes every form from the dumb
resentment of the day laborer who, at the end of a week's back-
breaking toil, finds that he has less than enough to feed his fam-
ily while others who have done nothing live in ease, to the
elaborate philosophy of the 'soap-box' orator who can quote sta-
tistics unendingly to demonstrate his contentions. At bottom,
tho, there is the one fundamental, controlling idea that income
should be received for service and for service only, whereas, in
fact, it bears no such relation, and he who serves least, or not at
all, may receive most. ' ' * Among the highest paid workers such
as the railroad engineers and conductors, glass blowers, certain
steel mill employees, and those engaged in a few of the building
trades there has been an approach to a living wage, but this is
not true of millions in other occupations. The same investiga-
4 Parker, Carlton H., Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 120, pp. 659, 660.
8 Final Eeport of the Commission on Industrial Relations, 1916, p. 30.
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tion showed that from one-fourth to one-third of the male work-
ers eighteen years of age and over, in factories and mines, were
earning less than $10 a week; two-thirds to three-fourths were
earning less than $15 a week; and only about one-tenth were
earning more than $20 a week. Lost time for any cause was not
considered in these figures. From two-thirds to three-fourths of
the women workers in factories, stores, and laundries, and in in-
dustrial occupations generally were working at wages of less
than $8 a week; approximately one-fifth earned less than $4 a
week; and nearly one-half received less than $6 a week. Even
more unsatisfactory were the earnings of children.6
An examination of the income tax returns for ten months of
1914 showed that there were in the United States at that time,
1,598 fortunes yielding an income of $100,000 or more a year;
that there were 44 families with incomes of $1,000,000 or more,
whose members perform little or no service but whose aggregate
incomes, totalling at least $50,000,000 a year, were equal to the
earnings of 100,000 wage earners at the average of $500. 7 Sta-
tistics of income for the calendar year 1917 issued by the United
States Treasury Department, Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
throw further light upon the subject of incomes in this country.
The following is a simple summary of the findings of the depart-
ment : 8
Income classes Simple distribution
Number in Per cent,
each class of total
,640,758 47.25
838,707 24.16
560,763 16.15
270,666 7.79
112,502 3.22
30,391 .87
12,439 .35
3,302 .10
2,347 .07
559 .02
315 .013
141 .007
Total 3,472,890 100.00
e Ibid., pp. 31, 32.
Ibid., p. 32.
s Statistics of Income, 1917, Treasury Department, Commissioner of In-
ternal Eevenue, 1919.
i 1,000 to 3
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Comparing the statistics of the above summary for 1917 with
the data for ten months of 1914, it is seen that whereas in
the 1914 period there were 44 families with incomes of
$1,000,000 or more, the number of persons who received incomes
of that size in 1917 totalled 141, an increase of about 320 per
cent. The statistics for 1917 indicate that in that year there
were 6,664 persons receiving incomes of $100,000 or more, of
whom 3,302 were receiving incomes of $100,000 to $150,000 and
2,347 were receiving incomes of $150,000 to $300,000.
Professor W. I. King has estimated that the poorest class of
our population (those who possess little or no property except
furniture, clothing, and personal belongings) constitute sixty-
five per cent of the people and own only about five per cent of the
wealth; the middle class, who constitute thirty-three per cent of
the people, own thirty-five per cent of the wealth ; the rich, who
constitute two per cent of the population, own sixty per cent of
the wealth. Professor King divides the middle class into the
lower middle class or those having perhaps a thousand dollars
worth of property, and the upper middle class or those having
from $2,000 to $40,000 worth of property. The rich he classi-
fies as those who have wealth amounting to $50,000 or more. 9
These figures imply that less than 2,000,000 people own twenty
per cent more of the nation's wealth than all the other 98,000,-
000. The largest private fortune in the United States is esti-
mated at $1,000,000,000, which is equivalent to the aggregate
9 See King, W. I., The Wealth and Income of the People of the United
States, 1915, Chapter v.
Dr. King's conclusions (which have been frequently quoted) are based on
data as to the value of estates probated in Massachusetts and six counties
in the southern part of Wisconsin for certain years. The assumption is
made that conditions in these states are typical for the whole of the United
States; and as there are no records for from two-thirds to three-fourths of
the men dying, a round sum is assumed as the average for this large pro-
portion of the total number taken into consideration. How far estimates
which depend on assumptions of this kind may be taken as clearly indicative
of actual conditions may be open to serious question. The census estimates
of wealth indicate that the average wealth per family in Massachusetts has
been a good deal more than for the United States as a whole, and more
than is indicated by Dr. King's data. It is also probable that residents of
Massachusetts own a considerable amount of property in other states, which
is not taken into account in the census statistics, and would increase further
the total and average wealth of Massachusetts residents.
249] ATTITUDE OF AMERICAN LABOR TOWARD THE WAR 35
wealth of 2,500,000 of the so called "poor" class, who own on
the average about $400 each.10
In presenting statistics of income and wealth it is necessary to
warn the reader that as yet we have in this country no adequate
and satisfactory method of measuring accurately the distribution
of wealth, and data so presented must be looked upon as esti-
mates rather than as exact determinations.
Government statistics of income, however, show that wealth
tends to concentrate in the hands of a few. Excessive profits
during the war increased both the bulk and the number of large
fortunes. Sufficiently reliable statistical data concerning wealth
and income are available to warrant the conclusion of a close
student of the labor problem that: "It is a conventional eco-
nomic truism that American industrialism is guaranteeing to
some half of the forty millions of our industrial population a life
of such limited happiness, of such restrictions of personal devel-
opment, and of such misery and desolation when sickness or acci-
dent comes, that we would be childish political scientists not to
see that from such an environment little self-sacrificing love of
country, little ethics, little of gratitude could come."
1X
Modern behavioristic psychology, in its analysis of the peculiar
state of mind evidenced by seemingly irresponsible individuals
who accept eagerly the class philosophy of such social groups as
the Industrial Workers of the World, cannot fail to discover a
basic causal relationship between the economic conditions de-
scribed above and the spread of radicalism. We do not mean to
imply that these anti-social traits have no basis whatsoever in
the hereditary equipment of the individual. It is generally rec-
ognized by modern social psychologists that many persons are by
virtue of temperament susceptible to suggestions of any form of
radicalism and anti-social philosophy and activity. This state of
mind can be explained partly in terms of hereditary character-
istics, but it would seem that its explanation must be sought
more in the social, economic, and political environment in which
it is manifested than in peculiar physical processes of metabol-
ism. Brief consideration of the quantitative character of the
common labor groups in American industry will give a little dif-
ferent approach to the psychosis of the mass of workers in rela-
10 Final Report of the Commission on Industrial Relations, 1916, p. 33.
11 Parker, Carlton H., Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 120, p. 662.
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tion to their reaction to a national emergency like the recent war.
It has been estimated that in 1910, of the 30,091,564 male
workers in the United States who were listed as breadwinners,
approximately 10,400,000 were engaged in that unskilled labor
from which is recruited the migratory class that swell the ranks
of the Industrial Workers of the World.12 It is further esti-
mated, moreover, that of about 35,000,000 men, women, and chil-
dren engaged in gainful occupations,13 13,000,000 are engaged in
occupations that lend themselves to the formation of trades-
unions
;
that of these 13,000,000 approximately 3,000,000 are or-
ganized, leaving about 10,000,000 outside the pale of trades-
unionism. 14 It is not so difficult to understand the absence of
patriotism and a profound sense of loyalty on the part of these
millions of workers when one recalls that they constitute the
nation's uneducated and unskilled labor whose wages often fail
to guarantee even the requirements of subsistence, whose hours
and conditions of employment do not conduce to health and effi-
ciency, and who are forced to accept these wages, hours, and con-
ditions because of ignorance of the labor market, lack of intelli-
gent leadership, and the disastrous competition arising out of
the actual or potential supply of their own kind which has made
successful organization and collective bargaining impossible.
Compelled to bargain individually with the employer this mass
of unskilled workers has suffered the inevitable consequences
injustice and exploitation.
Here, then, was fertile soil for the seed of radicalism a
group of minds representing every nationality and temperament
in the melting pot, susceptible to the concept that war is born of
commercialism and is designed to make cannon fodder of the
masses and idle rich of the bourgeoisie. It was not strange that
these people, so well acquainted with the sinister power of what
they term industrial autocracy, should see in war no rainbow of
promise for the oppressed proletariat of the world. To teach
them the deeper significance of the great struggle between autoc-
12 Parker, Carlton H., Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 120, p. 659.
is Most estimates put the total number of gainfully employed persons at
40,000,000. The number of organized workers in the United States today
is probably nearer 5,000,000 than 3,000,000.
i* Secretary of Labor Wilson, United States Employment Service Bul-
letin, July 31, 1918, p. 6.
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racy and democracy, between the philosophy of "Might is
Eight" and the principle that right makes might was no simple
task. The task was the more difficult because the masses were
less interested in political democracy than in industrial democ-
racy, and because the overthrow of the political autocracy was
of far less importance to them than the banishment of industrial
autocracy. They did not hesitate to point out that even in dem-
ocratic America there is a foe more dangerous to the proletariat
than the Kaiserism of Potsdam ever could be industrial des-
potism. The only war in which they are interested is a class
war, and for them that war will continue regardless of the form
of political government, until international industrialism is
established and the proletariat succeed the capitalistic class in
the ownership and control of the instruments of production. 15
To fulfill successfully its great part in the war the United
States needed the full cooperation of the skilled and the un-
skilled workers. The possibility of enlisting their support was
decidedly remote, however, so long as there was prevalent among
them the idea which was not without some foundation that
the war was being made a pretext for widespread profiteering
and was producing enormous profits for business enterprisers.
To counteract the anti-war philosophy and to enlist the workers
'
cooperation the government found it necessary to place before
them the fundamental issues of the war. Speaking of this matter
sixteen months after we had entered the conflict, Secretary of
Labor Wilson stated that : ' ' one of the first things we had to deal
with . . . was to change that attitude of mind [that all
wars are capitalistic in character] on the part of the wage-work-
ers of the country, first through the great leaders of the trades-
union movement, and then to the rank and file. . . We had
to carry that story to these people through the West, the Middle
West, the Far West, and the Pacific Coast in order to offset
the philosophy that they [the I. W. W. leaders] were preach-
ing." 16
!5 See the preamble to the Constitution of the Industrial Workers of the
World; the Manifesto of the Socialist Party, 1919; the Manifesto and Pro-
gram of the Communist Party of America, 1919; and the Program of the
Communist Labor Party of the United States, 1919.
16 U. S. Employment Service Bulletin, July 31, 1918, p. 6.
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2. LABOR AND PRODUCTION
As a result of the radical ideas that were permeating the ranks
of labor, and of certain undesirable conditions of employment,
the production of essential war supplies was repeatedly inter-
rupted. At a conference of shipbuilders and shipworkers called
by the National Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board in Phila-
delphia several months after we entered the war, a representa-
tive of a large shipbuilding company stated that the men were
loafing in the yards ; that his company was five months behind in
turning out government contracts because the men would not
work. The only solution he thought was for the government to
give the shipyards military protection to serve, of course, as a sort
of vis a tergo. To this suggestion of military aid a representative
of labor retorted that we are not living in Russia.
17 This crit-
icism of labor inefficiency was merely the echo of the general
denunciation of labor voiced in newspapers and trade journals.
It was said that the workmen remained at their jobs for a six
day period or only long enough to accumulate sufficient amounts
to enable them to idle for extended periods, and that the ten
per cent bonus paid under the authority of the United States
Shipping Board to men working six days a week was, therefore,
not producing the desired results.18 Labor's policies and meth-
ods were considered the greatest menace in the country 19 and,
due to the insistence of the unions in taking advantage of the
situation to urge an eight-hour day "and other measures calcu-
lated to reduce rather than increase the output,
' ' the weekly per
capita production of skilled labor was said to have steadily de-
clined following our entry into the war.
20
The above criticisms of labor 's policies in war-time were voiced
by representatives of the employing class who may have unduly
denounced labor's methods and policies. For this reason some
may question the validity of their attacks upon labor. But even
impartial observers of the labor situation during the early
months of the war concluded that the spread of strikes and gen-
eral industrial unrest was embarrassing to the cause which the
IT iron Age, Vol. 101 (No. 3), p. 235.
is/fetd., Vol. 101 (No. 5), pp. 332, 333.
is IUd., Vol. 101 (No. 8), p. 496.
20 /bid., Vol. 101 (No. 5), pp. 359, 360.
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nation had championed. The President 's Mediation Commission,
whose work is described in detail elsewhere in this study, 21 in its
investigation of the labor situation in the West during the early
months of our active participation in the war found that effective
conduct of the nation's war program was suffering needlessly
because of: (1) interruption of work due to actual or threatened
strikes; (2) purposed decrease in efficiency through the "strike
on the job;" (3) decrease in efficiency due to labor unrest; and
(4) dislocation of the labor supply.
22 The commission, however,
attributed the disruption of production, not to any wilful dis-
loyalty or un-Americanism on the part of labor, but to very seri-
ous and fundamental and unremedied but remedial defects in
our industrial system. There is no reliable statistical proof of
conscious inefficiency on the part of labor during the war, but
personal observation of industrial and construction work, espe-
cially in the construction of army cantonments, indicated that
"soldiering on the job" was a common practice.
Whatever the cause whether conscious disloyalty on the
part of labor, or certain fundamental deficiencies in our indus-
trial organization the fact remained that the nation's war
work was being retarded, if not disrupted, because of labor diffi-
culties. The declaration of war seemed a signal for a general
presentation of labor 's demands for shorter hours, higher wages,
recognition of the union, better condition of labor, etc. At one
time railroad employees filed with the Railroad Wage Commis-
sion a demand for increased wages aggregating $500,000,000, or
about one-half of the operating income received by the roads in
the fiscal year 1917, and this involved increases for the various
groups of laborers of from twenty to sixty per cent.
23 The effi-
ciency of the shipyard employees of the country was said to have
been reduced about thirty or fifty per cent because of purposeful
idling.
24 Strikes had become so general and menacing that early
in March, 1918, a bill was introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives making it a crime for workmen to conspire to prevent
the production of war materials, thus forbidding strikes in muni-
tion plants. This measure was passed by a vote of 255 to 50,
21 See Part II, pp. 150-155.
22 Official Bulletin, February 11, 1918, p. 14.
23 Iron Age, Vol. 101, (No. 6) p. 392.
24 Ibid., Vol. 101, (No. 7) p. 450.
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but later proved unacceptable because of certain amendments
insisted on by labor advocates which made it a feeble instrument
in suppressing strikes. However, a bill known as the Sabotage
Act, entitled "An Act to punish the wilful injury or destruc-
tion of war materials, or of war premises and for other purposes
' '
was signed by the President on April 23, 1918. Like the previ-
ous measure this Act imposed a maximum fine of $10,000 or im-
prisonment of not more than thirty years, or both, for wilful
injury or destruction of war material, war industries, or war
utilities. 25 According to the Department of Justice, this was
the most important and sweeping of all war statutes relative to
hostile or anti-war activities. 26 Many other measures were intro-
duced and some were passed which were designed directly or in-
directly to prevent industrial violence and syndicalistic propa-
ganda.
Among the important measures designed to prevent the spread
of disloyalty, one which organized labor feared might be aimed
indirectly at its several functions was Senate Bill 4471 intro-
duced by Senator Walsh of Montana, on May 2, 1918, and passed
by the Senate on May 6, 1918. 27 It declared unlawful associa-
tions purposing by physical force, violence, or injury to bring
about any governmental, social, industrial, or economic change
in the United States, and prescribed punishment for persons
engaged in the activities of such associations, and for other pur-
poses. The measure provided that any association, organization,
society, or corporation, one of whose purposes or professed pur-
poses was to bring about any governmental, social, industrial, or
economic changes within the United States by the use, without
authority of law, of force, violence or physical injury to person
or property or threats of such injury to accomplish such change
for any other purpose, and which, during any war in which the
United States is engaged, should by any means prosecute or
pursue such purpose or professed purpose, or should teach, advo-
cate, advise, or defend the same, should be declared to be an
unlawful association. Any persons who acted or professed to
act as officers or representatives of such association, or wrote,
25 Public No. 106, 65th Congress, second session,
ze Official Bulletin, April 26, 1918, p. 3.
27 Eeport of the Proceedings of the Thirty-eighth Annual Convention of
the American Federation of Labor, 1918, pp. 121, 122.
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published, or spoke anything in defense thereof, or who contrib-
uted anything as dues or otherwise should be punished by im-
prisonment for not more than ten years or by a fine of not more
than $5,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Even a
person who granted use of premises for assemblage of persons
who planned any governmental, social, industrial, or economic
change was to be punished by imprisonment of not more than
one year, or a fine of not more than $500, or both.
The sponsor of the above measure took care to explain that it
was not intended in anywise to affect the legitimate organization
of labor.28 The formulation of the measure, however, was doubt-
less aimed at the organization and activities of the Industrial
Workers of the World, the Nonpartisan League, and similar
organizations which were decidedly active in the State of Mon-
tana the home of Senator Walsh and other western states.
About that time the hanging of Frank Little, a labor agitator in
Butte, Montana, caused some consternation in the ranks of
American labor, and led to many demonstrations against the re-
vival of the
"illegal, coercive" methods of the Vigilantes and
Loyalty Leagues.
3. LABOR CONSCRIPTION PROPOSED
A member of the British Labor Commission which visited the
United States in 1917 stated that if there had been one-eighth of
the labor troubles in Great Britain that were current in the
United States, his country would have been forced to conclude a
disgraceful peace with Germany.29 That the magnitude of labor
unrest in this country commanded the attention not only of for-
eign observers but of our own statesmen and government is
evidenced both by legislation designed to remove any conditions
likely to embarrass our war program, and by widespread agita-
tion for labor conscription. The almost incessant stream of
strikes and the prevalence of sabotage propaganda led to a de-
mand by employers and politicians, and quite generally by the
press, for legislation providing for conscription of labor during
the period of the war. Among the ardent supporters of labor
conscription were Senators Sherman of Illinois, Nelson of Min-
28
Ibid., p. 122.
29 Quoted by Senator Nelson at a meeting of the Senate Commerce Com-
mittee, December 26, 1917. Chicago Tribune, December 27, 1918.
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nesota, Bankhead of Alabama, Smoot of Utah, and Fall of New
Mexico. These statesmen predicted that conscription of labor
would be effected in the United States before the war ended;
that if conscription of labor was not provided for by law it must
be done as a military measure ; otherwise the United States would
go down to defeat in the war and our boasted liberty would
amount to nothing.30
The essence of the argument advanced by labor conscription-
ists was that conscription of labor constitutes no greater viola-
tion of individual rights than does compulsory military service
under the selective draft law. To this contention admittedly
having some logical basis those who opposed it retorted that
conscription of labor must be accompanied by a similar conscrip-
tion of wealth.
From a complexity of causes, including the absence of a well
defined governmental war labor policy, the labor situation was
assuming a very serious aspect, but those persons who were
directly responsible for the execution of the nation's production
program were not favorably impressed with the suggestion for
labor conscription. Their attitude was based on : first, the posi-
tion that conscription of labor would logically necessitate a sim-
ilar conscription of wealth; and, second, the ground that com-
pulsory drafting of workers would be inexpedient and imprac-
ticable, for it would arouse the resentment of the labor forces
and result in marked decrease in labor efficiency, if not in open
rebellion. Mr. Kaymond B. Stevens, vice-chairman of the United
States Shipping Board and treasurer of the Emergency Fleet
Corporation, stated to the members of the Senate Commerce
Committee at its meeting on December 26, 1917, that altho the
corporation would soon need 300,000 additional laborers to com-
plete its program during 1918, he was sure that American labor
would do more for the country if it were not coerced than it
would
"wjth a bayonet at its back," for the latter policy would
instigate a general uprising of labor.
31 The chairman of the
Shipping Board, Mr. Edward N. Hurley, a few months later
March 26, 1918 in his address before the National Marine
League at New York, expressed a similar opinion,32 and a like
so Chicago Tribune, April 12, 1918.
31 Ibid., December 27, 1917.
32 Official Bulletin, March 27, 1918, p. 13.
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position with regard to labor conscription was voiced by Secre-
tary of the Navy Daniels in his address before the American
Alliance for Labor and Democracy at New York, February 22,
1918.33
Regarding the labor troubles that confronted the nation and
the proposal for labor conscription, Secretary of Labor Wilson
in his annual report stated the following :
With the coming of the war, traditional cleavages between employers and
wage earners were accentuated. The Department is of course aware of pro-
posals, more popular earlier in the war than now, to settle labor disputes by
coercing wage earners. But these proposals are both unfair and imprac-
ticable. They are also widely regarded, and not without reason, as unpatri-
otic. It is enough to say of them here that in the view of this Department
public sentiment cannot be expected to tolerate conscription of labor for
private profit. Should industrial conscription become really necessary in
order effectively to prosecute the war, a policy less likely to be considered
one-sided would be desirable. It would seem that is, if workers were to
be conscripted for industrial purposes that the working opportunities to
which they were assigned ought to be commandeered, so as to make such
workers not coerced servants but employees of the Government itself.
There is, howeveer, no reason for apprehending a necessity for any kind
of labor conscription in order to settle or prevent disputes between em-
ployers and their employees which may interfere with a vigorous prosecu-
tion of the war.s*
The unmistakable opposition of leading government officials
to the plan for conscription of labor, together with the united
resentment of the leaders and the rank and file of labor proved
sufficient barriers to its adoption, and most of the agitation for
legislation along these lines died as rapidly as it had been born,
altho there were many persons in private and in public life who
still cherished the conviction that such a policy was necessary
and just.
4. THE LOYALTY OF LABOR
The general impression one receives from reading the facts
and opinions presented in the preceding pages would seem to be
that labor's loyalty in the war was of an uncertain if not ques-
tionable nature. Thus far the case appears to have been against
labor. Can nothing be said in defense of the loyalty of that
conspicuous majority of labor leaders and workers who, ostensi-
bly at least, constitute the more conservative elements in our
ss Ibid., February 25, 1918, p. 7.
3< Fifth Annual Seport of the Secretary of Labor, 1917, p. 159.
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laboring population? Here we shall have to examine the opin-
ions and activities of these men, verifying them wherever pos-
sible with data and observations from unprejudiced sources.
To the student of social philosophy one of the most interesting
phenomena of the war was that during the war a change of atti-
tude was evidenced by many recognized leaders of labor, both
radical and conservative. This changed point of view took place
among many exponents of proletarian interests in every bellig-
erent country. Not a few leaders in the thought and activity
of the Socialist party in every country deserted the pacific posi-
tion of pre-war days and vowed unquestioned loyalty to their
respective governments. The Socialists of Germany were fre-
quently accused of alliance with the autocratic defenders of the
former economic and political systems, and many of the Socialist
leaders of France and Great Britain supported their respective
governments in the prosecution of the war. Abundant evidence
exists of the validity of the observation made in a recent his-
torical analysis that : "The Radicals and Unified Socialists rallied
to the support of the government with the other parties and
France presented a united front to the invader," while in Ger-
many :
' ' The Socialists rallied to the support of the government,
and in deeper patriotism sloughed off the superficial interna-
tionalism they were so fond of professing.
' ' 35
In the United States, pacifists like Clarence Darrow and social-
ists like Upton Sinclair, John Spargo, J. G. Phelps Stokes, and
William English Walling grew militant against the jungle phil-
osophy and activities of Prussianism. It is not to be implied, of
course, that these leaders of the more radical elements of society
abandoned permanently their opposition to war as a method of
settling international disputes. The truth seems to be that they,
like many others, found in this war a justifiable basis for the use
of force to crush the enemies of democracy and justice. Fur-
thermore, many recognized leaders, like Bertrand Russell, in Eng-
land, Romaine Rolland in France, Karl Liebknecht in Germany,
Hillquit, Debs, Berger, and Germer in the United States did not
abandon their opposition to the war.
Outside of the Industrial Workers of the World and the faith-
ful Socialists who never retrenched from their antagonism to the
war, the officials and mass of the more conservative organiza-
35 Holt and Chilton, European History, 1862-1914, pp. 523, 524, 529.
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tions of labor in the United States claimed indisputable loyalty to
the government in the great emergency, and contended that the
disruption of industry was due either to enemy agents or to the
radical anti-war philosophy of the American syndicalists and
socialists. In an attempt to ascertain the nature of the reaction
of American labor to the war a personal inquiry was sent to rec-
ognized labor leaders who are in close touch with the mental atti-
tudes of the rank and file of labor. Without a single exception
the answers expressed the belief, supported with data on liberty
loan investments and other manifestations of war support, that
American labor was unquestionably loyal throughout the war.
The following excerpt from these replies is characteristic of
them all : ' ' There is no question that organized labor has been
loyal to the Government and to our country in the present war.
As a matter of fact the representatives of organized labor on
March 12, 1917, nearly a month before we were declared to be
in a state of war with Germany, met in Washington and declared
their purpose to stand squarely in back of our Government if we
were drawn into the European War." 36 From every state in
the Union similar expressions of labor's loyalty were received. 37
Samuel Gompers, chairman of the Committee on Labor of the
Council of National Defense, as President of the American Fed-
eration of Labor called a special meeting of the executive council
of the Federation for March 9, 1917, and also convened a gen-
eral labor conference at Washington on March 12, 1917, to con-
sider labor's attitude toward the war. At this conference, be-
sides the executive council of the American Federation of Labor,
there were present one hundred and forty-eight representatives
of seventy-nine affiliated national and international unions, five
unaffiliated organizations, and the five departments of the Amer-
ican Federation of Labor. Foremost among the resolutions
adopted at the conference were the following :
We, the officers of the national and international trade-unions of Amer-
ica, in national conference assembled in the Capital of our Nation, hereby
pledge ourselves in peace and in war, in stress and storm, to stand unre-
36 Perkins, G. W., International President Cigar Makers International
Union of America, in a personal letter to the author, April 19, 1918.
37 Statements of liberty bond investments and other financial aid to the
government made by the unions are not printed here, being considered con-
fidential. For statistical evidence of labor's patriotism see the Illinois Blue
Book, and similar records for other states.
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servedly by the standards of liberty and the safety and preservation of the
institutions and ideals of our Republic. . . We, with these ideals of lib-
erty and justice herein declared as the indispensable basis for national pol-
icies, offer our services to our country in every field of activity to defend,
safeguard, and preserve the Republic of the United States of America
against its enemies, whomsoever they may be, and we call upon our fellow
workers and fellow citizens in the holy name of labor, justice, freedom, and
humanity, to devotedly and patriotically give like service.38
Many persons, not in any way connected with trades-unionism,
voiced unqualified endorsement of the loyal attitude of organ-
ized labor in America. For instance, Mr. W. A. Appleton, an
Englishman who made an extensive tour of 9,000 miles in the
United States subsequent to our entry into the war, observed that
while here and there among both employers and employed in-
dividuals were making trouble, the vast majority of the employ-
ers, as the vast majority of workers, realized the nation's need
and each was doing his share to meet it without thought of per-
sonal advantage.
39 Edward N. Hurley, chairman of the United
States Shipping Board, was convinced that the majority of
laborers in the shipbuilding industry were patriotic and, with
only one exception, the leaders of the shipyard crafts generally
had shown a spirit of cooperation,
' '
ready to sink their personal
differences in the common pool of patriotism.
' ' * Like observa-
tions were made by Secretary of the Navy Daniels 41 and Presi-
dent Wilson. The President, in his letter to William L. Hutch-
ison, General President of the Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, when the latter called a general strike in the
shipyards, said :
' ' The strike of the carpenters in the shipyards
is a marked and painful contrast to the action of labor in other
trades and places.
' ' 42
An examination of the official and newspaper reports of na-
tional, state, and local conventions and assemblies of trades-
unions revealed a marked support of the government in the war.
There were some exceptions, as pointed out above, but leaders
and the rank and file of organized labor rendered patriotic ser-
vice to the country. In the 1917 and 1918 conventions of the
as First Annual Report of the Council of National Defense, 1917, p. 74.
SB Chicago Sunday Tribune, June 9, 1918.
Official Bulletin, March 27, 1918, p. 13.
4i Ibid., February 25, 1918, p. 7.
^
42 Ibid., February 16, 1918, p. 1.
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American Federation of Labor resolutions were adopted pledg-
ing full cooperation with the government in the successful pros-
ecution of the war. The keynote of both conventions was one of
indisputable loyalty.
43 Samuel Gompers and other recognized
leaders of labor proved of invaluable service to the nation in
stimulating loyalty in the ranks. Regarding the general strike
which was to voice labor's protest against the decision in the
famous Mooney case in California, Mr. Gompers emphatically
declared that "such an attempt either to invite or order a local
or general strike is unjustifiable and dangerously prejudicial to
the lives of our sons and brothers fighting in France for the
safety of the home, freedom, and democracy the world over.
' ' *4
Further evidence of labor's support of the nation was uncov-
ered shortly after we declared war. In May, 1917, a convention
was called in New York by the so called Workingmen's Council
to consider protection of labor's interests during the war. This
Council was manifestly a branch of the People's Council, an
organization that seemed to be under the domination of forces
not in harmony with the government and the policy declared by
the authorized representatives of the people in the war. Aided
by the foreign press, whose policies and activities were to fur-
ther the interests of the enemies of western democracy, this
Council disseminated discord and anti-war propaganda, and in
this instance sought to incite unrest among the laborers of New
York City. President Gompers met the Central Federated
Union of New York City and exposed the danger of sending dele-
gates to the convention called by the Workingmen's Council.
The Union disapproved of the convention and formed what be-
came known as the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy.
As the activities of the "Workingmen's Council were carried to
other states in the mission of creating unrest, so the American
Alliance heralded throughout the nation its simple declaration
that:
It is the sense of this conference that it is the duty of all the people of
the United States, without regard to class, nationality, politics or religion,
43 See Proceedings of the Thirty-seventh Annual Convention of the Amer-
ican Federation of Labor, 1917, pp. 318, 319, and the same for the Thirty-
eighth Annual Convention, 1918, pp. 86, 87.
4* Chicago Tribune, April 23, 1918. See also American Labor and the
War, by Samuel Gompers.
48 LABOR PROBLEMS AND LABOR ADMINISTRATION [262
faithfully and loyally to support the government of the United States in
carrying the present war for justice, freedom, and democracy to a tri-
umphant conclusion, and we pledge ourselves to every honorable effort for
the accomplishment of that purpose.45
To thwart the insidious efforts of enemy forces, the Alliance
held a conference at Minneapolis in September, 1917. Among
the many declarations of the conference was the following :
The Americal Alliance of Labor and Democracy, in its first national con-
ference, declares its unswerving adherence to the cause of democracy, now
assailed by the forces of autocracy and militarism. As labor unionists,
social reformers, and socialists, we pledge our loyal support and service to
the United States government and its allies in the present world conflict.
We declare that the one overshadowing issue is the preservation of democ-
racy; either democracy will endure and men will be free, or autocracy will
triumph and the race will be enslaved. . . We declare that the great
war must be fought to a decisive result; that until autocracy is defeated
there can be no hope of an honorable peace, and that to compromise the
issue is only to sow the seed for bloodier and more devastating wars in the
future.*6
It should not be inferred from the above evidence that conser-
vative unionism was always in complete agreement with the pol-
icies of the government, or that it at no time or place committed
acts prejudicial to the national welfare. The legislative com-
mittee of the American Federation of Labor appeared before the
Military Affairs committees of the House of Representatives and
of the Senate and ' ' vigorously opposed the adoption of the law
which carried with it conscription of men for military service,"
and Mr. Gompers addressed a communication to those committees
stating that the labor movement stands firmly by the voluntary
principle and urging the rejection of conscription.47 When mil-
itary conscription was embodied in law, however, the American
Federation of Labor seems not to have said or done anything to
hinder its enforcement. That numerous strikes, even by so-called
conservative unions, frequently endangered the nation 's war pro-
gram will be seen from facts recorded in the following pages.
In general, however, it can be said that American labor showed
decided loyalty to the government during the great war, and
that wherever and whenever it became violent or restive there
45 Report of the Proceedings of the Thirty-seventh Annual Convention of
the American Federation of Labor, 1917, p. 95.
46 Ibid., p. 98.
47 Ibid., p. 112.
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appears to have been industrial or larger economic conditions
operating as an unmistakable cause of seeming disloyalty. We
do not mean to imply that labor was at all times patriotic, for
an examination of industrial disputes will show that labor was
often guilty of conscious interruption of work with a view to
forcing acceptance of demands not always justified in the light
of prevailing conditions of employment. The evidence which we
have been able to gather, however, warrants the conclusion that,
while many socialistic and syndicalistic adherents unreservedly
opposed our participation in the war and hindered the nation's
war program whenever possible, the vast majority of American
labor supported the government without reservation, and any
charges of general disloyalty were as unfounded as they were
vicious.
CHAPTER III
LABOR CONDITIONS IN RELATION TO PRODUCTION
In the preceding pages we have tried to show that: (1) the
economic reorganization occasioned by the great war was char-
acterized by centralization of control and coordination of admin-
istration, but that such centralization and coordination were not
characteristic of our methods in dealing with the labor problem
until almost a year after we had been at war; and (2) that the
anti-war reaction on the part of a large number of workers was
due to a complexity of causes, chief among which were the spread
of enemy propaganda, the dissemination of the anti-war phil-
osophy of radical forces, and certain economic conditions in
American industries. We attempted to point out in this regard
that an examination of the evidence led to the conclusion that
the conservative workers and labor leaders of the United States
were generally loyal to the government, altho there were many
exceptions. In the remainder of Part I of this study it is our
purpose to examine the elements in the labor problem and to
analyze the causes of industrial unrest during the war period.
The nature of the labor problem in the United States during
the recent war was not very different from what it has always
been in normal times. We say "not very different" advisedly,
for there were some elements in the war labor situation which
were uncommon. The war, as novel in many respects as it was
great, gave rise to innumerable strange situations and readjust-
ments in the economic, social, and political life of participating
nations, and had a marked effect upon industrial relations which
constitute, in the final analysis, the labor problem. Perhaps no
other war has done so much to strengthen the position of the
world 's common laborers and to promote the feeling of solidarity.
Moreover, the indispensability of labor in the protection of na-
tional welfare and in the execution of a national program was
never more fully realized. The other aspects of the problem in
the recent period were the usual ones greatly magnified, due to
50
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the extraordinary economic and social conditions incident to the
war. These familiar elements were the struggle for higher
wages, better conditions of employment, shorter hours, demands
for recognition of the union, and the establishment of other in-
dustrial relations in keeping with the rights and conducive to
the dignity of labor. But in its demands labor was more in-
sistent than ever before. These causes of labor unrest are dis-
cussed in a later chapter. Before examining the conditions that
were conducive to friction in industrial relations, it is necessary
to consider the more general aspects of the labor problem that
affected production.
Among the most important phases of the labor problem during
the last four years were the following:
1. The supply and distribution of skilled and unskilled
workers.
2. Labor migration and labor turnover.
3. Variation in wage scales and the necessity of wage stand-
ardization.
4. Housing and transportation facilities for the greatly con-
centrated masses of workers in war industries.
5. The need for increasing and maintaining labor efficiency.
6. Replacement of men workers by women and children,
especially in war industries.
7. The tendency to break down labor safeguards.
8. The problem of industrial unrest.
There is not sufficient space within the limits of this brief
study to make an exhaustive analysis of each of these several
aspects of the labor problem, and only sufficient analysis will be
made to form an adequate basis for scientific conclusions.
1. THE LABOR SUPPLY AND ITS DISTRIBUTION
A great deal of controversy and divergence of opinion centered
about the question of labor shortage in the United States during
the first ten months of our participation in the war. Immedi-
ately after the declaration of war by the government the repre-
sentatives of the great industries, such as the steel, copper, lum-
ber, iron, and textiles, were lamenting the deficiency in the sup-
ply of unskilled labor, and attempted to arouse the administra-
tive officials of the government as well as public opinion to the
need of removing restrictions on immigration of oriental and
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other laborers. Representatives of the United States Depart-
ment of Labor, on the other hand, just as emphatically main-
tained that no labor shortage existed for the country as a whole,
and that the problem was not one of increasing the labor supply
but of a more scientific distribution of the existing labor forces.
This diversity of opinion between the representatives of industry
and those of the Department of Labor necessitates brief exam-
ination of the facts.
(1) Conditions Affecting the Supply of Labor. In a period of
war two conditions arise which diminish a nation 's labor supply,
especially of unskilled labor. There is a big decrease in the tide
of immigration which in normal times furnishes a constant
stream of workmen for industries, especially in countries like
the United States, and a rapid withdrawal of men from the
nation's industries for the army and navy. Of 20,000,000 per-
sons engaged in gainful occupations in Great Britain at the be-
ginning of the war, 5,000,000 were quickly taken away for the
army, leaving the labor supply twenty-five per cent short. 1
Later the British government was forced to recall a large force
of skilled workmen in order to maintain the industrial life at
home. British experience caused much anxiety in the indus-
trial circles of the United States when it became apparent that
a long war was imminent and that as a consequence there would
be an unprecedented shrinkage of the labor supply, especially
with the passage of the selective draft law. Threatened if not
actual depletion of the ranks of labor is a conceded possibility
in war-time, and the fears entertained by our industrial leaders
were, therefore, not without some justification. Secretary of
Labor Wilson, however, attempted to quiet all apprehension of
a labor shortage. Early in January, 1918, he stated that Amer-
ica's situation was quite different from that of England. Altho
admitting that the selective draft was bound to make inroads on
our labor supply and to interfere to some extent with industry,
Mr. Wilson pointed out that the United States has 35,000,000
workers, of whom only 1,500,000 would be taken in the first
year of the war a number less than the total of unemployed
in normal times. 2 Whatever comfort this explanation of the
1 Secretary of Labor Wilson quoted in the Chicago Tribune, January 10,
1918.
2 Ibid.
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Secretary of Labor contained for the leaders of industry was
almost dissipated when the Committee on Military Affairs of the
United States Senate soon afterwards estimated that the gov-
ernment's tentative military program called for 4,000,000 men
in the field and an additional 4,000,000 in the cantonments at
home from which to fill depleted ranks in France.
It was believed by some that the expansion of war industries,
which necessitated a large addition to the labor supply, would be
counterbalanced by a corresponding contraction of non-war or
non-essential industries. But the immobility of both capital and
labor, coupled with the reluctance of business enterprises to slow
down or postpone production of non-essential commodities, pre-
cluded any such complementary contraction in the production of
goods of this character. Of course, the falling off in demand for
non-essentials forced the curtailment of their production to con-
siderable extent and so released labor for war industries, but
there was little evidence of a reduction in the consumption of
non-essentials sufficient to affect seriously the shifting of labor
forces. On the contrary it was true that never had labor in this
country been so well paid and so prosperous as during the war
period, and this in itself contributed greatly to the buying power
in the retail trade and tended to steady the retail markets which
naturally would be affected by the restrictions of non-essential
production.
3 We were too far removed from the scene of conflict
to feel strongly the necessity of decreased consumption of non-
essential commodities, and government action was necessary to
curtail the production of such goods. On the whole, the demand
for labor increased. American industry responded wonderfully
to the needs of production and capital was readily provided for
the necessary industrial expansion, but an acute situation devel-
oped in the threatened if not actual shortage of labor.
The inevitable increase in production resulted in a correspond-
ing increase in the demand for labor, skilled and unskilled.
There soon appeared feverish competition for workmen, and
great inequality in wage scales resulted, giving rise to unprece-
dented increase in labor turnover. The problem resolved itself
into the following forms: (a) Securing an additional supply of
labor for war industries; (b) devising means and methods of
s See Annual Crop Report and Business Beview, Continental and Com-
mercial Bank of Chicago, 1918.
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keeping the labor supply when once it was secured; (c) equip-
ping and training laborers for their respective tasks in the given
industry, which called for labor dilution.
The second condition affecting the labor supply was the de-
crease in the volume of immigration into the United States. The
following statistics showing the ebb and flow of the tide of im-
migration during the last eight years give us a basis of compar-
ison of the war period with the pre-war period.
TABLE I. SHOWING THE TOTAL ANNUAL IMMIGRATION INTO THE UNITED
STATES, THE TOTAL ANNUAL DEPARTURES, AND THE NET ANNUAL ADDITION
TO THE POPULATION FOR THE PERIOD 1910 TO 1917 INCLUSIVE *
Total No. of Total No. of Net Addition to Pop-
Immigrants Immigrants ulation of the U. S.
Year 5 Arrived Departed per Immigration
1910 1,041,570 202,436 839,134
1911 878,587 296,666 582,921
1912 838,172 333,262 504,910
1913 1,197,892 308,190 889,702
1914 1,218,480 303,338 915,142
1915 326,700 204,074 122,626
1916 298,826 129,765 169,061
1917 295,403 66,277 229,126
Total 6,095,630 1,843,008 4,252,6226
From the above statistics it will be seen that the total number
of immigrants arriving in the United States during the fiscal
years 1910 to 1914 inclusive was 5,174,701, or an average of
about 1,034,940 a year; the total number of immigrant arrivals
for the fiscal years 1915 to 1917 inclusive was 920,929, or a yearly
average of about 306,976. This means an average annual de-
crease of 727,964 during the latter, as compared with the former
period. The total number of alien immigrants that left our
shores during the earlier period (1910-1914) was 1,442,892, or a
yearly average of 288,578, as against a total of 400,116 for the
* Compiled from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1910 to
1917 inclusive.
s Figures are for the fiscal year in each case.
e Since this table was compiled the statistics for 1918 have been made
available. During the fiscal year 1918 the number of immigrant aliens ad-
mitted was 110,618, and the departures totalled 94,585, making a net addi-
tion to our population through this source of only 16,033. Annual Report
of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 1918, p. 55.
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latter period (1915-1917), or an annual average of 133,372.
That is, during the latter period there was an average yearly de-
crease of 155,206 in the number of immigrants who departed for
their native lands. The total net addition to our population dur-
ing the period 1910-1914 was 3,731,809, a yearly average of 746,-
361, while the total for the period 1915-1917 was 520,813, a
yearly average of 173,604. This means that of the total net
addition of 4,252,622 to our population for the eight year period
87.7 per cent was added in the first five years and 12.3 per cent
during the last three years, a decrease of about 75 per cent for
the latter period. In 1918 the number of immigrant aliens ad-
mitted totalled 110,618, while the total number of those who left
our shores was 94,585, making a net addition to our population
of only 16,033 through this source.
7 These data justify the con-
clusion that the United States during the war did not receive
through immigration the customary or normal annual addition
to its labor supply, and that this condition had a marked influ-
ence upon the problem of labor shortage in American industries.
(2) The Labor Shortage. The representatives of American
industries whose products were necessary to successful prosecu-
tion of the war continued to warn the country of the impending
if not actual labor shortage. Judge Gary, chairman of the
United States Steel Corporation, in an address before the Com-
mercial Club of Chicago, early in June, 1917, voiced the general
conviction of industrial leaders. Among other things he pointed
out that: (a) There existed a great need for both skilled and
unskilled labor, especially the latter; (b) to the extent that work-
men are lacking in number, wealth and raw materials are with-
out value; (c) to meet this labor shortage the United States
should bring a supply of workmen from the islands Porto
Eico, Virgin Islands, etc. and from oriental countries. 8 Trade
journals and the daily press generally expressed the same opin-
ion, asserting that labor constituted the crux of the whole prob-
lem of production.
The first war labor survey made by the United States Employ-
ment Service covered conditions in the state of New York. It
included the war industries of forty-one cities, and found a
i Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 1918,
p. 55.
Age, Vol. 101, (No. 2) p. 137.
56 LABOR PROBLEMS AND LABOR ADMINISTRATION [270
scarcity in some and a surplus in others. Two hundred factories
were visited, representing employment of 261,117 persons. Of
these, 176 were calling for 34,155 workers the call extending
to June, 1918. Skilled workers were requested in three-fourths
of the cases
;
women laborers in a little over one-tenth
;
and un-
skilled male labor in about one-seventh. 9 In normal times me-
chanical forces at the naval yards and other naval establishments
aggregate about 22,000 artisans, helpers, and common laborers.
In four months ending July 31, 1917, the total number increased
to 35,000.
10
Approximately 300,000 mechanics were soon needed
by the shipyards of the country.11 By January, 1918, the need
for common laborers was such that the United States Employ-
ment Service arranged to bring 110,000 laborers from Porto Rico
and the Virgin Islands.12 The Employment Service announced
that American war industries were short between 300,000 and
400,000 common laborers,
13 and later that 500,000 were badly
needed.1* On July 29, 1918, John B. Densmore, Director Gen-
eral of the Employment Service, estimated that within the subse-
quent twelve months between 3,000,000 and 4,000,000 workmen
of all kinds would be needed, in addition to those then engaged
in war industries.15 This shortage of labor was not confined to
the manufacturing establishments of the country; it was felt
just as keenly in the agricultural regions during the seeding and
harvesting seasons of 1917 and 1918. In the West the need for
farm help was so great than even the California State Develop-
ment Board favored importation of experienced Chinese farmers
into the state for the period of the war 16 a very radical de-
parture for a California body. It has been estimated that it took
from six to ten workers in the rear to maintain one soldier in the
trenches,
17
which, if the estimate is correct, gives some idea of
9 Official Bulletin, January 11, 1918, p. 4.
10 Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, September, 1917,
pp. 74-76.
11 Official Bulletin, May 11, 1918, p. 8.
12 Ibid., January 24, 1918, p. 1.
is Daily Pantograph, Bloomington, Illinois, June 28, 1918.
i* United States Employment Service Bulletin, August 6, 1918, p. 3.
is Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, March, 1918, p. 77.
ie Iron Age, Vol. 101 (No. 2), p. 150.
IT Secretary of Labor Wilson, U. S. Employment Service Bulletin, July
31, 1918, p. 6.
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the importance of the labor supply. The problem became more
serious, and during the week ending July 27, 1918, thirty-four
out of forty-eight states faced a serious labor shortage of un-
skilled workers. 18
The following statistics issued by the United States Employ-
ment Service in the spring of 1918, indicate the gravity of the
problem of labor scarcity :
WAR LABOR NEEDS 19
War construction 709,184
Army personnel, civilian workers 185,000
Shipbuilding 278,125
Housing 30,000
Munitions 878,800
Mines 165,916
Railways, tracks and shops 35,000
Farm labor 1,646,931
Total 3,928,956
Much of the need revealed in the table above was for skilled or
semi-skilled workers, the supply of whom was very limited. It
was pointed out by government officials that for want of neces-
sary training the output of more than 7,000,000 of the 10,000,000
workers engaged in manufacturing industries was less than thir-
ty-five per cent of what it could have been without speeding up
or exploitation, due to the fact that the men were unfitted for
the tasks to which they were assigned.20 This lack of trained
workmen contributed much to our war labor problem, as it does
to the labor situation in normal times. For example, of 6,000
American manufacturing establishments, each employing groups
of more than 250 persons, facilities for part-time instruction
were not available in 300 of them. 21 To meet this general need
for trained workers the United States Training and Dilution
Service was established, while the United States Employment
Service assumed the responsibility for the general adjustment of
the problem of labor supply and distribution.
(3) A Problem of Distribution. Altho the above statistics
seem to indicate a serious labor shortage, government officials
is United States Employment Service Bulletin, July 31, 1918, p. 9.
19 U. S. Department of Labor, Information and Education Service, Bul-
letin on ' ' Employment Questions, ' ' by Charles T. Clayton, p. 12.
20 U. S. Department of Labor, Training Service, Bulletin No. 9, p. 3.
21 Ibid., p. 5.
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denied that such a shortage existed for the country as a whole.
After a survey of the labor needs of the country early in Janu-
ary, 1918, the Employment Service contended that, taking the
country as a whole, there was at that time no real shortage of
labor. The demand of employers seeking workmen and the num-
ber of workmen seeking employment were substantially equal.
Except for temporary inconveniences every willing and able
worker could be employed during the current year and the needs
of industry could in a reasonable time be filled practically to 100
per cent.
22 The director of the service believed our problem to
be one of proper distribution of the existing supply; further-
more, he believed that labor conscription was both impracticable
and unnecessary.23
It was a matter of common observation that if England,
France, and Germany, with several times as many laborers with-
drawn for the army and navy, could still supply war materials
and support to a large extent their civil populations, it was ab-
surd to speak of a labor shortage in the United States which has
so much larger laboring population and as yet had given by no
means as many men to military and naval service.
The conclusions of the United States Department of Labor
relative to the labor supply at the beginning of 1918 were stated
by Secretary of Labor Wilson as follows :
Our problem then is one of readjustment to supply the demand for work-
ers in those trades which are expanding rapidly, such as shipbuilding and
munition factories.
At present there is a shortage of labor in some trades and a surplus in
others. For instance, there is unemployment in the building trades. It is
our task to make the supply equal to the demand, which will involve trans-
portation of workmen voluntarily from one section to another, housing them
in their new homes, and training the unskilled men when the skilled supply
in any particular line of work is short. 24
The same opinion regarding shortage of farm labor was voiced
by Assistant Secretary of Labor Post, who contended that two-
thirds of the farm labor shortage was imaginary and the other
third could be remedied by team work, cooperation, and not so
much agitation about importing Chinese. 25 The fact that there
22 Quoted in the Chicago Tribune, February 28, 1918.
23 Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, March, 1918, p. 78.
2* Quoted in the Chicago Tribune, January 10, 1918.
25 Chicago Tribune, April 17, 1918.
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was 110 shortage of labor for the country as a whole was not
much consolation to the employer of labor whose plant was not
operating up to the limit of production because of a dearth of
workmen. His problem was local and immediate and his need
imperative. He could ill afford to wait for a national labor sur-
vey and the redistribution of labor planned by the national Em-
ployment Service. In reality, then, there was an acute labor
shortage for particular industries and given localities, but for
the nation no such dearth of labor existed. The ultimate solu-
tion of the problem lay in proper distribution of the supply.
2. LABOR TURNOVER
Labor turnover is defined as the change in the personnel of
workmen resulting from the hiring and termination of employ-
ment, and is now recognized as one of the most serious problems
in American industry, even in normal times. The problem as-
sumes much larger proportions in a period of war when employ-
ment is abundant and employers are competing vigorously for
workmen. Whereas, in normal times men are seeking jobs, in
times of war jobs are seeking men. A labor turnover of 300 per
cent per annum is quite common in normal times for many of
our larger and smaller industries.26 For example, six cement
companies which recently analyzed their labor turnover for a
period of three years reported an average of 103 per cent per
annum, while a public service corporation near Philadelphia had
a labor turnover of 1,100 per cent in 1916 and, altho this was
exceptional, a turnover of 400 per cent is not uncommon.
27 Prior
to the war labor turnover in the United States was said to be
about 300 per cent per annum, and the number of vacancies oc-
curring in American industry every year was estimated to be
more than 100,000,000.28
The war accentuated the problem of labor turnover. Men did
not stick to their employment. One Baltimore shipyard which
employed several thousand men discovered that only ten per cent
could be counted as a net gain to the number of employees.
Many establishments which in peace times had a labor turnover
of 200 to 300 per cent annually found that during the war turn-
20 See article by Dr. Paul H. Douglas, American Economic Review, Vol.
VIII (June, 1918), p. 306 ff.
27 Allen, Leslie H., Industrial Housing Problems, Boston, 1917, p. 5.
as United States Employment Service Bulletin, July 31, 1918, p. 12.
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over of 100 per cent a week was common.29 Twenty-three hun-
dred hull workers left one shipyard in three months in the Bal-
timore district, and one yard on the Pacific coast hired each day
175 new men to take the places of those leaving for other em-
ployments.
30 The problem was summarized by Secretary Wilson
in the following words :
It is estimated that the industries of the United States employ some
30,000,000 unskilled workers. In ordinary times the labor turnover of the
manufacturing establishments of the country is, on the average, 300 per
cent. That means that every establishment which requires the services of
100 workers is accustomed to hire 300 workers during a single year.
Since the war this endless migration of workers has been multiplied many
times. In some cities the labor turnover has gone as high as 3,000 per cent.
The production of ships and of munitions will be largely increased if the
disastrous labor turnover can be eliminated and our civil man-power wisely
distributed and husbanded.si
The fundamental causes of this enormous increase in the
labor turnover were : (a) the great inequality in wage scales pre-
vailing in different sections of the country, and especially in dif-
ferent industries within the same territory, and (b) unscientific
employment and management of workmen. Inequality in wage
standards was due to the unprecedented competition for laborers.
Wages were especially high in shipyards and other establish-
ments working on government contracts, such as those let by the
Emergency Fleet Corporation. Other causes were the lack of
proper housing and transportation facilities, and the marked ten-
dency for colored unskilled laborers, at the approach of cold
weather, to leave northern shipyards and manufacturing estab-
lishments for the South.32 It was stated that the labor turnover
in the Delaware River shipyard district increased in almost
direct ratio to the climbing wage scale, men going from one yard
to another, tempted by offers of increased pay, each employer
evidently concerning himself only with progress in his own estab-
lishment.33 In regard to the relation of housing facilities to
labor turnover, the conclusion of a thoro student of this problem
is worthy of note ; namely, that :
" In years gone by wages were
29 Official Bulletin, May 11, 1918, p. 8.
so/row, Age, Vol. 101 (No. 5), pp. 332, 333.
si Chicago Tribune, August 1, 1918, and U. S. Employment Service Bul-
letin, August 6, 1918, p. 3.
sz Official Bulletin, May 18, 1918, p. 14.
as Iron Age, Vol. 101 (No. 5), p. 332.
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low and the cost of labor turnover was hardly considered, for
there was always a long line of new men waiting for a job, and
because of this excess supply of men over demand, a man was
not so ready to throw up his job to seek another. He would put
up with poor housing conditions for the sake of having any job
at all. But in the present labor situation, with demand far ex-
ceeding supply, the workman will no longer be content with the
disgraceful housing conditions he has had to put up with.
' ' 34
The workmen were not responsible for the wasteful labor turn-
over, for it was to their advantage to migrate to the center of the
highest wage and best working conditions, including adequate
housing and transportation facilities.
3. INEQUALITY IN WAGE SCALES
In the foregoing discussion of labor turnover there was sug-
gested another aspect of the labor problem during the war;
namely, the absence of wage standardization. Inequality in
wage scales appeared as the basic cause of the disastrous labor
migration of the war period. The complete demoralization of
labor which characterized the shipbuilding industry was attrib-
uted by the representatives of the government and by private
employers alike to the competition between shipbuilders and
other manufacturers for workmen. There was great need for
wage standardization, without which the situation promised to
go from bad to worse.35 The greatest variation in wages pre-
vailed in the same section of the country, and in the same kind
of occupations, as well as between various industries and differ-
ent sections of the country. For instance, in a single week an
industrial district near the South Atlantic seaboard offered 22
cents an hour for common labor; New England offered 40 cents
an hour; the district west of the Ohio offered 50 cents an
hour. Similar inequalities in wage standards prevailed in the
case of skilled labor.36
It is to the interest of the wage workers always to migrate to
the center of the highest wage scale. The extraordinary demand
for labor during the war period, coupled with diminution in the
supply, resulted in an unprecedented increase in wages. Em-
s* Allen, Leslie H., Industrial Housing Problems, pp. 5, 6.
35/ron Age, Vol. 101 (No. 5), pp. 332, 333.
se Official Bulletin, May 18, 1918, p. 14.
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ployers, anxious to secure workmen in order to fill war contracts
which offered an attractive differential, entered into unrestricted
competition for labor and in the process of bargaining offered
special wage inducements. Labor was not at fault for obeying
the motive of self-interest in migrating from one establishment
to another in response to these special wage offers, for it was a
rare experience for labor to be so much sought after. They were
doing just what all good business men do seeking the market
that guarantees the maximum net returns. Much of the re-
sponsibility for the difficulty, however, was attributed to the
wage policy of the United States Shipping Board and other gov-
ernment agencies, and their procedure was severely criticised by
employers of labor, as is indicated by the following :
The shipbuilding industry has been brought conspicuously into view be-
cause of the extraordinary wage policy adopted by the United States Ship-
ping Board, which has undertaken to outbid all employers, private and pub-
lic, and without any attempt at standardization of rates has instituted wage
scales so high as not only to demoralize the labor market, but also to induce
the idling of employees to such an extent as to reduce their efficiency from
30 to 50 per cent.s?
The Shipping Board not only introduced the basic eight-hour
day and time and one-half for overtime and double time for Sun-
days and holidays, but also paid very high wages and an addi-
tional ten per cent bonus for each workman working six days in
succession. These and other measures which tended to make em-
ployment in the shipyards very attractive had tremendous influ-
ence upon the labor situation in the neighboring territory and
dislocated the labor supply.
The general intensive competition for workmen had the direct
effect of increasing wage scales throughout industries engaged in
the production of war materials. To keep the labor force intact
employers were compelled to advance wages to a point approx-
imating the standards in shipyards and other industries paying
the highest figure. In the iron and steel industry of the United
States there were five wage advances in two years 1916 and
1917 making a net increase in wages of about sixty per cent.38
On August 1, 1918, the United States Steel Corporation made
effective throughout its plants an additional ten per cent wage
ST Jron Age, Vol. 101 (No. 7), pp. 450, 451.
ss /bid., Vol. 101 (No. 1), p. 100.
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advance which benefited 300,000 laborers. This was the seventh
raise in wages granted by the same corporation subsequent to
January, 1916, the seven increases aggregating seventy-five per
cent. Six of these increases were for ten per cent each, and one,
granted March, 1918, was for fifteen per cent.39 The Bethlehem
Steel Company on July 31, 1918, announced an increase of ten
per cent in the general rate of wages. Between August, 1915,
and August, 1918, the company granted increases totalling more
than 100 per cent.
40 In the shipyards alone, upon the advice of
the United States Shipping Board, wage advances were made
during the first year of our participation in the war aggregating
forty and fifty per cent, altho the wage scales were already high.
This was in addition to the ten per cent bonus paid by the board
to men working six consecutive days a week.41 Nor will it be
forgotten that after the government took over the railroads Mr.
McAdoo, as Director General, on May 26, 1918, authorized an
advance in wages aggregating $300,000,000, benefiting approx-
imately 2,000,000 workmen, and that this advance was followed
by others aggregating hundreds of millions of dollars. This
general advance in wages was applied to the one hundred and
sixty-four roads under government control. Statistics of wage
increases by public agencies and private industrial establish-
ments might be quoted i6uch more at length here, but they are
discussed elsewhere in this study.
42 Sufficient data have been
given to warrant the conclusion that the prevailing inequality in
wage standards was due to : (a) the competition for workmen on
the part of employers who were under the necessity of complet-
ing contracts on specified time, and (b) the influence of the gov-
ernment as an employer of labor.
4. INDUSTRIAL HOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION
The great increase in the demand for labor in the shipbuilding
yards and other industrial establishments producing war mate-
rials attracted large forces of laborers who flocked to the centers
of quickened industrial activity to take advantage of the wage
inducements offered. The concentration of so large a laboring
39 Chicago Tribune, July 31, 1918.
Ibid., August 1, 1918.
/ron Age, Vol. 101 (No. 3), pp. 204, 205.
42 See pp. 95-98.
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population within a comparatively short time was bound to
result in indescribable congestion, for neither the government
nor private industrial establishments possessed adequate housing
facilities to take care of the greatly augmented labor force. The
housing problem became acute. It soon became evident that men
would not remain in the industries that could not furnish at
once proper housing facilities for its workers and their families,
and an inevitable increase in labor turnover resulted. The seri-
ousness of the problem was tardily realized, and on October 19,
1917, the Council of National Defense appointed a committee
"to investigate and report upon the extent of the housing prob-
lem in connection with workers employed on government con-
tracts and the relation of that problem to the output of war ma-
terials." At the close of the year 1917, this committee reported
that with few exceptions the government contracts for ships,
guns, ammunition, and other war materials had thus far been
made with little or no government provision for the housing
necessities incident to a rapid and enormous increase of labor.
The committee illustrated the problem by citing a New England
manufacturing city in which sixteen concerns were engaged upon
war contracts, and to which 10,000 additional men had nocked
with practically no living quarters provided. In some plants
the production of guns and other munitions was threatened to
be curtailed fully one-third of the possible output within three
months, unless necessary housing facilities were provided. The
report of the committee warned against exaggeration of the
acuteness of the situation which, altho very serious, could be
remedied by means of government loans at low rates of interest
to private enterprises engaged on war contracts.43
Manufacturers who for a long time have recognized the neces-
sity of successfully solving the housing problem found them-
selves with a critical situation to meet in the midst of a great
national emergency, and it dawned upon them that they did not
possess adequate means of meeting it. In this respect the United
States was less fortunate than nations like Great Britain which
had behind them a large background of experimental legislation
in housing. Great Britain provided for the absorption of land
values arising out of the establishment of munition plants and
*s Monthly Eeview, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, December, 1917,
pp. 18-20.
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housing developments connected therewith, and during the war
and as long as the government was in possession of the land
taken over for the purposes indicated no compensation was
paid for land values created by governmental operations.** Sim-
ilar procedure was suggested for the United States on the
grounds that the conservation of the unearned increment in land
for the benefit of the community is in itself the prime factor in
the economic solution of the housing problem.45 Many persons
would not have endorsed a general governmental policy of con-
fiscation of increased land values, even when it could be demon-
strated that such "unearned" increment was due to "social"
causes. It was a sound conclusion, however, that the govern-
ment of the United States would not be justified in lending
money at low rates of interest, even to the extent of suffering a
loss, as suggested by the. Housing Committee of the Council of
National Defense, if the corporations or other private agencies
were to take advantage of the situation by increasing rents or in
any other way reaping unearned increment from rising land
values due to the influx of workers.
The problem of housing the labor forces was succinctly set
forth in a letter from Chairman Edward N. Hurley of the Ship-
ping Board, to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Com-
merce. Among other things Mr. Hurley pointed out that one
of the most perplexing problems of the war to the United States
Shipping Board, the Army, and the Navy was the lack of housing
facilities for the enormously increased army of labor, and the
demand for immediate action became so apparent, upon inves-
tigation, that the board decided to start immediate construction
of houses at the most critical points. Ten million dollars were
set aside for the erection of housing facilities in the vicinity of
Hog Island, and aid was granted to the Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corporation at Sparrows Point, Maryland, to purchase 400 five
and six room brick houses to care for shipyard workers. For
the housing program of the Shipping Board $35,000,000 was re-
quired; and large sums also were needed by the Army and the
4* Ibid., February, 1918, pp. 209, 210.
45 Ackerman, Frederick L., American Institute of Architects, Washing-
ton, D. C., Journal American Institute, December, 1917, Vol. 5, pp. 591-622.
See also Monthly Bevieiv, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, February, 1918,
pp. 210-213.
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Navy, especially in connection with the construction of housing
facilities in army camps. Furthermore, there was need for co-
ordination and standardization of the government's housing
activities in one commission for all branches of the government.46
The recommendations of the Housing Committee of the Council
of National Defense included a similar government program of :
(a) financial aid to such industries or communities as clearly
demonstrate their right to relief, preferably in the form of loans
at a low rate of interest; (b) creation of an organization of rea-
sonable permanency and authority with broad powers to conduct
building operations, to deal in real estate, and to borrow and
lend money; (c) distribution of government contracts for war
materials in such manner as to prevent undue concentration of
workers in any locality.47 The government's policy of dealing
with the problems of housing and transporting workers in indus-
trial centers congested as a result of the war is stated in a later
chapter of this study.
48
Certainly no phase of the labor situa-
tion demanded a more immediate solution, for inadequate hous-
ing and transportation facilities were among the basic causes of
labor migration and unrest which imperiled production of essen-
tial war supplies.
5. LABOR EFFICIENCY
The necessity of speeding up and increasing production in
every possible way in order to make American effort count as
potently and rapidly as might be in the war, made the govern-
ment exceedingly anxious to prevent any conscious falling off
in the efficiency of the laboring force in our industries. Accord-
ingly the government was confronted with a twofold problem
in this regard: (a) the elimination of all conditions of conscious
and purposive decrease in efficiency or withdrawal of labor effort
and, (b) the stimulation of efficiency and numerical increase of
skilled or semi-skilled workers.
No time could, have been more opportune than the war period
for the purposeful relaxation of effort on the part of labor.
American workmen were in an exceptionally strategic position
46 Monthly Review, United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, February,
1918, pp. 205-207.
47 Ibid., p. 205.
48 See Part II, pp. 208-210.
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to practise many things which in normal times would incur dis-
missal. The abundance of work coupled with high wages which
enabled the men to lay off more than in ordinary times was
bound to affect production adversely. According to the Presi-
dent's Mediation Commission, which investigated conditions on
the Pacific Coast, and to other sources of information,
' '
conscious
withdrawal of efficiency" and "strike on the job" characterized
many essential war industries in this country.49 It should be
added, however, that the commission found that much of this
decreased efficiency was due to the absence of proper housing and
other desirable living conditions, and that improvement of indus-
trial communities was a necessary step to make them "fit human
habitations. ' ' Improvement of what may be called, for want of
a better term, the social environment of industry was, then, a
prerequisite to increased efficiency.
Altho the conditions of industry may have been a potent factor
in the decrease of efficiency in such essential war industries as
copper mining and lumbering, there is every reason to believe
that under fairly acceptable or even desirable working condi-
tions the labor force, conscious of its indispensability in carrying
out the nation's war program, often took advantage of the sit-
uation to assert its independence and practised "loafing on the
job" or, aided by high wages, took a "lay-off" quite frequently.
Such, at least, seems to have been true in the shipbuilding in-
dustry subsequent to our entry into the war.
50 High wages paid
in this industry resulted in idling which reduced the effective-
ness of some yards thirty per cent and of others fifty per cent.
Added to the high wages, of course, was the ten per cent bonus,
but even this failed to have the desired effect of increasing effi-
ciency. Men kept at their tasks for six-day periods only long
enough to accumulate sufficient money to enable them to idle
for extended periods. 51 It was a common observation that the
weekly per capita production of skilled labor steadily declined
in many industries after we entered the war.
Besides purposeful withdrawal of effort on the part of some
skilled and unskilled workmen, other difficulties appeared in the
Official Bulletin, February 11, 1918, p. 12.
so Iron Age, Vol. 101 (No. 3), p. 235.
si Ibid., (No. 5), p. 333.
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shortage of well-trained, efficient laborers to perform the skilled
and semi-skilled tasks in shipbuilding and other war industries.
The war revealed the woeful situation of the United States from
the standpoint of a supply of technical workers to do the finer
work in industry. The lack of vocational, technical schools so
prevalent in European countries threatened to paralyze Amer-
ica's war program, and resulted in widespread demand for voca-
tional education. At one time the shipbuilding industry was
calling for several hundred thousand technically trained work-
ers, but no one knew from whence they could be drawn. This
led to the introduction of a system of labor dilution and rapid
training under the direction of the United States Training Ser-
vice, described later in this study.
The problem of labor efficiency, then, resolved itself into the
following aspects: (1) A decrease in labor efficiency, due to (a)
high wages, which enabled the men to idle; (b) undesirable
working conditions and unfit living conditions, which were not
conducive to health and effort; (c) the independence of labor
arising out of the abundance of employment, which encouraged
conscious withdrawal of effort or "soldiering;" (2) the shortage
of skilled workmen to perform the more technical tasks of in-
dustry, due to the lack of a definite and adequate national sys-
tem of industrial or vocational education. The remedies were :
(1) Improvement of working and living conditions ; (2) awaken-
ing of a spirit of loyalty and a sense of responsibility in those
men who purposely loafed on the job; (3) training and dilution
of labor to perform the increasing number of skilled and semi-
skilled tasks.
6. WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN INDUSTRY
The necessity of increased production during the war, coupled
with the withdrawal of millions of men for the army and the
navy, forced upon our industries the alternative of replacing
men with women and of accepting children for the common tasks
which they were physically able to perform. We have already
touched upon the serious tendency to break down labor safe-
guards which resulted from the emergency, and potential dan-
gers which such a policy involved, especially as regards women
and children.
The experience of European belligerents had demonstrated the
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successful adaptation of women and children to many of the
lighter mechanical operations formerly performed by men.
There was general recognition of the value of women workers
as an essential factor in production. It was also demonstrated
that in the absence of the most stringent regulation and protec-
tion very serious results grew out of the replacement of men by
women and the unwise employment of child labor. Inaugura-
tion of extended employment of women and children in industry
involved several considerations, among which were the following :
(1) The extent to which women and children could assume the
more difficult and heavy tasks in production without causing in-
juries to themselves and endangering their future usefulness in
the life of the nation. Prevention of undesirable results in this
regard was possible through the following precautions: (a)
Prohibition of lifting excessive weights/ Since handling of
freight or other heavy burdens by women or children may over-
tax their strength, many establishments adopted a weight of
twenty-five pounds as the maximum to be lifted by women. In
the state of New York, for instance, there was a legal maximum
of twenty-five pounds for women's work in foundries, and this
maximum was also adopted by forty large industrial plants of
Detroit.52 (b) Protection against poisoning incident to the mak-
ing of explosives and the handling of munitions. This would
include every possible measure of sanitation and frequent phys-
ical examinations, (c) Regulation of hours of labor to prevent
over-fatigue. As suggested in previous pages, it was necessary
to exercise every care and exert every effort to maintain pre-
vailing safeguards of labor. Prohibition of night work and ex-
cessive overtime was a necessary measure, and many states passed
legislation to this end.
(2) The guaranty of equal pay for equal work where women
filled positions formerly occupied by men. Such a guaranty was
necessary as a prevention against the employment of women as
a subterfuge to obtain cheap and exploitable labor, thus afford-
ing the unscrupulous employer an unfair advantage over his
more honest and generous competitors and leading to dangerous
exploitation of unorganized employees.
52 Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, January, 1918,
p. 59.
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(3) The establishment of facilities for training unskilled wo-
men in the shortest possible time to do the mechanical tasks pre-
viously performed by men. Many establishments provided short
training courses for women in so called "Vestibule Schools."
The Bethlehem Steel Company paid women twenty-five cents an
hour while in training, and this rate was increased as soon as the
women were able to handle production work. In addition, this
company established a bonus system to encourage efficiency in
production. The Lincoln Motor Company, Detroit, Michigan,
which was building liberty motors, also installed facilities for
training women. This company found the vestibule schools so
advantageous that they decided to make them a permanent
feature for both men and women workers.53
(4) The provision of conveniences and comforts in order to at-
tract and retain the right kind of female workers. Such facilities
had not been previouslsy installed by corporations for their male
employees, therefore a new expense was entailed, amounting at
times to $25 per person. 5* Managers who provided such conveni-
ences and comforts for their women workers asserted that this
was not a large outlay in view of the results obtained in content-
ment. This whole movement for betterment and welfare plans in
American industries received its greatest impetus from the ex-
periences of Great Britain, especially from the investigations of
the British Ministry of Munitions which revealed the futility of
attempting to increase production in the absence of desirable con-
ditions for employees, and showed that there is a definite rela-
tion between health, contentment, and output.55
Previous to the war the idea was prevalent in every country
that women were neither actually nor potentially so efficient as
men in operations requiring a high degree of technical skill.
Such an idea was a legacy of antiquity and seldom, if ever, based
upon scientific inquiry. The evidence available for the war
period shows that women who entered occupations formerly held
53 Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, September,
1918, p. 214.
s* Ibid.
ss See the following bulletins by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics :
Welfare Work in British Munition Factories, Bulletin No. 222; Employ-
ment of Women and Juveniles in Great Britain during the War, Bulletin.
No. 223; Hours, Fatigue, and Health in British Munition Factories, Bul-
letin No. 221.
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by men proved themselves equally efficient, in some instances
showing even greater skill. For example, in a British shell fac-
tory skilled men required 3.16 machine hours to bore a shell,
while women with one week's practice did it in 3.6 hours and
within two or three months had reduced the time to 1.25 hours,
increasing output two and one-half times.56 A typewriter and
comptometer company declared that the slowest woman oper-
ator in point of production equalled the best man's daily pro-
duction. 57 A small factory found that girls were turning out
about seventy-five per cent of what men produced, but when
completely trained they showed 110 per cent efficiency as com-
pared with men. The Lincoln Motor Company found women
not more productive than men, indeed a little slower, altho this
was offset by their attention to details and the very low per-
centage of waste. On the other hand, one company employing
800 women concluded that the same attention and training given
to each new man hired would make them as productive.68
Equally interesting information regarding women's efficiency
in industry is available for the metal trades. In an investigation
of 127 establishments it was found that in thirty of these wo-
men's output exceeded men's in all operations; in six it was
equal in some operations and greater in others; in thirty wo-
men's work was as productive as men's; in seven it was greater
in some operations and less in others ; in eleven it was equal in
some and less in some; and in fifteen establishments women's
work was less productive than men's in all operations. A total
of twenty-eight concerns either did not report or their data was
not comparable.
59 From the standpoint of attitude towards their
work and regularity of attendance women have proved them-
selves worthy competitors with men.00 Of 111 manufacturing
establishments reporting on the attitude of women towards their
se Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, September,
1918, p. 212.
ST American Machinist, February 7, 1918, Vol. 48, p. 241.
ss Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, September,
1918, pp. 212, 213.
59 War-time Employment of Women in the Metal Trades, National In-
dustrial Conference Board, Research Report No. 8. Quoted in Monthly
Labor Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, October, 1918, p. 192.
eo For experiences of Great Britain see Bulletin No. 221 and Bulletin
No. 223, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1917.
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work 103 stated it to be as good or better than men 's, while eight
considered it worse than men's. Over one-half of the women
reported upon equalled or surpassed men in their regularity of
attendance. However, the experience of other companies and
other industries warrants the conclusion ' ' that a higher average
time loss because of absence must be counted among the unavoid-
able disadvantages connected with the employment of women."
But this adverse circumstance has a compensatory advantage in
the fact that labor turnover is smaller among women. 61
Relative to the wages of women in war-time, it is worthy of
note that never has there been given so much impetus to the
slogan :
' '
Equal pay for equal work without discrimination as to
sex." This principle was emphasized by governmental agencies
and by the spokesmen of women workers. It was one of the basic
principles governing the procedure of the War Labor Board and
its subsidiary representatives, and a surprisingly extensive ac-
ceptance of this policy was evidenced by industrial enterprises
independent of the influence of governmental commissions or
boards. In munition plants women were generally paid equal
piece rates, and in many railway equipment shops there was no
difference in rate whether piece or time. The principle of equal
wages for equal work seemed to be more generally accepted in
industries in which women were being employed for the first
time, than in the establishments where they were accustomed to
find employment. In the metal trades there was some variation,
and this seems to have been true of many other war industries.
An investigation of wage scales in 127 metal trades establish-
ments, for instance, showed that in fifty-three women's wage
rates were equal to men's; in twenty-nine the piece rate was
equal but the time rate less; in twenty-four all rates were less
for women. In data from twenty-one establishments this infor-
mation was either not given or was not comparable. In only
three out of thirteen electrical manufacturing plants were equal
time and piece rates paid to men and women. One industrial
establishment discriminated against women, starting them in at
the rate,paid to boys. Later, because of the increased labor turn-
over resulting from this discrimination and a series of tests
61 War-time Employment of Women in the Metal Trades, National In-
dustrial Conference Board, Eesearch Report, No. 8. Quoted in Monthly
Labor Review, U. 8. Bureau of Labor Statistics, October, 1918, p. 195.
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which disclosed women 's productivity greater than men 's, a new
wage scale was devised.62 The question of hours for women and
children is closely related to wage rates. It was necessary in
every state to prevent exploitation under the guise of patriotism
or war emergency. Hours varied between eight and nine; wo-
men proved more efficient on the eight-hour schedule and on day
work rather than night work.63
There are no reliable figures concerning the number of women
who entered industry in the United States during the war.64 It
is therefore impossible to state exactly at this time to what
extent women replaced men in the various industries. Some
estimates have been made, however, and in a few cases investiga-
tions completed for special industries like the textile and metal
trades. In this regard the United States is less fortunate than
Great Britain and France, where statistics were compiled. Be-
tween July, 1914, and January, 1918, the increase in the number
of women workers in Great Britain was nearly 1,500,000, and
the number of women who actually replaced men is said to have
been 1,400,000. In munition plants alone the number was 700,-
000 in October, 1917. In January, 1918, 400,000 French women
were making munitions. The movement to fill industrial vacan-
cies in the United States gained its greatest momentum between
September 1, and November 1, 1918.
Previous to the war the number of gainfully employed women
in the United States was about 10,000,000. Subsequent to 1915,
however, an additional 1,000,000 are believed to have entered
gainful occupations, especially manufacturing and clerical posi-
tions. Approximately 100,000 teachers left the schools for cler-
ical and other positions of war work, going particularly to Wash-
ington and other Atlantic coast cities. An industrial survey of
fifteen states showed that about 1,266,000 women were engaged
in making war supplies in the United States in January, 1918,
100,000 of whom were manufacturing munitions. Women were
placed in machine shops, automobile factories, railway repair
62 Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, October,
1918, pp. 193, 214. Quoted from Eesearch Eeport No. 8, of the National
Industrial Conference Board, 1918.
es Monthly Labor Review, U. 8. Bureau of Labor Statistics, September,
1918, p. 213.
* No such statistics were available on December 13, 1918, according to
a letter of that date from the U. S. Department of Labor to the writer.
74 LABOR PROBLEMS AND LABOR ADMINISTRATION [288
shops, the street railway service, etc. In December, 1918, the
manager of the
' 'Women 's Service Section ' ' of the Railroad Ad-
ministration stated that between January and October, 1918, the
number of women employed by the steam railroads had increased
from 60,000 to 100,000.65
The United States Employment Service began to collect sta-
tistics of placement of women in industry after August 1, 1918.
These figures were more or less incomplete for August, but the
records show that during the four weeks of September 49,846
women were placed by the Service. The results for October
were expected to show a "considerable increase over this num-
ber, indicating that the placement of women in industry was in-
creasing at a very rapid rate as the war went on." With the
exception of the building and construction trades, the records of
the United States Department of Labor showed that women
"were placed in practically every industrial occupation and
especially in metal and machinery work.
" 66 A recent estimate
puts the number that went into textile mills at 275,000, and
1,000 girls as employed in the seaplane factory at League Island
Navy Yard.67 A suggestive investigation of war-time employ-
ment of women in the metal trades was made early in 1918, by
the National Industrial Conference Board. A total of 330 metal-
work establishments reported. Of this number 131 employed
women in manufacturing processes. Of a total labor force of
384,709, women numbered 4,831, or 12.9 per cent. It is inter-
esting to note that women were for the most part employed in
addition to men, not as substitutes for them.68
The problem of women and children in industry during the
war, then, involved: (1) the prohibition of child labor except as
a final resort, and then only under the most rigid public regula-
tion as to wages, hours, and the nature of employment ; (2) equal
pay for equal work, without discrimination as to sex; (3) a basic
os War-time Employment of Women, by Margaret A. Hobbs, American
Labor Legislation Bevieiv, Vol. 8 (December, 1918), pp. 332-338.
66 No statistics were available on December 13, 1918, according to a let-
ter of that date from the United States Department of Labor to the writer.
67 Chicago Tribune, December 15, 1918.
ss War-time Employment of Women vn the Metal Trades, Eesearch Ee-
port No. 8, of the National Industrial Conference Board, Boston, 1918.
Quoted in Monthly Labor Beview, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, October,
1918, p. 192.
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eight-hour day for women, with the minimum of overtime, night
work, and Sunday work; (4) facilities for training women work-
ers to take skilled or semi-skilled positions vacated by men.
7. LABOR SAFEGUARDS
An unmistakable loss of health, output, and national effective-
ness had resulted in other belligerent countries from the serious
breakdown of protective labor regulations.69 Furthermore, it
had been repeatedly demonstrated in the experience of American
industries that accidents, over-fatigue, and occupational diseases
tend to increase pari passn with the speeding up of workers,
lengthening of the working day, and otherwise breaking down
protective measures designed to conserve labor.70 In view of
these facts it was necessary, in order to protect American labor,
to exact the following conditions: (1) maintenance of all exist-
ing standards of safeguarding machinery and industrial pro-
cesses for the prevention of accidents; (2) maintenance of all
existing measures for the prevention of occupational diseases,
and the provision of protective agencies against occupational
poisonings incident to the making and handling of explosives;
(3) the establishment of a basic eight-hour day wherever feasible,
no extension of existing hours of employment, and one day of
rest in seven; (4) periodic adjustment of wage scales to cor-
respond with the variations in the cost of living, equal pay for
equal work without discrimination as to sex, and time and one-
half for overtime; (5) maintenance of all existing regulations
and the introduction of new measures designed to protect women
and children in industry, including maximum hours, prohibition
of night work, prohibition of hazardous work, minimum wages,
etc.; (6) maintenance of existing standards of workmen's com-
pensation for industrial accidents and diseases, provision of spe-
cial insurance or compensation for occupational diseases incident
to the manufacture of explosives, periodical physical examina-
tions in order to safeguard the health of workers in war indus-
tries; (7) rigid enforcement of factory and other labor laws, and
the creation of joint commissions of representatives of workers,
ea See Bulletin No. 223, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1917.
TO See Fatigue and Efficiency, by Miss Josephine Goldmark. (Russell
Sage Foundation,) 1913. See also Bulletin No. 250, U. 8. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 1919.
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employers, and the public to draft and enforce regulations neces-
sary to the successful execution of all measures designed to pro-
tect the interests and welfare of labor. 71
Altho individuals and organizations interested in the mainte-
nance of labor safeguards enunciated principles and made recom-
mendations similar to the above, the tendency to repeal or sus-
pend protective legislation grew apace during the months im-
mediately following our declaration of war. In many of the
states there was an unmistakable movement toward the repeal of
laws restricting hours of work or toward giving to state officials
authority to abrogate protective legislation under certain condi-
tions. 72 On April 12, 1917, Vermont enacted a law allowing the
Commissioner of Labor, with approval of the Governor, to sus-
pend the laws limiting women's and children's working hours;
New Hampshire, on April 19, 1917, authorized the Governor to
suspend labor laws at the request of the Council of National De-
fense
;
and a similar law was enacted by the state of Connecticut,
May 2, 1917. This list might be extended to include many other
states in which labor safeguards were either threatened or com-
pletely broken down.73
Shortly after the entry of the United States into the war,
Governor Brumbaugh of Pennsylvania wrote President Wilson
relative to the wisdom of protecting the safeguards that have
been built around American labor. In his reply the President
said:
I think it would be most unfortunate for any of the States to relax the
laws by which the safeguards have been thrown about labor. I feel that
there is no necessity for such action, and that it would lead to a slackening
of the energy of the nation rather than to an increase in it, besides being
very unfair to the laboring people themselves.7*
Yet there was a suspension of the federal eight-hour laws un-
der authority of the Naval Appropriations Act, approved March
71 See Special Bulletin No. 1, April, 1917, of the American Association
for Labor Legislation, and recommendations of the National Child Labor
Committee : What Shall We Do for the Children in Time of War, October,
1917.
72 First Annual Report of the Council of National Defense, 1917, p. 87.
73 See Labor Laws in War-time, Special Bulletin No. 2, of the American
Association for Labor Legislation, June, 1917.
7* Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, July, 1917, p. 54.
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4, 1917 (Public No. 391, 64th Congress), due to the national
emergency for work connected with war and contracts of the
United States for national defense, and a waiver of the eight-
hour day law for navy department contracts under authority of
the President's order, March 22, 1917, and issued in Secretary
of the Navy Daniels 's order of June 23, 1917. 75 It should be
said, however, that in the subsequent months of the war various
agencies and departments of the government bent their efforts
to establish and maintain the eight-hour day in industries direct-
ly operated by the government and private plants working on
government contracts, and President Wilson vetoed the bill
passed by both houses of Congress providing for the introduc-
tion of a nine-hour work-day for government employees. The
true attitude of the departments of government toward labor
safeguards was set forth in the following summary of General
Orders No. 13, issued by the Chief of Ordnance, November 15,
1917:
In view of the urgent necessity for a prompt increase in the volume of
production of practically every article required for the conduct of the war,
vigilance is demanded of all those in any way associated with industry, lest
the safeguards with which the people of the country have sought to protect
labor should be unwisely and unnecessarily broken down.
It is a fair assumption that for the most part these safeguards are the
mechanism of efficiency. Industrial history proves that reasonable hours,
fair working conditions, and a proper wage scale are essential to high pro-
duction. During the war every attempt should be made to conserve in every
possible way all our achievements in the way of social betterment.
Excessive hours or unfair wages were not to be tolerated, the
basic day was not to exceed ten hours, time and one-half was to
be paid for overtime ; Saturday half-holiday, legal holidays, and
one day of rest in seven were to be granted. All necessary pro-
tection of labor against danger, together with precautionary
measures for comfort and sanitation, wages comparable with the
advance in the cost of living, protection of women and juvenile
workers, and no child labor were to be assured.76 The attitude
of the departments of the national government was a powerful
contrast to that evidenced by many state legislatures. The prob-
lem became serious, for our states had not yet learned the truth
Ibid., p. 55, and August, 1917, p. 148.
7
Ibid,, December, 1917, pp. 51-53.
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that in the long run a well-protected labor force is likely to be
the most contented and efficient, while the exploited masses not
only consciously or unconsciously become inefficient, but consti-
tute fruitful ground for the sowing of seeds of discontent, in-
dustrial unrest, and revolutionary propaganda. It has been well
stated that: "The war, which ushered in a concerted attack on
protective labor legislation for women, ended by demonstrating
more clearly than ever before the scientific basis of such restric-
tions and their necessity in the maintenance of efficiency and
output."
77
8. INDUSTRIAL UNREST
A great national emergency like the recent war is an oppor-
tune time for the assertion of the claims of labor, since, for rea-
sons already suggested, the supply of labor is much less than the
demand. Realization of this strategic position is likely to make
labor restless and to encourage vigorous presentation of its de-
mands for shorter hours, higher wages, recognition of the union,
and better working conditions, all of which in normal times are
put forth with much less assurance of success. None of the
belligerent countries escaped the serious problem of industrial
unrest in an accentuated form, and each government constantly
faced the necessity of placating or coercing the mass of laborers
who took advantage of the crisis to press home their claims.
Conspicuous among the many contributing causes of this wide-
spread industrial unrest, as it appeared in the United States,
were the growing independence of labor, the rapidly rising level
of prices, the spread of revolutionary ideas, and the quite preva-
lent belief that the European war, like all others, was essentially
a capitalistic venture arising out of the struggle for world mar-
kets. Before discussing these and other causes it is necessary to
examine the development of industrial unrest in the United
States during the period of the war.
The entrance of the United States into the war was followed
by general labor unrest; strikes or threatened strikes appeared
as the order of the day.
' ' With the coming on of the war, tradi-
tional cleavages between employers and wage earners were ac-
" Hobbs, Margaret A., American Labor Legislation Review, Vol. 8, p.
336 (December, 1918).
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centuated,
' '
stated the Secretary of Labor. 78 In every section of
the country industrial unrest expressed in strikes or threatened
walk-outs imperiled the production of essential war supplies.
During the summer and fall of 1917 important war industries
in the "West experienced disastrous shutdowns. Trade union offi-
cials agreed that the extent and nature of the industrial unrest
that wa$ manifested in the western part of this country was the
cause of deep concern to those responsible for the conduct of the
nation's affairs. 79 Disputes were prevalent in four copper dis-
tricts of Arizona in which was mined twenty-eight per cent of the
copper produced in the United States, and within three months
these shutdowns entailed a loss of 100,000,000 pounds of copper.
Oil was another essential war product, especially for the navy,
yet there was widespread unrest in the oil fields of California,
which average in output 8,000,000 barrels a month or about one-
third of the total output of the whole United States. In these
oil fields about 18,000 men were employed.80 The tie up of the
telephone industry of the northwest states, which employed over
12,000 persons, greatly threatened the means of communication.
The lumber industry of the Pacific Northwest, which was so es-
sential to aircraft and ship construction and which employed
70,000 men, suffered a serious breakdown for several months
during the summer of 1917, and for several months afterwards
operated far below normal productivity. The labor troubles in
the meat packing industry centering in Chicago threatened, late
in 1917, to paralyze the entire industry employing over 100,000
men, and endangered the meat supply for ourselves and our
allies. 81 All these cases were dealt with by the President's Medi-
ation Commission whose work is discussed elsewhere in this
study.
82
Industrial unrest was not confined to any one section of the
country, but characterized almost every type of industry in
every section of the country. Between October, 1917, and Jan-
78 Fifth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1917, p. 158.
73 Eeport of the Proceedings of the Thirty-seventh Annual Convention of
the American Federation of Labor, 1917, p. 88.
so Official Bulletin, February 11, 1918, pp. 9, 12.
si Ibid., p. 12.
82 See Part II, pp. 150-155.
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uary, 1918, an examination of eighteen strikes reported in a
daily newspaper disclosed the fact that 750,000 men were direct-
ly affected, and 90,000 men indirectly affected. These statistics
are inadequate, for in only two of the cases were there any re-
ports of men indirectly affected. A strike in the Lake Carriers'
Association, comprising 64 vessel owners and 400 vessels, threat-
ened to undermine completely the transportation of iron ore,
coal, and other supplies on the Great Lakes, the strike being
called for October 1, 1917, a critical period in our war prepara-
tion.83 In Alabama 25,000 miners threatened to walk out and
were prevented from doing so only by the intervention of the
government. In the railroad shops of the Southwest 42,000 me-
chanics threatened to strike, in the shipyards over 175,000 men,
and in the Pennsylvania coal mines 8,000 men, all in the summer
of 1917.84
Since there has been some controversy as to whether industrial
strikes increased subsequent to the entry of this country into
the war, further statistics will not be amiss. During the six
months from April 6 (the day we declared war on Germany) to
October 6, 1917, nearly 3,000 strikes occurred in industrial estab-
lishments in the United States, according to an examination of
various sources of information. This number cannot be said to
include all strikes taking place within that period. A very sug-
gestive investigation of the first six months of our active partici-
pation in the war throws light on the situation as it existed.85
Reports on 1,156 strikes gave the following statistics : number of
employees idle, 283,402; number of days of production lost,
6,285,519 ; 251,400 persons would have to work a whole month to
make up the loss of production ; a manufacturing plant employ-
ing 1,000 workers would have to operate for 21 years of 300
work-days to offset the loss sustained by these strikes ; the aver-
age loss per worker was 22.2 days. Among the most essential
war industries were the metal trades, shipbuilding, coal mining,
and copper mining. These constituted 46.1 per cent of the 1,156
strikes reported, 61.8 per cent of all the workers idle, and 66.3
ss Iron Age, Vol. 101 (No. 12), p. 745.
84 Official Bulletin, August 29, 1917, p. 29.
85 Strikes in American Industry in War-time, Besearch Keport No. 3, of
the National Industrial Conference Board, March, 1918, pp. 3, 5.
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per cent of the work-days lost,
the table below.86
Further statistics are given in
TABLE II. CLASSIFICATION OF STRIKES ACCORDING TO INDUSTRIES
Establishments Employees Work-days
Industry Affected Made Idle Lost
No. Per cent No. Per cent No. Per cent
Total 1,156
Metal Trades
Shipbuilding
Coal Mining
Copper Mining
Textiles
Lumber
Clothing, Hats, Shoes .
Railroads
Miscellaneous .
.,15
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It will be noted from the above table that during the three
years (1916, 1917, 1918) there was a total of 11,430 strikes and
lockouts, of which 11,092 were strikes and 336 were lockouts. Of
the 11,092 strikes 7,414 or about 67 per cent occurred during the
two years in which we were at war, while of the 336 lockouts,
230 or about 68 per cent took place in that period. In 1917 there
were more strikes and lockouts than in 1916
;
while in 1918 there
were less than in either of the two preceding years.
Interesting statistics concerning the distribution of strikes is
contained in the data below : 88
TABLE IV. NUMBER OF STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS IN 1916, 1917, AND 1918,
BY SEXES
Strikes Lockouts
Sex 1916 1917 1918 1916 1917 1918
Males 3,042 3,434 2,345 76 99 76
Females 122 152 86 .. .'. 3
Males and Females 260 184 263 9 6 11
Not reported 254 463 487 23 21 14
Total 3,678 4,233 3,181 108 126 104
The statistics of the above table indicate that men only were
involved in about 82 per cent of the strikes in 1916, about 81
per cent in 1917, and about 74 per cent in 1918, while women
were involved in comparatively few strikes. Men only were in-
volved in about 70 per cent of the lockouts in 1916, 78 per cent
in 1917, and 73 per cent in 1918, while women were locked out
by employers in comparatively few cases.
In 1916, in 2,600 strikes and 64 lockouts the number of persons
involved was stated to be 1,546,428 and 53,182 respectively, or
an average of 595 and 831, respectively; in 1917, in 2,174
strikes and 46 lockouts the number of persons involved was re-
ported to be 1,193,867 and 19,133, respectively, or an average
of 549 and 416, respectively; and in 1918, in 2,027 strikes and
70 lockouts the number of persons involved was said to be 1,192,-
418 and 43,041, respectively, or an average of 588 and 615,
respectively.
89 This means that during the three years 6,801
strikes made idle 3,932,713 persons, and 180 lockouts made idle
ss Monthly Labor Eeview, TL S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, June, 1919,
p. 310.
td., p. 311.
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115,356 persons. Of the total number of persons made idle dur-
ing this period on account of strikes approximately 61 per cent
were out of work for varying periods during the two years in
which we were at war, while of the total number of persons
forced out of employment on account of lockouts during the
three years fully 54 per cent were locked out during the two
years of our active participation in the war.
Brief mention should be made concerning the duration of the
strikes and lockouts. Of 6,368 strikes reported in 1916, 1917,
1918, 2,540 lasted from less than one to not more than seven
days ; 861 from eight to fourteen days ; 483 from fifteen to twen-
ty-one days ; 219 from twenty-two to twenty-eight days ; 76 from
forty-three to forty-nine days ; 201 from fifty to seventy-seven
days ; 216 from seventy-eight to one hundred and nineteen days ;
and 47 over two hundred days. No information regarding dura-
tion was reported in 1,391 cases. These statistics indicate that
of the 6,368 strikes reported 3,894 or about 61 per cent ended
within three weeks, while of the 174 lockouts reported 65 or
about 36 per cent ended within that time. 90
Of the 11,092 strikes tabulated by the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics during the three years (1916, 1917, 1918), 8,373 or about
76 per cent occurred north of the Ohio and east of the Missis-
sippi; 2,018 or about 18 per cent occurred west of the Missis-
sippi ; and 701 or about 6 per cent south of the Ohio and east of
the Mississippi. Of the 335 lockouts reported 230 or about 68
per cent occurred north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi ;
74 or about 22 per cent occurred west of the Mississippi ; and 34
or about 10 per cent occurred south of the Ohio and east of the
Mississippi. Industries having the largest number of strikes and
lockouts were as follows: building trades, clothing industries,
mining, shipbuilding, textile industry, metal trades, and trans-
portation.
91
The trend of industrial unrest during recent years may be
seen also from an examination of the reports on the work of
conciliation and mediation of the United States Department of
Labor. "The number of labor disputes calling for government
mediation increased suddenly and enormously with the begin-
so For complete data see ibid., p. 313.
9i For statistics of distribution of strikes and lockouts by industries
see ibid., p. 312.
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ning of the war" 92 and Congress, recognizing the need of deal-
ing with the situation, appropriated and made available for 1917,
$100,000 for the mediation work of the Department of Labor.
In the cases coming before the mediators of the Department of
Labor from April 6, to June 30, 1917, 228,123 employees were
directly affected, and 178,376 were indirectly affected; and by
October 25, 1917, these had been extended to include an aggre-
gate of 572,029 men directly affected and approximately 380,954
involved indirectly. The number of cases coming before the con-
ciliators of the Department of Labor were as follows :
March 4, 1913, to June, 1914 33
1915 42
1916 227
1917 378
1918 1,217
Total 1,897
These cases embraced controversies in nearly every state of the
Union in exact figures 43 states, together with Alaska and
Porto Rico.93 For the fiscal year 1917 there were 473,734 work-
ers affected directly, and 334,225 indirectly.94 In the table below
are given the statistics on mediation of labor disputes for each
month during the fiscal year 1918 : 95
TABLE V. NUMBER OF MEN DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY AFFECTED IN ALL
CASES COMING BEFORE THE DIVISION OF CONCILIATION OF THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, IN EACH
MONTH DURING THE FISCAL YEAR 1918 s6
Workmen affected in all cases
Month Directly Indirectly
July 159,505 68,842
August 122,164 38,484
September 98,970 96,530
October 64,048 66,347
November 53,125 145,385
December 46,412 115,007
January 126,436 103,345
2 Fifth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1917, p. 51.
83 Ibid., p. 50. The figures for 1918 are from the Sixth Annual Report
of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 31.
* Fifth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1917, p. 51.
5 Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 30.
86 Compiled from the Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
1917-18.
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February 58,069 120,455
March 41,644 80,931
April 81,348 162,734
May 98,951 116,926
June 90,670 200,671
Total 1,041,342 1,315,657
It will be seen from the foregoing statistics that the number
of cases coming before the Division of Conciliation during the
period of the war, 1914 to 1918, totalled 1,864. Of this number
of disputes 1,595 arose during the time the United States was at
war. In other words, about 85.5 per cent of all the cases under
consideration came before the Division subsequent to our entry
into the war, while 14.5 per cent were handled previous to that
time. During the fiscal year 1918 a total number of 1,217 dis-
putes came before the Division, involving 1,041,342 workmen
directly affected, and 1,315,657 indirectly affected. This means
that two and one-half millions of wage earners, approximately
three times as many as during the preceding year, were involved
in cases submitted to the Division of Conciliation
;
that the aver-
age number of workmen directly affected in the 1,217 disputes
was about 855, the average number indirectly affected about
1,081.
These statistics are not necessarily an index to an increase in
the number of industrial disputes, altho there is no reason to
doubt that they express such a tendency. They show positively,
however, an increasing desire on the part of employers and em-
ployees to mediate their difficulties. That this increasing ten-
dency toward conciliation during the war period is indicative of
a permanent change in the attitude of labor and capital toward
the amicable settlement of their difficulties does not necessarily
follow, for during the recent national crisis both parties to the
industrial conflict were actuated by the powerful motive of
patriotism, and in times of peace such a motive is not a dynamic
factor. The total number of strikes occurring during the last
four years was much greater than the statistics of the previous
pages imply. Many other governmental agencies, including the
production departments, were solving the problem of industrial
unrest in their own way, and complete statistics on the number
of disputes coming before these agencies are not available at this
time. These would doubtless swell the total.
CHAPTER IV
The economics and psychology of unionism and the labor
movement are as yet vaguely understood. This lack of under-
standing of one of the most potent agencies in modern industrial
life is due largely to a corresponding deficiency of knowledge of
the conditions that have produced the phenomenon of unionism
and that today constitute the greatest stimulus to its growth.
The interesting but impractical schemes advanced for dealing
with the problem of industrial unrest during the period of the
recent war are convincing evidence of the unwillingness or in-
ability of many persons in public and private life to comprehend
the true nature of the labor problem and the phenomenon of
trades-unionism. Until there is adequate comprehension of the
industrial and other causes that give rise to the recurrent
phenomena of labor disputes a solution of the labor problem
manifested in these disputes will not be forthcoming. It is not
too much to say that ignorance of the principle of causation, as
it operates in the industrial system, giving rise to maladjustment
in industrial relations, has been responsible for the failure to
provide an acceptable means of preventing industrial conflict.
The labor problem, like the broad field of economics of which it
is a part, is of such general interest and touches the business of
living so intimately and affects so largely the whole fabric of
social relations that almost every one ventures an analysis and a
solution.
At no time has familiarity with the labor problem and its
solution been more generally assumed than during the four war
years, and this fact may be partly responsible for the wilderness
of abstraction and confusion in which the problem of industrial
relations finds itself today. There is need for a more scientific
approach to the perplexing phenomenon of industrial unrest. It
is necessary to learn that such unrest grows out of definite,
ascertainable, antecedent phenomena. Complete understanding
87
88 LABOR PROBLEMS AND LABOR ADMINISTRATION [302
of these antecedents is a prerequisite to a fair consideration and
final judgment of the industrial conflict. For this reason a brief
analysis of the causes of recent industrial disputes is set forth
in the following pages.
Examination of industrial disputes during recent years re-
veals two sets of fundamental causes. In the first place, there
are what may be termed general conditions and, second, those
which may be designated as specific conditions. By general con-
ditions are meant those circumstances prevalent throughout the
industrial system of the United States, while by specific causes
are meant those conditions or circumstances which are found in
particular industrial establishments and may or may not
be present in other plants. Another classification that suggests
itself is that of a twofold division of causes into economic and
psycho-social. These economic and psycho-social elements, how-
ever, enter into almost every conceivable cause of industrial un-
rest. If we bear this in mind the division into general and spe-
cific conditions, even tho it be an arbitrary classification will,
nevertheless, be sufficient for our purposes.
Among the general conditions responsible for recent indus-
trial unrest are:
1. The high cost of living and the failure of wages to keep
pace with the rapidly rising level of prices.
2. Inequality in wage scales as between different occupations,
different establishments, and different localities.
3. The demand for a shorter work-day.
4. Faulty distribution of the labor supply and the absence of
adequate machinery for securing a better distribution.
5. Distant or absentee ownership and control of industry.
6. Autocratic government of industry.
7. Inadequate machinery for settling labor difficulties.
8. The prevalence of profiteering.
9. The spread of internationalism.
Some of the more important specific causes of recent conflict
in industrial relations are :
1. Inadequate housing and transportation facilities.
2. Lack of healthful and desirable social environment in in-
dustrial neighborhoods.
3. Demand for readjustment of rates of pay for overtime,
Sundays, night-work, and legal holidays.
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4. Discrimination against union employees, and the use of
intimidation and coercion by both employers and workmen.
5. Demand for recognition of the union and the right of
organization.
6. Undesirable conditions of employment.
7. Demand for a minimum wage scale. .
8. The employment of women on work formerly done by
men.
9. Deductions from wages to cover the cost of education, in-
surance, and medical aid.
10. The use of the permit system.
11. The practice of discounting orders for money advanced
to employees.
12. Operation of the apprentice system.
13. Demand for specific and more frequent pay-days.
14. The polyglot character of workmen in some industries.
These two groups of conditions will be considered briefly in
their relation to recent industrial disturbances.
GENERAL CAUSES OF INDUSTRIAL UNREST
(1) The High Cost of Living. The importance of the standard
of living of American workmen as a factor in the determination
and formulation of wage demands and other claims of labor is
generally recognized by students of the labor movement. 1 In
fact the bread and butter approach is the logical one to a clear
understanding of the industrial conflict, both in times of peace
and war. The war has resulted in a more general recognition of
the relation of the cost of living to industrial unrest. To the
plodding worker, the business of living has its genesis and goal
in the satisfaction of his physical and spiritual wants here and
now. Where the business of making a livelihood does not guar-
antee the satisfaction of these wants there is widespread dis-
content. When prices soar far above the level of wages the in-
evitable result is the spread of strikes and threatened strikes.
It is not necessary in this period of the world's history to pre-
sent statistical proof of the rising cost of living, for it is a fact
with which we are all unhappily too familiar. Some statistical
data, however, will show more clearly the relation of rising
i Trade Unionism in the United States, by R. F. Hoxie, especially Chap-
ter x.
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prices to labor unrest. Rising prices are a world phenomenon at
present, as they have been for some years past, and the United
States has shared generously in this common experience of the
world. Professor Kemmerer has stated this advance in prices
for the United States during the eight years from 1910 as fol-
lows : 2
INDEX NUMBERS OF WHOLESALE PRICES
Year Index Number
1910 99
1911 97
1912 101
1913 102
1914 101
1915 102
1916 125
1917 178
Statistics published by the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics for the six years from 1913 show the following ad-
vances : 3
INDEX NUMBERS OP WHOLESALE PRICES
Year Index Number All Commodities
1913. 100
1914 99
1915 100
1916 123
1917 175
1918 203
In the period from August, 1914, to August, 1918, index num-
bers for wholesale prices of farm products increased 120 per
cent; food, etc., 80 per cent; cloths and clothing 151 per cent;
fuel and lighting 89 per cent; chemicals and drugs, 107 per
cent; house furnishing goods 124 per cent. All commodities
showed an average increase of 101 per cent.4 Summarizing the
movement of wholesale prices for the period, 1914 to 1917, Pro-
fessor Kemmerer says :
Comparing individual prices for December, 1917, with those for July,
1914, we find that of the thirteen items of animal products covered by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics figures every one increased decidedly in price
2 The American Economic Review, Vol. VIII (June, 1918), p. 263.
3 Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, June, 1918, pp. 42-
93. Figures for 1918 are for August of that year.
* Ibid., October, 1918, p. 106.
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during that period, increases varying from 37 per cent to 158 per cent.
For vegetable products, eleven in number, the price rose decidedly for all
but one (potatoes), where there was a decline of 10 per cent for the dates
mentioned. Of the other ten items, the smallest increase registered was 46
per cent, and the largest 233 per cent. Of the thirteen items classified
under textile and leather goods every one increased decidedly in price, the
smallest increase for any item being 51 per cent and the largest 208 per
cent. For the fourteen items of mineral products, every one likewise in-
creased decidedly in price, the smallest increase being 17 per cent and the
largest one being 200 per cent.5
The same trend in wholesale prices is shown by several gen-
erally accepted sources. The United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics (294 commodities) shows an advance from 100 in 1913
to 175 in 1917; Annalist (25 commodities) from 100 in 1913 to
187 in 1917; Bradstreet (96 commodities) from 100 in 1913 to
170 in 1917
;
Dun (200 commodities) from 100 in 1913 to 169 in
1917; Gibson (22 commodities) from 100 in 1913 to 204 in 1917. 6
Rising wholesale prices result in similar advances in retail
prices for the principal commodities of consumption, especially
those which constitute the major portion of the nation's diet,
the demand for which is more or less inelastic. Food as a whole
was 52 per cent higher on December 15, 1917, than on December
15, 1913, and 50 per cent higher than on either December 15,
1914, or December 15, 1915. During this four-year period corn
meal advanced 108 per cent ; lard 111 per cent ; pork chops and
potatoes, 67 per cent each ; ham, 64 per cent ; milk, 44 per cent ;
butter, 37 per cent ; and eggs, 33 per cent. No article declined in
price. Of 27 commodities of general consumption enumerated
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics the retail price advanced from
91 per cent in 1913 to 138 per cent in 1917, for all articles com-
bined. 7
In the table below is given the trend of retail prices of food
from 1913 to 1917 : 8
INDEX NUMBERS OF EETAIL PRICES OF FOOD
Year Index Number
1913 100
1914 102
5 The American Economic Eeview, Vol. VIII (June, 1918), p. 264.
e Monthly Review, U. 8. Bureau of Labor Statistics, June, 1918, p. 98.
T Ibid., February, 1918, p. 92.
s Ibid., June, 1918, p. 146.
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1915 101
1916 114
1917 146
1918 159
The illuminating Report of the Railroad Wage Commission
throws further light upon the cost of living. This report shows
that the increase in the various items of the family budget from
January 1, 1916, to January 1, 1918, were as follows :
Food 52 per cent
Bent 10 per cent
Clothing 44 per cent
Fuel and Light 31 per cent
Sundries 35 per cent 10
Weighting these advances according to the proportion of ex-
penditure for each item for incomes of different amounts, the
following increases are ascertained :
Families with incomes up to $200 42 per cent
Families with incomes from $200-$400 41 per cent
Families with incomes from $400-$600 40 per cent
Families with incomes from $600-$1,000 38 per cent
Families with incomes from $1,000-$2,000 37 per cent
In the period 1915-1917, the sundry items of the workingman's
budget showed advances as follows : insurance, 50 per cent ; house
furnishings, 40 per cent ; books and papers, 50 per cent ; amuse-
ments and vacations, 15 per cent; liquor and tobacco, 75 per
cent; expenses connected with sickness and death, 50 per cent;
and all other items, 50 per cent. Many estimates show that the
purchasing power of the dollar had shrunk during this period
from 29 per cent to 50 per cent, or to 71 cents and 50 cents re-
spectively.
11
The data and conclusions of the Railroad Wage Commission
relative to the advance in the cost of living are verified by the
special investigations of the United States Shipping Board and
the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. A comparison of
the results of each investigation is given in the table below. In
Weighted index number for 22 foodstuffs in 45 cities of the United
States. Ibid., October, 1918, p. 111.
10 Eeport of the Railroad Wage Commission to the Director General of
Eailroads, April 30, 1918, p. 82.
31 Ibid., pp. 82, 83, 85.
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column five we have averaged the percentage increases of the
three studies.
TABLE VI. COMPARISON OP RELATIVE INCREASE IN SPECIFIED ITEMS OF EX-
PENDITURE AS DETERMINED BY THREE INDEPENDENT STUDIES 12
Jan. 1, 1916 June, 1916 Jan. 1, 1916
to to to
Jan. 1, 1918 Feb., 1918 Jan. 1, 1918
U. S. Bureau U. S. Ship- Railroad Average Percent-
of Labor ping Wage Com- age increase of
Item Statistics 13 Board 1* mission the studies
Food 51% 52% 52% 51.2%
Rent 3% 16% 10% 9.2%
Clothing 46% 74% 44% 54.2%
Fuel and Light 23% 49% 31% 34.1%
Sundries 40% 35% 35% 36.2%
It will be seen from the above statistics that food increased
51.2 per cent; rent, 9.2 per cent; clothing, 54.2 per cent; fuel
and light, 34.1 per cent ; sundries, 36.2 per cent.
Later information discloses a continued advance in the cost of
living. In June, 1918, the cost of living had increased about 55
per cent over the pre-war period. Data collected by the United
States Bureau of Labor but not yet completely tabulated, show
that in fifteen shipbuilding centers in August, 1918, the average
increase over 1914 was 65 per cent. For certain cities the
increase was even greater than this, as for example in New York
city where the cost of living up to December, 1918, as compared
with that for December, 1914, had advanced 75 per cent. In
October, 1918, food showed an increase of 75 per cent over the
average for 1914-1915.
13 Of all the major items in the family
budget clothing showed the greatest increase, ranging from 125
per cent to 70 per cent over the pre-war period to August, 1918,
the general advance registering between 95 per cent and 100 per
cent. 14 Furthermore, statistics reveal a marked variation as be-
tween the various shipbuilding centers, from December, 1914,
to August, 1918, according to the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics. These data are as follows : Baltimore, 80 per cent ;
12 Compiled from the report of the Railroad Wage Commission to the
Director General of Railroads, April 30, 1918, p. 86.
!3 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Study made for the United States Ship-
ping Board.
"Pacific Coast Study.
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Norfolk, 75 per cent ; Bath, Maine, 60 per cent ; Philadelphia, 67
per cent ; Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 67 per cent ; Chicago, 65
per cent ; Boston, 65 per cent ; Jacksonville, Florida, 63 per cent ;
Portland, Maine, 63 per cent; Toledo, Ohio, 63 per cent; New
York, 62 per cent ; Superior, Wisconsin, 60 per cent ; Beaumont,
Texas, 60 per cent ; Savannah, Georgia, 50 per cent ; Mobile, Ala-
bama, 56 per cent.15
Items in the worker's budget which also deserve special men-
tion are street car fares and rents. Street car fares during the
war period were raised above the five cent level in 238 cities, or
for more than one-third the urban population of the United
States and Canada. According to figures compiled by the Amer-
ican Railway Association this means a population of 11,000,000. 1G
The area of advanced street railway rates has been greatly
widened since these figures were published. This is significant
when one remembers that the street railway systems of the coun-
try are so extensively used by the laboring population, especially
in our industrial centers where these increases have been most
marked.
Workmen who, actuated either by the motive of patriotism or
the desire for higher wages, flocked to the centers of essential
war industries immediately faced advancing rents. Rising rents,
together with exorbitant prices of other necessities, absorbed a
large part and often the entire amount of the higher wages
earned in these industries. " Careful investigations have shown
that rents in industrial districts have increased in some instances
considerably more than two hundred per cent, and that labor
turnover in war industries, because of rise in rents has actually
retarded contracts sorely needed by both Army and Navy."
Furthermore, these investigations showed that some landlords
raised rents every time the wage scale of the community was
advanced, and utterly disregarded the thought of basing their
rents on a fair return on the investment.17 This unpatriotic
profiteering became so prevalent that it was necessary to intro-
duce an anti-rent profiteering bill. Such a measure was spon-
" Ogburn, William F., The Annals of the American Academy of Polit-
ical and Social Science, Vol. LXXXI, No. 170 (January, 1919), pp. 111-113.
is Chicago Tribune, August 18, 1918.
" Statement issued by the United States Department of Labor, Septeni-
be"r 4, 1918. Quotations are from mimeographed copy sent by the depart-
ment to the writer.
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sored by Representative Clark of Georgia, and was drafted at
the suggestion of the Bureau of Housing and Transportation of
the Department of Labor. 18 In general, however, there was a
wide variation in the level of rents, and they rose less rapidly
and the increases were not so marked as in the case of other items
in the family budget. According to data given above the aver-
age advance in rents from January 1, 1916, to January 1, 1918,
was 9.2 per cent. The great variation in rents is shown by the
fact that in Detroit from December, 1914, to March, 1918, rents
increased 380 per cent, while in Jacksonville, Florida, from De-
cember, 1914, to August, 1918, they fell one per cent.
The foregoing statistics indicate a great increase in the cost
of living for the United States during the period of the World
War. A fair conclusion would seem to be that the average in-
crease in the cost of living between July, 1914, when the great
war began, and November, 1918, when actual fighting ceased,
was somewhere between 55 and 65 per cent. In particular com-
munities the average advance was much greater. Examination
of official and non-official studies in prices of the major items in
the American family budget shows that they increased about as
follows: clothing, 77 per cent; food, 62 per cent; rent, 15 per
cent
;
fuel and light, 45 per cent ; sundries or miscellaneous com-
modities, 50 per cent.
19
Wages, the price paid for the services of labor, like the general
level of prices, have also advanced during these four years. Espe-
cially was this true subsequent to our entry into the European
conflict. As stated elsewhere in this study,20 wages in many in-
dustries like iron and steel, shipbuilding, and munitions, ad-
vanced as much as 50 per cent and 100 per cent during the war
period. Big increases were registered also for railroad em-
ployees under government control, aggregating at one time
$500,000,000. The war advances in railroad wages, as compiled
by the New York Times, are shown as follows :
War advances in wages by railroad companies in 1916-17: To trainmen,
(Adamson eight-hour law), $70,000,000; to other employees, $280,000,000;
total advances by companies, $350,000,000.
is Ibid.
is An excellent non-governmental study of the cost of living is Wartime
Changes in the Cost of Living, Eesearch Report No. 9, National Industrial
Conference Board, August, 1918.
20 See pp. 62-63.
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War advances in wages by Eailroad Administration, 1918-19: First
Cycle, (Lane Wage Board) : To trainmen, $160,000,000; to other employees,
$240,000,000; total, $400,000,000.
Second Cycle, (Supplemental Increases): To shopmen, $200,000,000; to
trackmen, clerks, etc., $200,000,000 ; to telegaphers, agents, etc., $45,000,000 ;
to trainmen, (April, 1919), $65,000,000; total, $510,000,000.
Total advances by government, $910,000,000; total wage advances in
three years, $1,200,000,000, an average of $600 for each employee ; total wage
advances since beginning of war, $1,365,000,000, an average of $650 per
employee.21
To these and the numerous other advances in wage scales trade
journals and the daily press have repeatedly called attention.
Rarely, however, has precaution been taken to point out that
these increases were in nominal or money wages, and that the
increased volume of wages was due in part to the large amount
of overtime made necessary by our war program. In many in-
stances a comparison of money wages with real wages or pur-
chasing power of income would have shown a less conspicuous
advantage to the worker and, indeed, such a comparison would
often have uncovered the decidedly disadvantageous position of
the wage earner. The failure to interpret wage advances in
terms of purchasing power beclouded the fundamental issues in
the consideration of recent industrial unrest, and resulted in
much unfounded and premature criticism of American labor.
It is very necessary, therefore, before formulating any conclu-
sions relative to the phenomena of industrial disputes, that we
consider, among other things, the recent trend of wages. The
statistics of the following table will throw some light on this
consideration :
TABLE VII. INDEX NUMBERS SHOWING THE TREND OF UNION WAGES PER
HOUR AND PER WEEK, AND RETAIL PRICES, 1913 TO 1917 22
Bates of wages Bates of wages per Betail prices
Year per hour week full time of food
1913 100 100 100
1914 102 102 102
1915 103 102 101
1916 107 105 114
1917 114 112 146
21 Quoted in the Weekly Letter No. 65, (April 24, 1919), The National
Founders' Association, p. 2.
22 Monthly Beview, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, June, 1918, p. 146.
Wage figures are for the month of May of each year.
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It will be seen that the average rate of wages per hour in May,
1917, was 14 per cent higher than in May, 1913, while wage rates
per week, full time, showed an average increase of 12 per cent.
For certain industries, of course, the advance in wages was much
greater than these data indicate. The purchasing power of
union wages for the period 1913 to 1917 is set forth in the table
below :
TABLE VIII. INDEX NUMBERS OF THE PURCHASING POWER OF UNION
WAGES AS MEASURED BY FOOD PRICES, 1913 TO 1917 23
Purchasing power of union wages measured by
Year retail prices of food
Of rates of wages Of rates of wages per
per hour week full time
1913 100 100
1914 100 99
1915 101 101
1916 94 93
1917 78 77
From the above table it is seen that an hour's wages in 1917
purchased but 78 per cent as much food as in 1913, and a week's
wages only 77 per cent as much. The Bureau's figures both as to
wages and prices go back to 1907, but we are concerned here
primarily with the period 1913 to 1917. The decline of 22 per
cent in the purchasing power of union wages per hour and of 23
per cent in the purchasing power of union wages per week, full
time, indicated in the above table is significant when one recalls
the suggestion made elsewhere in this study, namely, that rising
prices without a corresponding advance in wages tends to create
industrial unrest.
A fact which should not be lost sight of in this connection,
however, is that wages advanced in the leading occupations of
the United States, and that these increases were greatest, not in
the organized or unionized trades, but in those in which the
union movement has made little or no progress. According to a
recent investigation, wages in 1917 ranged from 11 per cent to
87 per cent higher than in 1911-1912, and from 6 per cent to 105
per cent in 1917 over 1914-1915. The three industries in which
wage increases were especially notable were iron and steel,
bituminous coal mining, and shipbuilding. Organization has
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made practically no headway in the iron and steel industry,
while in bituminous coal mining organization has long been very
effective. The shipbuilding industry is partly organized and
partly unorganized. It would seem, then, that there is no strong
connection between organization of labor and recent wage in-
creases. For this reason the purchasing power of recent union
wages is not an index of advances in real wages. For the great
mass of workmen the greatest percentages of wage increase have
appeared during the war in those communities characterized as
"poorly organized," due to the fact that wage levels in such
communities were at a very low ebb as compared with organized
communities. "Unorganized labor seems more responsive to the
immediate demands of the moment than is organized labor. Its
wages have tended to rise more rapidly in periods of business
activity and to sink more rapidly in periods of business depres-
sion." 2*
An example of recent wage increases in an unorganized
industry is found in farming, which has never been gener-
ally and successfully organized. Farm labor during recent years
has received a general increase in pay. As a general average
for the whole of the United States the advance in wages per
month, with board, for farm labor in 1917 over 1916 was 24.2
per cent. The increase over 1910 was 50.3 per cent. In the
average rate of wages including board, for harvest hands the
increase in 1917 over 1916 was 23.1 per cent ; without board, 22.7
per cent. For day labor, outside of harvest, farmers paid 23.8
per cent more, including board, and 24.7 per cent more, exclu-
sive of board. "The general fact is that the rates of wages for
farm labor increased almost one-quarter in one year and about
two-fifths to one-half in seven years.
' ' 25
The great disturbance in the price level resulting from a state
of world war focused attention upon the relation of the standard
of living to wages and industrial unrest. The major demand of
striking workers everywhere was for an advance in the wage
scale commensurate with the increase in prices. This situation
necessitated official studies of the cost of living, some of which
we have cited above. In 1907, according to Dr. R. C. Chapin's
24 Hanna, H. S., and Lauck, W. Jett, Wages and the War, pp. 3-6.
25 The President 's Mediation Commission, Official Bulletin, February 11,
1918, p. 14.
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excellent study, an income less than $800 was insufficient to
guarantee the maintenance of a normal standard, and an income
of $900 or over would probably sustain such a standard, at least
as far as the physical man was concerned. 20 In 1914 the min-
imum-of-subsistence budget for New York City which was set
by the New York Factory Investigation Commission was $876.
In 1915 the Bureau of Personal Service of the Board of Estimate
and Apportionment of New York City estimated that the min-
imum budget for an unskilled laborer's family in New York was
$845.27 These estimates were made before the great upheaval in
prices began, which was noticeable first in the summer of 1915.
Since that time numerous changes have been made in the so
called "normal standards" of living. The cost-of-living division
of the National War Labor Board, basing its conclusion upon
data collected by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics in
1918, showed that a family of five in a large eastern city should
have an income of $1,380 in order to maintain a minimum of
subsistence. Later the board set budget of $1,760 to cover
minimum subsistence expenditures. The apportionment of a
family budget in the New York shipbuilding district in No-
vember, 1918, was: food, $607.02; clothing, $200.07; housing,
$174.14 ; fuel and light, $62.21 ; furniture, etc., $43.58 ; miscel-
laneous, $261.62. The statistics for Seattle in June, 1917, give
the following apportionment: food, $576.38; clothing, $240.70;
housing, $211.51 ; fuel and light, $73.19 ; furniture, etc., $73.87 ;
miscellaneous, $393.45. 28 These data indicate that the family
budget in New York in 1918 called for a minimum income of
$1,348.64; while the Seattle budget required an income of
$1,569.10. Similar minimum-subsistence budgets were compiled
from other investigations, including the packing house investi-
gation in Chicago in 1918. The same budget which necessitated
an income of between $700 and $900 in 1907 and 1914, required
in 1918 a minimum income of from $1,300 to $1,600. "It seems
20 Chapin, B. C., Standard of Living Among Worlcingmen's Families in
New York, pp. 245, 246.
27 Ogburn, William F., The Annals of the American Academy of Social
and Political Science, Vol. LXXXI, No. 170 (January, 1919), p. 115. See
also Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, March, 1919,
pp. 5, 6.
28 Monthly Labor J.Yr-V,/, I". S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, March, 1919,
pp. 5, 6.
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fairly clear that in June, 1918, the minimum of subsistence for
a family of five living in a large eastern city was from $1,350-
$1,400. If the cost of living since June, 1918, to the present time
(November, 1918) has risen 10 per cent, then a minimum of
subsistence at the present time costs about $1,500 for a family of
five in a large eastern city.
' ' 29 All this means that the family
income in 1918 would have to increase approximately 100 per
cent to guarantee the same standard of living as obtained in
1907. Income, however, did not keep pace with the level of
prices, and the discrepancy between prices and income contrib-
uted most to the spread of industrial unrest during the war.
This fact is attested by the numerous cases that came up for
adjudication before such agencies as the President's Mediation
Commission, the War Labor Board, the Shipbuilding Labor Ad-
justment Board, and the Division of Conciliation of the Depart-
ment of Labor.
(2) Inequality in Wage Standards. We have already dis-
cussed the existence of inequality in wage scales as between dif-
ferent sections of the United States and different occupations
and establishments within the same territory. It is necessary
here only to point out the relation of such inequality to recent
labor unrest. The increased demand for labor arising out of a
state of war, coupled with the decrease in the supply of labor
due to the selective draft, made it unnecessary for any laborer or
group of laborers to remain in an establishment which paid a
wage lower than the rates prevailing in neighboring plants. It
was natural that workmen should leave the occupations and
establishments in which pay was comparatively low and seek
those having higher wage scales. Altho the difference between
real wages was not always sufficient to repay this labor migra-
tion, nevertheless, the fact that money wages were much higher
proved an effective inducement to workmen. For instance, even
tho the difference in real wages was not so great as to constitute
a fundamental attraction to labor, still the fact that money wages
for farm labor were higher per month in 1917 for some sections
of the country than for others tended to cause a conspicuous
migration of farm hands. Monthly wage scales for farm labor
29 Ogburn, William F., The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, Vol. LXXXI, No. 170 (January, 1919), p. 116.
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that ranged from $21.88 in the South Central States to $36.23
in the North Central States west of the Mississippi River, and
$44.25 in the "Western and Pacific States, with board in each case,
had a decided influence upon the dislocation of the labor supply
and made this kind of labor generally restive.
Another excellent example of this competition for workers
and its consequent effect upon the movement of labor forces was
that of the shipyards. The Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment
Board fixed seventy-two and one-half cents an hour for the cop-
persmiths in the yards on the Atlantic Coast. The outside shops
immediately offered eighty-five and ninety cents an hour and
succeeded in taking seventy-five per cent of the coppersmiths out
of the shipyards, which compelled the yards to sublet their cop-
persmith work to the outside shops.30
It is true that labor was not always financially able to migrate
freely to take advantage of differences in wage rates. Labor is
frequently characterized by an unfortunate immobility, and in
normal times this immobility conduces to destructive competi-
tion. In a period of labor shortage, however, employers are
often ready to furnish sufficient inducement and immediate
financial aid to enable workmen to throw up the old job and
accept a new one. Labor-stealing was excessively practiced by
employers during the recent war, and this resulted in marked
inequality in wage scales. This inequality encouraged workmen
to force their demands for wage advances within their old estab-
lishment, for they realized that if the demand was refused ample
employment at higher pay was obtainable elsewhere. In this
way inequality in wages stimulated industrial unrest. It was
quite generally recognized by employers and government offi-
cials that the prevailing inequalities in wage rates resulted in:
(a) a great increase in labor turnover; (b) encouragement of
idling and inefficiency; and (c) stimulation of industrial dis-
putes.
(3) Deemand for a Shorter Work-day. It is a fact too familiar
for extended discussion here that the desire for a shorter work-
day almost always has been a potent factor in industrial unrest.
It is necessary merely to point out that during the recent world
soMacy, Everit V., The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, Vol. LXXXI, No. 170 (January, 1919), p. 85.
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crisis this desire received quickened emphasis, and to a remark-
able extent labor, under the pressure of the emergency, was suc-
cessful in securing recognition of its demand for the basic eight-
hour day.
The need for increased production of materials for war pur-
poses had the rather natural effect of intensifying the demand
of employers for even a longer work-day, or at least for the
maintenance of the old basic schedule of ten hours. Conscious
of its indispensability in the nation's war program and of the
acute shortage of workers in given occupations, labor was equally
emphatic in demanding a reduction in hours of work. These
two desires diametrically opposed to each other resulted in an
accentuation of industrial unrest. In the United States, as in
England, the demand for a shorter work-day was given great
impetus by the sympathetic attitude of the government towards
it. This sympathy was based on the belief that there exists a
very intimate relation between an eight-hour day and efficiency
in production. Just before the United States entered the war
Congress, desirous of protecting the principle of an eight-hour
day included in one section of the Naval Appropriations law
the following provision:
That in case of national emergency the President is authorized to sus-
pend the provision of law prohibiting more than eight hours labor in any
one day of persons engaged upon work covered by contracts with the United
States: Provided further, That the wages of persons employed upon such
contracts shall be computed on a basic day rate of eight hours work with
overtime rates to be paid for at not less than time and one-half for all hours
work in excess of eight hours.31
We have already called attention to the orders issued by the
Quartermaster General and the Chief of Ordnance, as well as
those of the United States Shipping Board and other govern-
ment agencies relative to the basic eight-hour day and other
labor safeguards.
32
Organized labor fully recognized that the great emergency in-
cident to war increased the opportunity for the enforcement of
the demand for a basic eight-hour day and heightened the prob-
ability of its establishment, in spite of opposition by employers.
"The principle of a maximum work-day of eight hours has been
si Naval Appropriations Act, approved March 4, 1917 (Public No. 391),
64th Congress, Section 180.
sz See p. 77.
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endorsed by society and officially by the United States Govern-
ment. The eight-hour day represents a standard of productivity,
of living, and of conservation. By protecting the workers
against over-fatigue and enabling them to sustain their highest
degree of productivity and skill, the eight-hour work-day not
only is an assurance that workers will make their most effective
contribution to production, but they will also be more useful and
honorable members of society.
' ' S3
When the war broke out and "the large contracts for war
materials were being let organized labor insistently presented its
case for the application of the eight-hour day to government
contracts and government work.
" 34 In response to the demand
of the representatives of labor the national government endorsed
the basic eight-hour day, and this endorsement was emphatically
cited as one of the fundamental causes of industrial unrest, em-
ployers insisting that the attitude of the government stimulated
workers' demands for shorter hours. 35 Samuel Gompers is re-
ported to have gone a step further and proposed a basic seven-
hour day for the period of the war, with a view to conservation
of fuel and relief of traffic congestion, which during the war
constituted such grave problems to the nation. This proposal
evoked great denunciation by employers and their spokesmen
who insisted that ' ' in spite of the great emergency and the neces-
sity of maximum production, Mr. Gompers and other labor lead-
ers have taken advantage of the situation to urge the eight-hour
day and other measures calculated to reduce rather than increase
production."
36 (Coal miners both in England and the United
States have endorsed recently the six-hour day. ) Manufacturers
considered labor union methods the greatest menace in our coun-
try at this period, because of their insistence upon a basic eight-
hour day and higher wages, for which strikes and threatened
strikes were increasingly instituted.
37 The President's Media-
tion Commission which had been engaged in extensive work in
mediation of labor disputes in the Pacific Northwest, stated in
its report that one of the fundamental causes of industrial un-
33 Report of the Proceedings of the Thirty-seventh Annual Convention of
the American Federation of Labor, 1917, p. 93.
z* Ibid., p. 93.
ss Iron Age, Vol. 101, No. 12, p. 782.
3 Ibid., No. 5, pp. 359, 360.
37 Ibid., No. 8, p. 496.
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rest was the desire of the men for an eight-hour working day
and the opposition of the employers to the introduction of such
a day.
' '
Opposition to the eight-hour day is carried to the point
of binding members of an employers' association on the Pacific
Coast by agreement to discriminate against such mills as intro-
duce the change," and the opinion of the commission was that
the basic eight-hour day in the Pacific Northwest was indispens-
able in order to assure stability of production and efficiency of
output, and to obtain adequate labor supply in the face of bet-
ter conditions elsewhere. 38
An examination of the cases adjusted by the National War
Labor Board and the investigations of private agencies shows
that the demand for shorter hours has been one of the principal
causes of labor disputes during the four war years, and that it
is becoming an even greater and more universal cause of indus-
trial unrest as the years pass. For instance, of 1,156 strikes in-
vestigated by the National Industrial Conference Board fully
60 per cent were either wholly or partly attributed to the desire
for a shorter working day.39
(4) Faulty Distribution of the Labor Supply and the Ab-
sence of Machinery for Better Distribution. The fact that some
industries and some localities were well supplied with workers
while others were suffering from a dearth of labor was responsi-
ble for restlessness on the part of workmen, and greatly accentu-
ated the problem of labor turnover. Where the opportunities
for work are numerous labor migration tends to increase and,
like a ball of snow, it increases in size the more it rolls. As the
President's Mediation Commission observed:
The derangement of our labor supply is one of the great evils in industry.
The shockingly large amount of labor turnover and the phenomenon of
migratory labor means an enormous economic waste and involves even a
greater social cost. . . Finally, we have failed in the full use and wise
direction of our labor supply, falsely called "labor shortage" because we
have failed to establish a vigorous and competent system of labor distribu-
tion.*
It might be conservatively stated that migratory labor, grow-
ing out of uncontrolled instability of employment and faulty
ss Official Bulletin, February 11, 1918, p. 12.
3 Strikes in American Industry in War-time, Research Eeport No. 3, Na-
tional Industrial Conference Board, March, 1918, p. 8.
4 Sixth Annual Eeport of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 25.
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distribution of labor, is one of the most potent influences in aug-
menting industrial unrest. Migratory workmen are a restless,
dissatisfied group and the longer the period of migration the
greater becomes their restlessness. In time these ''caravan"
workers become sowers of the seed of discontent and industrial
conflict.
(5) Absentee Ownership and Control of Industry. The evils
of absentee landlordism have their counterpart in distant or ab-
sentee ownership and control of industry. The fact that the
mining, oil, and lumber industries of the West are owned and
controlled by persons who reside in the East has a significant
bearing upon the growth of industrial unrest. This is the con-
clusion not only of economists but also of broadminded capital-
ists and government investigators as well.41 Technical operation
of industry tends to be left increasingly to resident managers
who "fail to understand and reach the mind and heart of labor
because they have not the aptitude or the training or the time
for wise dealing with the problems of industrial relationship.42
It is a familiar observation that the problem of industrial unrest
has developed pari passu with the increase in size of modern in-
dustry. Wherever the intimate relationships and contact of
employer and employee that characterize a small business estab-
lishment give way to the distant relationship that exists in
gigantic modern industrial establishments, with their thousands
of stockholders and absentee directors, there is lacking the surest
basis of industrial peace, namely, frequent contact between em-
ployer and employed. "The result is that contact between own-
ers and employees is practically impossible, and too frequently a
chasm opens between them.
' ' 43 The situation is the more unfor-
tunate because of the indifference of owners, directors, and man-
agers to the importance of the labor problem, or the human fac-
tor in industry. The primary concern of these administrators
in industry is profits, and they have hardly learned yet the eco-
nomic value of a scientific solution of the labor problem.
(6) Autocratic Government of Industry. It is not a new
4i See the Report of the President 's Mediation Commission ; also the
interesting pamphlets: Brotherhood and Representation in Industry, by
John D. Rockefeller, Jr.
<2 Report of the President 's Mediation Commission, Sixth Annual Report
of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, pp. 12, 13.
*s John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Brotherhood of Men and Nations, p. 8.
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thought that American industry lacks a healthy basis of rela-
tionship between management and men. In fact it has been rec-
ognized for some time that American industry is in a very
unhealthy condition as regards the relationship of labor and cap-
ital. This is due in part to the situation mentioned above
distant ownership and control and in part to the insistence of
employers upon traditional rights and their strong resistance to
any efforts on the part of labor which might curtail these rights.
Employers have insisted, and still insist, upon dealing with the
individual employee and refuse to deal with the workmen
through their union representatives. "Direct dealings with em-
ployees' associations are still the minority rule in the United
States. In the majority of instances there is no joint dealing,
and in too many instances employers are in active opposition to
labor organizations. This failure to equalize the parties in ad-
justments of inevitable industrial conflicts is the central cause
of our difficulties. " 44 In the light of the present world move-
ment for political democracy autocratic government in industry
assumes an extremely unbecoming aspect, and is no doubt one
of the basic causes of industrial unrest.
(7) Inadequate Machinery for the Adjustment .of Labor Dis-
putes. At the outbreak of the World War the United States had
only one general federal agency for dealing with industrial dis-
putes, namely, the Division of Conciliation of the Department of
Labor, and few of our states had such machinery. 45 There was
little or no opportunity for a peaceful settlement of disputes,
and industrial peace was left to passionate rivalry and antagon-
ism of divergent and competitive interests. Law gave way to
force, and order gave place to strikes, boycotts, blacklists, and
lockouts. A coordinated, continuous, widely disseminated sys-
tem of adjusting disputes would have done much to avert this
disorder.
(8) The Prevalence of Profiteering. Reports of profiteering
in foodstuffs, clothing, and rents are too familiar to warrant de-
tailed treatment here. The fines and other penalties imposed by
the United States Food Administration, and the evidence of the
<* See the Report of the President 's Mediation Commission, Sixth Annual
Eeport of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 24.
The United States Board of Mediation and Conciliation was created in
1913 to deal exclusively with industrial disputes on railroads.
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Division of Industrial Housing of the United States Department
of Labor quoted elsewhere in this study are striking testimonials
of the prevalence of profiteering during the period of the war.46
The findings of the Federal Trade Commission supported the
conviction of labor relative to profiteering. Altho their findings
have been the subject of much controversy and dispute and the
validity of their statement not unqualifiedly accepted, neverthe-
less, they show the trend of business earnings and certainly sup-
port the claims of labor in regard to excess profits. The commis-
sion pointed out that the net income of the United States Steel
Corporation for 1917 was $224,738,908, of which about one-tenth
was applicable to interest on bonds of the corporation and the
rest was available for dividends and surplus. Profits in the sev-
eral mills ranged from 52.63 per cent to 109.05 per cent. In the
copper industry profits for 1917 ranged from one per cent to 107
per cent on the investments; in the petroleum industry profits
ranged from losses up to 122 per cent. The meat packing in-
dustry was an especial target for the commission 's attack. Four
of the big meat packers (Armour, Swift, Morris, and Cudahy)
had an aggregate annual average pre-war profit (1912, 1913, and
1914) of $19,000,000; in 1915 they earned $17,000,000 excess
profits over the annual average for the pre-war period ; in 1916,
$36,000,000 more profit than the annual average for the pre-war
period; and in 1917, $68,000,000 more profit than the annual
average for the pre-war period. During the three war years
(1915-1917) their total profits reached the very large figure of
$140,000,000, of which $121,000,000 represents excess over their
aggregate annual average profits for the three pre-war years.
Much of this increased profit was due to higher prices rather
than to increased volume of business, the return of profit in-
creasing 400 per cent, or two and one-half times as much as the
sales.47 The commission gives statistics of profits for several
other industries, such as leather and leather goods, salmon can-
ning, canned milk, coal, zinc, sulphur, and nickel, aggregating
200 per cent in some cases.
46 See p. 94.
47 Profiteering, Senate Document No. 248, 65th Congress, 2nd Session,
pp. 9-13. The packers have disputed the conclusions of the Federal Trade
Commission, and maintained that their profits have been only a small per-
centage on the aggregate business handled.
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Workingmen soon awakened to the fact that whatever ad-
vances in wages they were able to secure were counteracted by
similar if not greater advances in the prices of commodities and
in rents. Labor generally demanded that profiteering cease, and
the President's Mediation Commission concluded that until it
did cease a sense of inequality and exploitation would cause
labor to withhold its most productive effort.48
(9) The Spread of Internationalism. The last few years have
witnessed a remarkable development of the spirit of universal
brotherhood among workmen. International labor conferences
and labor missions have been but the tangible evidence of this
increasing consciousness of solidarity of interests among the
men who toil in the world's industries. The growth of liberal-
ism, and often of socialism and syndicalism, among American
workmen in recent years a growth which cannot be measured
in terms of recorded membership of these respective groups
has stimulated rigid insistence upon the demands for higher
wages, shorter hours, better conditions of employment, recogni-
tion of the union, and so on. In other words, industrial unrest
has gathered momentum in proportion to the spread of liberal-
ism and radical ideas, for labor received therefrom fresh in-
spiration for more insistent demands for industrial justice.
SPECIFIC CAUSES OF INDUSTRIAL UNREST
The specific conditions to which the recent spread of industrial
difficulties must be attributed are the same, greatly accentuated,
as have always been responsible for maladjustment in industrial
relations. Under the abnormal circumstances of the great war
these specific causes assumed a much more serious and dynamic
character. The necessity for maximum production of every kind
of essential commodity and the resultant excessive demand for
labor coupled with diminution of the supply, constituted an
unusually opportune time for insistence upon labor's demands
and the widening of the breach between labor and capital. The
consequent urgent presentation of ultimata by the workers who
suddenly became conscious of a new independence and a strat-
egic position during the war, brought into a clearer light the
specific basic industrial conditions that make up the ferment in
the strained relations between employers and employees.
48 Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 25.
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(1) Inadequate Housing and Transportation Facilities. In-
dustrial expansion incident to the war was so great that in many
manufacturing centers the number of workmen soon outran the
housing and the transportation facilities for their accommoda-
tion.49 It was at once apparent that where such facilities were
lacking labor unrest and labor turnover greatly increased.
(2) The Lack of a Healthful, Desirable Social Environment
in Industrial Neighborhoods. Isolated mining, lumber, and oil
camps have too frequently been devoid of any healthful social
and recreational facilities, and some entrepreneurs and capitalists
have learned in recent years that there is a very definite relation
between this condition and the growth of industrial problems
pertaining to labor. The importance of fostering a community
spirit through facilities for social, recreational, and intellectual
development is receiving tardy attention as a means of allaying
labor unrest. The period of the war has done much to emphasize
this phase of the labor problem, and the period of reconstruction
is revealing throughout the world a sincere and profound inter-
est in socio-industrial conditions.
(3) Adjustment of Compensation for Overtime, Night-work,
Holidays, and Sundays. The speeding up of production incident
to the war necessitated an increase in overtime, holiday, Sunday,
and night-work. This created among workmen a demand for
readjustment of the basic standards of pay for extra work, and
this demand constituted one of the several irritants in creating
unrest. The awards made by the National War Labor Board
and other agencies of mediation, conciliation, and arbitration
generally contained the stipulation that workers should be paid
one and one-half times the regular wages for all time in excess
of eight hours, and double time for Sundays and holidays, ex-
cept where they are shift workers. The holidays specified in-
cluded New Year's, Washington's birthday, Lincoln's birthday,
Decoration Day, the Fourth of July, Labor Day, Thanksgiving
Day, and Christmas.50
(4) Discrimination against Union Employees, and the Use of
Intimidation and Coercion by both Employers and Employees.
The prevalence of the complaint made by workers that employers
*9 See the Seventh Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, pp.
130-136.
so See awards of the National War Labor Board.
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openly or secretly descriminated against members of trades-
unions was noticeable during the recent emergency. It was a
basic cause of unrest in the packing industry and in the mining
industry, as well as in other lines of production.
51 In many in-
stances workmen testified that the opposition of employers took
the form of intimidation, coercion, and dismissal. On the other
hand, employers urged that union employees were intimidating
and coercing other workmen into joining the union. Frequently,
however, investigation revealed that the evidence was not suffi-
cient to establish findings in regard to this matter.52 Whether
the basis of complaint in regard to intimidation and coercion by
either side was real or imaginary, it appeared as one of the
causes of industrial unrest during the war period. That dis-
crimination against union employees was a potent cause of
strikes and threatened strikes there is no room for doubt.
(5) Demand for Recognition of the Union. This is a familiar
cause of industrial disputes, and it has received added impetus
recently from the fact that governmental agencies created to deal
with the problem of labor unrest have generally recognized and
established the principle of the right of workmen to organize
and bargain collectively. Similar recognition has been given to
organizations of employers. The fundamental principles upon
which the National War Labor Board was founded were con-
clusive on these points: (a) The right of workers to organize
in trades-unions and to bargain collectively through their chosen
representatives was recognized and affirmed. This right was not
to be denied, abridged or interfered with by the employers in
any manner whatsoever, (b) The right of employers to organ-
ize in associations or groups and to bargain collectively through
chosen representatives was recognized and affirmed. This right
was not to be denied, abridged, or interfered with by the workers
in any manner whatsoever, (c) Employers were not to dis-
charge workers for membership in trade-unions, nor for legiti-
mate trade-union activities, (d) The workers, in the exercise of
their right to organize were not to use coercive measures of any
si See the cases that appeared before the National War Labor Board, the
President's Mediation Commission, and the Division of Conciliation of the
Department of Labor.
52 National War Labor Board, Employees v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel Com-
pany, Birmingham, Ala. Docket No. 12, p. 3.
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kind to induce persons to join their organization nor to induce
employers to bargain or deal therewith. 53 Recognition of the
right to organize does not necessarily imply a willingness on the
part of either employers to recognize and deal with the trade-
union, or of the employees to bargain with employers' associa-
tions
; consequently the demand for recognition of the union was
one of the basic causes of labor troubles during the war.54 Em-
ployers
'
opposition to trades-unions seems not to have lost any of
its rigidity in some of our larger industries as a result of the
war, although such opposition has decreased greatly in some
parts of the country. Recent investigations have shown that
direct negotiation between employers and representatives of
trades-unions is riot yet practiced extensively, and that in a vast
number of cases there is not only no joint dealing but active op-
position to labor organizations. The failure to establish col-
lective regulation of the conditions of employment may be char-
acterized as the central cause of our labor difficulties.55
(6) Undesirable Conditions of Employment. The absence of
protective regulations and other labor safeguards appeared as
one of the minor causes of labor disturbance during the last few
years. In an increasing number of cases there seems to be a
demand by workmen for such improvements as a sufficient num-
ber of sanitary drinking fountains, lavatories, lockers, and bath-
ing facilities; and, furthermore, where such facilities already
exist, that provision be made in all departments of an establish-
ment for keeping them in a clean and sanitary condition. A re-
cent award in a labor dispute specified minutely that: "San-
itary drinking fountains shall be installed so that they can be
kept packed with ice from May 15th to October 15th of each
year.
' ' 5G Other demands for improved conditions of work have
included facilities for sitting down to work and for frequent rest
periods and rest rooms, especially in the case of women and chil-
dren, and regulations for the safety and protection of the health
of all workers.
5 National War Labor Board, Docket No. 12, p. 3.
154 See Strikes in American Industry in War-time, Research Report No. 3,
National Industrial Conference Board, March, 1918, p. 8.
55 Report of the President's Mediation Commission, Sixth Annual Re-
port of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 24.
se National War Labor Board, Employees v. National Refining Company,
Coffeyville, Kansas, Docket No. 27, p. 6.
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(7) Demand for a Minimum Wage Scale. We have already
discussed the necessity of wage readjustments caused by the re-
cent advances in the price of commodities. We have seen that
wages lagged behind prices and that this fact explains in large
measure the growth of industrial disputes during the war period.
Workmen demanded that wage scales be advanced to keep pace
with the rapidly rising level of prices. It should be especially
noted, moreover, that in addition to this demand there was rigid
insistence upon the establishment of a minimum wage. Exam-
ination of the cases that came before governmental agencies of
conciliation and arbitration reveals a decided tendency towards
a general demand for a definitely prescribed minimum. These
governmental bodies, moreover, realizing the necessity of such a
minimum rate of pay, very frequently embodied it in their
awards. In the case of women over eighteen years of age the
guaranteed minimum was usually 30 cents an hour, and for
men the minimum was generally 40 cents. When women per-
formed the same tasks as men the rates of pay were the same
for both sexes. Minimum wage rates, however, did not apply
to those who by reason of old age or permanent physical in-
capacity were unable to perform a normal day's labor, and in
the case of women under twenty-one years of age were not to be
rigidly applied to inexperienced beginners or apprentices. 57
These regulations were in accord with the procedure in the vari-
ous states that have passed minimum wage legislation, and served
to prevent injustice being done to those unable to earn the
legally prescribed minimum.
(8) Employment of Women. The replacement of men by
women as a result of the war gave rise to some difficulties and
led to demands for readjustments as to compensation for work
done by women. There was danger of women being employed
at much lower rates than were formerly paid to men for the
same work. Such a practice would increase competition and
tend to pull down the wages of male employees to the level paid
to women. This situation, evidenced in many establishments in
recent years, led to a demand for equal pay for equal work.
Arbitral awards in recent cases have specified that in case wo-
men are employed on work ordinarily performed by men they
67 National War Labor Board, Employees v. St. Louis Car Company,
Docket No. 4a, p. S.
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must be allowed equal pay for equal work and must not be al-
lotted tasks disproportionate to their strength.
58
(9) Deductions from Wages. A practice that obtains in many
industrial establishments, especially those located in remote
places like some mining and lumbering camps, is the deduction
from wages of specified amounts for the provision of medical at-
tendance, school maintenance, and insurance. In some instances
$1 per month is deducted for a physician, 50 cents per month
for the maintenance of a school, and $1.25 per month for insur-
ance. These various deductions have frequently been a source
of grievance and complaint, and they constitute one of the
causes of industrial unrest. A reasonable conclusion seems to
be that, under the conditions prevailing in the neighborhoods in
which the practice of deductions obtains, there is no other or at
least no better way of providing medical serevice and proper
educational facilities, and for this reason there is ample justifica-
tion for the system, provided competent service is rendered. In
the case of insurance deductions, where the charge is optional,
there is little room for serious complaint, provided the men re-
ceive just compensation in case of misfortune.
Relative to the matter of deductions for these several purposes
government arbitrators in a recent case concluded :
' ' The obliga-
tion upon the company to select a physician with care and to see
to the proper administration of the school fund thus created is
obvious and should be strictly fulfilled. In respect to the first
two charges the arbitrators find that under the conditions pre-
vailing in the neighborhoods this is practically the only way of
securing medical service and proper educational facilities.
They do not find the charge for a physician unreasonable, if
proper medical service is rendered. The total sum collected
from all employees should secure a competent physician and
surgeon and proper medical equipment.
' ' B9
(10) The Use of the Permit System. The permit system, as
a cause of industrial unrest, may take one of two forms or both.
First, a company may require a workman to obtain a permit to
68 National War Labor Board, Employees v. Columbus Eailway, Power
and Light Company, Docket No. 46, p. 6. See also other awards of the
board.
so National War Labor Board, Employees v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel and
Iron Company, Birmingham, Alabama, Docket No. 1%, p. 3.
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change employment from one mine or establishment to another
owned by the same company; second, several companies in a
given territory may form an agreement by which one company
requires a permit from another before a workman leaving the
employment of the one shall be accepted by the other. The first
of these practices seems legitimate under the present system of
industrial government, for a company possesses full right to
jurisdiction over its several establishments. The second practice,
however, is fundamentally a disguised system of blacklisting
whereby an employee, for trades-union activities or other legit-
imate practices in keeping with his dignity as a laborer, may find
himself deprived of the opportunity to work. Objection to this
second system of permits would seem a well founded basis of
labor dispute and is conceived as such by many persons. Wil-
liam H. Taft and Frank P. Walsh, the joint chairmen of the
National War Labor Board, acting as arbitrators in a recent
dispute concluded on this point as follows :
With reference to the permit system, we deem it proper that the company
should require the workmen to obtain a permit to change employment from
one mine to another mine of the same company ; but we condemn any agree-
ment, and any practice under it equivalent to blacklisting, if it exists, by
which one company requires a permit from another before a man leaving
the employment of one company shall be accepted by the other.co
(11) Discounting Orders for Money advanced to Workmen.
The company store, with its fraudulent manipulation of book
accounts, has long been recognized as a factor in industrial
grievances. Less has been heard, however, of the practice of
discounting orders for money advanced to employees. Either on
account of low wages which prove insufficient to tide the work-
man and his family over from one pay-day to another, or be-
cause of undue extravagance or carelessness wage earners fre-
quently find themselves under the necessity of requesting an ad-
vance on their wages before pay-day arrives. Either as a meas-
ure of discouraging this practice or of consciously exploiting the
ignorant and unsuspecting laborer unfamiliar with current legal
rates of interest, companies sometimes charge a 20 per cent
discount for advances to employees. Gradual realization of this
exploitation has led to strong protest by the workmen and has
constituted a cause of malcontent. Higher wages and education
eo ibid.
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would do much to render the practice unnecessary. Where such
advances result from insufficient wages the practice of exacting
a high discount certainly cannot be justified, and it is condemned
by some under all other circumstances. 61
(12) The Apprentice System. Rules of apprenticeship have
always been jealously guarded by strongly organized skilled
workers as an effective means of regulating the labor supply, and
any encroachments upon these rules or any tendency to disre-
gard them has been vigorously protested by the unions. It can-
not be gainsaid that it is to the employer's advantage to break
down these prolonged periods of apprenticeship and so under-
mine any monopoly of the supply of labor. The employer 's task
in this regard has been increasingly easy following the invention
of mechanical appliances that enable unskilled and semi-skilled
workmen to perform tasks which formerly required thoroly
skilled and highly trained workmen. The period of the recent
great war, in making necessary increased production, presented
a strong inducement to disregard established rules of apprentice-
ship, and violation of regulations became one of the many causes
of labor troubles. It often became necessary for arbitrators to
include in their awards specific stipulations pertaining to ap-
prenticeship, namely, that apprentices be given an opportunity
to learn a trade, the character of work and compensation to be
agreed upon by joint committees of workers and employers.62
(13) Demand for Specific and more Frequent Pay Days. In
many of the recent industrial disputes specific demands relative
to the time of payment of wages have appeared as a minor cause.
Associated with the demand for a specific and regular pay-day
was the demand that only a few days
'
pay be retained. In some
establishments it is a common practice to keep back a week's or
two weeks' pay. Arbitral awards in regard to these grievances
usually stipulated that pay-days shall be once per week or once
in two weeks on companies' time and that no more than three
days' pay should be retained. 63
(14) The Polyglot Character of the Working Force. Intel-
ligent industrial relations can scarcely be expected to exist in
6i Ibid.
as National War Labor Board, Employees v. Frick Company, et al.,
Docket No. 40, p. 4.
s Ibid.
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many American industries that have drawn thefmass of their
unskilled labor from the complex races of Europe. "The poly-
glot character of the workers adds the difficulty of racial diversi-
ties." The President's Mediation Commission in its report
pointed out that in one mining camp twenty-six and in another
as many as thirty-two nationalities were represented. "The in-
dustry [Arizona copper mining] contains within itself the Bal-
kan problem on a small scale. In other camps, even where there
was not great racial diversity, large numbers were non-English
speaking, particularly Mexicans. The seeds of dissension among
the workers render difficult their cohesion, and the presence of
non-English speaking labor tends even to greater misunderstand-
ing between management and men than in the normal American
industry.
' ' 6*
Moreover, the commission found little or no
ground for the hope that this polyglot character of the working
force in some American industries will soon be eliminated, for
"the movement toward Americanization, so fruitful in its results
in different parts of the country, has hardly penetrated into
these outposts of industry. Next to nothing is done to integrate
non-English speaking labor citizens and prospective citizens
into our social life. ' ' 65
Writers upon the labor problem have not always placed suffi-
cient emphasis upon the minor conditions that conduce to mal-
adjustment in industrial relations. Attention has been focused
upon the major causes such as the demands for higher wages,
shorter hours and recognition of the union, and for this reason
minor irritants have too frequently been overlooked. Moreover,
the period of the World War 1914 to 1918 intensified the de-
mands of labor and consequently all causes of industrial unrest
assumed a far more serious aspect.
Examination of the totality of causes of labor troubles during
the four war years would seem to justify the conclusion that the
overwhelming mass of the laboring population of the United
States was generally in no sense disloyal in its insistence upon
demands for higher wages, shorter hours, better working condi-
tions, etc., but that American labor, like every other class of our
e* Eeport of the President 's Mediation Commission, Sixth Annual Report
of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 13.
o Ibid.
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citizenship, faced the necessity of adjusting itself to the new con-
ditions such as high prices incident to a state of war. We are
learning, tho very slowly, the truth already suggested in this
study, that industrial unrest is in itself a symptom and not a dis-
ease. Behind this phenomenon of discordant industrial relations
lie industrial conditions that are not in keeping with the dignity
of American labor and therefore are not voluntarily accepted by
the vast army of skilled and unskilled workers. Removal of
these conditions is the primary step towards industrial peace.
All other procedure is but an attempt to deal with effects and not
causes, to cure the disease after it appears rather than to pre-
vent its development. Industrial unrest, of course, will evidence
itself like any other maladjustment, in spite of precautionary
measures, and for this reason machinery for settling labor dis-
putes is very necessary and frequently very efficient. But great-
er energy should be expended in the elimination of those condi-
tions of industry, such as opposition to employees, organiza-
tions, insufficient wages, a long working day, and autocratic con-
trol of industry, that are responsible for the spread of discontent
among the workers. The elimination of such industrial condi-
tions promises to be one of the most effective antidotes for bol-
shevism and similar revolutionary proposals that seek to over-
throw the present organization of society.
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PART II
The Development of War Labor Administration

CHAPTER V
DECENTRALIZED LABOR ADMINISTRATION
At the time of its entry into the great war the United States
did not possess adequate executive, administrative, and judicial
machinery for dealing with the numerous labor problems that
such an emergency is likely to uncover. Consequently we were
forced to learn by the slow method of experience, which at fre-
quent intervals proved costly. The development of our war
labor administration constitutes one of the most interesting chap-
ters in the history of our industrial reorganization for war.
Characterized during the first year of our active participation in
the great struggle by a series of mistaken efforts and a groping
in the darkness after some solution for the perplexing and in-
creasingly threatening labor situation, the war labor administra-
tion of the United States finally crystallized into a centralized
and coordinated system. Differentiated administration, how-
ever, was replaced by centralized administration only after the
labor situation threatened a complete breakdown of the national
war program.
The spread of industrial unrest following our entry into the
war revealed the utter inadequacy of existing labor administra-
tive machinery to cope successfully with the problem. This sit-
uation was attributed to the fact that the functions of the De-
partment of Labor were limited by statute and incidentally by
appropriations ; also because each production department of the
government assumed the administration of labor conditions aris-
ing in connection with its own industrial projects. Labor dis-
putes, dislocation of the labor supply, lack of standardization of
wages, inadequate housing and transportation facilities, labor
turnover, etc., were commanding attention. The Department
of Labor was using its facilities to the utmost, and each of
the production departments of the government was attempting
to devise its own ways and means of handling its own problems.
Thus there was evolved a decentralized labor administration
123
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which obtained throughout the first year of our active partici-
pation in the war. Closer examination of the prevailing situa-
tion will show the extent of this decentralization.
1. PREEXISTING AGENCIES
Prior to the outbreak of the war two national government
agencies were functioning in the adjustment of industrial griev-
ances the United States Board of Mediation and Conciliation,
and the Division of Conciliation of the Department of Labor.
In addition the Department of Labor was attempting, through
the Bureau of Immigration and the Post Office, to solve the prob-
lems of employment and unemployment.
The United States Board of Mediation and Conciliation was
one of several attempts to discover some means of adjusting the
recurrent controversies between common carriers in interstate
commerce and their employees. Legislation for this purpose was
comprised in a series of acts, beginning with the act of 1888, and
including the act of 1898, known as the Erdman act, the act of
1913, known as the Newlands act, and Section 8 of an act passed
in 1913 which created the Department of Labor. The act of 1888
provided, on the initiative of the President of the United States,
for voluntary arbitration, compulsory investigation, and publi-
cation of the decision. This act was on the statute books for ten
years, and there is no record of its application as a source of
arbitration. This law was superseded by the Erdman act of
1898. 1 Under the provisions of this act the chairman of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission and the Commissioner of Labor
were required, on application of either party to the controversy,
to endeavor to adjust the difficulty by mediation. During the
first eight years after the enactment of the law only one attempt
was made to apply it, and that was not successful. Subsequently
the provisions of the law were frequently involved.
2
In July, 1913, the Erdman act was superseded by the New-
lands act,3 which provides for a Commissioner of Mediation and
Conciliation, to be appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, the term of the commissioner's office
to be seven years. The President is also authorized to designate
1 United States, Laws 1898, C. 370.
2 Commons and Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation, pp. 133-137.
3 United States, Laws 1913, C. 6.
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not more than two other government officials, appointed with the
consent of the Senate, to constitute, with the commissioner, the
United States Board of Mediation and Conciliation. An assistant
commissioner is appointed in the same way to assume the duties
of the commissioner in case of the latter 's absence or in the event
of a vacancy, and to assist him in other ways. In the case of a
controversy to which the law applies either party may appeal to
the Board of Mediation and Conciliation, whose duty it is to
seek to adjust the controversy by amicable methods, or failing
in mediation, to urge arbitration. If disruption of traffic is im-
minent and the public interest endangered the board may offer
its services as mediator. In case of a dispute over the agreement
concluded through the efforts of the board, either party may re-
quire an opinion from that body. If these attempts to settle the
dispute fail, a board of arbitration may be organized, composed
of six or three arbitrators. Each party to the dispute chooses
two members, or one member, as the case may be, and these mem-
bers select the remainder. In case of the failure of these initial
members to agree on a third member or members, the board
designates the remainder. Upon consent of both parties the
board of arbitration is given powers of compulsory investigation.
The award becomes operative in ten days after filing, unless
exception is taken to a matter of law upon the record.4
During the four years ending June 30, 1917, the services of
the Board of Mediation and Conciliation were used in seventy-
one cases. Fifty of these were settled completely by mediation ;
six partly by mediation and partly by arbitration ; eight wholly
by arbitration; three by the parties themselves; one by con-
gressional action ; and one remained unsettled. 5
The act of March 4, 1913, creating a Department of Labor,
provides that the Secretary of Labor shall have power to act as
mediator and to appoint commissioners of conciliation in labor
disputes whenever in his judgment the interests of industrial
peace may require it to be done. 6 No appropriation was made
for the expenses of the commissioners till October, 1913, and
none for their compensation till April, 1914. 7 The first appro-
* Commons and Andrews, op. cit., pp. 136, 137.
s Willoughby, W. F., Government Organisation in War Time and After,
p. 204.
e United States, Laws 1912-1913, C. 141, Section 8.
7 Commons and Andrews, op. cit., p. 137.
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priation was $25,000; for 1915, $50,000 was appropriated; for
1916, $75,000 ; for 1918, $175,000.
8
The function of the Mediation Service of the Department
of Labor, as it is generally known, is diplomatic rather than
judicial. Its powers are not mandatory nor is any disputant
required to accept its good offices.
9 In spite of these limitations,
the success of the service has been most gratifying both in peace
and in war times, as is indicated by the following summary of
its work. 10
TABLE IX. SHOWING THE NUMBER AND THE DISPOSITION OF CASES HAN-
DLED BY THE DIVISION OF MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
March
4, 1913,
to June Year endinS June 30 >
30,1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 Total
33 42 227
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rather than judicial, and it is in that spirit the problems of con-
ciliation in labor controversies are approached." "
For some years prior to the war the Department of Labor had
a service the purpose of which was to bring the manless job and
the jobless man together, and to correlate as far as possible the
employment services of other political units. Section 40 of the
Immigration Act of February 20, 1909, provided for the organ-
ization within the Bureau of Immigration, at that time an in-
tegral part of the Department of Commerce and Labor, of a
Division of Information to assist immigrants and other persons
in securing employment. The Bureau of Immigration, including
the Division of Information, was made a part of the Department
of Labor under authority of the Act of March 4, 1913, which
created the department. Upon its organization in 1914, the
department converted the Division of Information into a gen-
eral employment service to function in the placement of all kinds
of labor. Sanction for this procedure was found in the Act
creating the Division of Information, and especially in Section
1 of the organic Act of March 4, 1913, providing for a Depart-
ment of Labor, which stipulated that: "The purpose of the
Department of Labor shall be to foster, promote, and develop the
welfare of the wage earners of the United States, to improve
their working conditions, and to advance their opportunities for
profitable employment." 12 This reorganized employment ser-
vice was called the United States Employment Service, and it
functioned primarily through the Division of Information,
which had been maintained as an integral part of the Bureau of
Immigration.
The Employment Service mapped a more vigorous and general
program. The country was divided into zones, and labor ex-
changes were established with sub-branches in each. On June
30, 1916, there were 20 of these zones with an equal number
of labor exchanges or central offices and 62 sub-branches. In
addition, the cooperation of the Post Office Department was
secured, which resulted in the use of post offices throughout the
country as branch agencies of the Employment Service. Co-
operative relations were also established with all state and
11 Fifth Annual Eeport of the Secretary of Labor, 1917, p. 11.
12 United States, Laws 1912-1913, C. 141, Section 1.
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municipal employment bureaus, the purpose being to make the
federal service a sort of clearing house and coordinating agency.
At a general conference between the Department of Labor and
official employment services held in 1915 it was decided to organ-
ize a joint advisory council or board to promote closer relations
between all public employment services, to correlate their work,
and for all practical purposes to establish a national employment
system.
In 1914 the federal employment service had assumed the obli-
gation of providing farm labor to harvest the crops. This work
was carried on in conjunction with the Department of Agricul-
ture. In 1916 a women's and children's division was created
for the primary purpose of placing women and juveniles in
suitable employment. The federal service was functioning quite
successfully, as is manifested by the fact that during the year
ending June 30, 1916, 25,640 applications for help were received,
requesting 109,771 laborers, and 184,481 applications came from
workers seeking employment, of whom 84,953 were referred to
positions and 75,195 actually furnished with work.13
2. LABOR PROGRAM OF THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
The facilities of the government agencies described above were
utterly inadequate to meet the problems incident to a state of
war, and it was imperative that new agencies be created to assist
them. Even before the United States became involved in the war,
the Council of National Defense had provided for a committee
on labor. Samuel Gompers, chairman of this committee, called
the representatives of organized labor to meet at Washington on
February 28, 1917. At this assembly resolutions were passed
promising labor's support of the government. A general labor
conference held at Washington on March 12, 1917, also passed
resolutions pledging to the government the support of organized
labor in the event of war. On April 2, 1917, the committee on
labor of the Council of National Defense called a meeting of the
representatives of American labor and other interests to be held
in Washington for the express purpose of organization. More
than 150 persons attended this conference, including representa-
tives of leading international unions, railway brotherhoods, em-
13 Willoughby, W. F., op. tit., pp. 243-247.
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ployers, and the general public, and welfare experts in the lead-
ing industries. The conference included a very desirable repre-
sentation of the commercial, transportation, financial, and civic
interests of the nation, and portended great results. A unity of
purpose was developed among the different groups represented,
and a permanent committee was selected with Samuel Gompers as
chairman. This committee was composed of representatives of the
several interests attending the conference. National committees
were also organized for dealing with wages and hours, mediation
and conciliation, welfare work, women in industry, information
and statistics, cost of living, and domestic economy. At a con-
ference of state governors called by the Council of National De-
fense in the spring of 1917, resolutions were passed recommend-
ing in the respective states committees on labor similar in scope
and organization, to cooperate with the National Committee on
Labor.14
Labor Standards. A resolution adopted at a meeting of
the executive committee, Committee on Labor, and approved by
the Advisory Commission and the Council, April 6, 1917, em-
bodied a declaration of the attitude of American workmen with
regard to the war. The resolution pointed out that in order to
guarantee the defense and safety of the nation, and to avoid con-
fusion and facilitate action for national defense, the following
principles of conduct should be accepted: (1) Neither employ-
ers nor employees should endeavor to take advantage of the
country's necessities to change existing standards, unless made
imperative by economic or other emergencies, and then only
after investigation and approval of the Council of National De-
fense; (2) state legislatures, and administrative officers charged
with the enforcement of labor and health laws should make no
departure from existing standards of health and welfare of
workers without a declaration of the council that such departure
was necessary and conduced to the national defense ; state legis-
latures should delegate to the governor of their respective states
the power to suspend or modify restrictions of labor laws when
such modification or suspension was requested by the council,
this power to continue for a definite period and not longer than
i* First Annual Eeport of the Council of National Defense, 1917, pp.
75, 76.
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the duration of the war. 15 This resolution was amplified later to
clear up some misunderstanding which prevailed concerning the
meaning of the phrase "no departure from present standards."
The council pointed out that unless deemed necessary by its
own action, the prevailing legal standards of hours, safety, san-
itation, child labor, and woman labor should be maintained by
both employers and employees; that changes in wages to meet
the changing cost of living should be made only after investiga-
tion, mediation, or arbitration, and by no means should there be
recourse to stoppage of work until all conciliatory measures had
been exhausted.
The Functions of the National Committees. 16 To deal with
the questions arising between labor and capital the council
provided national and divisional committees. The National Com-
mittee on wages and hours was composed of full representation
of labor organizations and capital to deal with questions of hours
and wages during the war. This committee assisted in incor-
porating in government contracts the standards for wages and
hours already established by federal legislation. The National
Committee on Mediation and Conciliation, consisting of seventy-
five members representing wage earners, employers, and the gen-
eral public, with an executive committee of five members, was
created, not to arbitrate disputes but, in every case where con-
ciliation failed, to urge arbitration, the parties to the dispute to
select their own arbitrators. This committee was further em-
powered to cooperate in establishing industrial peace when called
upon by the Council of National Defense, its Advisory Commis-
sion, the Board of Federal Mediators, the Commissioners of
Mediation and Conciliation of the Department of Labor, or state
boards of conciliation. Important service was thus rendered by
the committee in the settlement of industrial grievances in vari-
ous parts of the country, and it removed many misunderstand-
ings in regard to government contracts. These negotiations in-
volved many thousands of men, including iron and steel workers,
packing house employees, milling employees of Minnesota, rail-
way men, and New England textile workers. A third national
committee of major importance was entrusted with welfare work.
ibid.
16 For detailed account of these committees see ibid., pp. 79-81.
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Care was taken of the needs of workers during and after work
hours by the establishment of precautionary measures, and safe-
guards of health were promoted through education, cooperation
of churches, chambers of commerce, fraternal societies, employ-
ers' associations, and trades-unions. Maximum production and
conservation of the health and efficiency of the human machine
was the objective of this committee. 17
Sectional and Divisional Committees. In addition to the
major committees described above, the Council of National
Defense sought to establish a more comprehensive system of
labor administration by the creation of divisional and sectional
committees to consider the following important matters: Pro-
vision of sustenance for dependents of men in the service ; aid to
employers in providing healthful conditions in dangerous trades
and the creation of general sanitary conditions of employment;
a campaign of education and advice relative to protection of
workers in establishments manufacturing explosives and poison-
ous products ; formulation of a code for factories, mills, and
workships covering essentials for proper and adequate light, in-
tensity of light required, the shading of lamps, the distribution
of light, and so on; investigation regarding the conditions pro-
ducing industrial fatigue and the elimination of those condi-
tions
;
consideration of inadequate and inoperative laws concern-
ing ventilation and heating, with a view to suggesting greater
care; provision for necessary and proper facilities for drinking
water; prevention and control of occupational diseases; estab-
lishment and maintenance of desirable home nursing facilities.
Other important matters to which these divisional committees
were to give their attention included the installation of medical
departments, or industrial health-service departments to care for
the human factor in industry; training of highly skilled work-
men for such trades as shipbuilding, as well as training of un-
skilled men, boys, and women to supplement skilled workmen;
investigations and recommendations as to temporary or perma-
nent housing facilities ; organization of facilities and opportuni-
ties for recreation; public health education; advice on the em-
ployment of women in order to combine maximum efficiency with
17 Ibid., p. 80.
!8 For detailed account of these committees see ibid., pp. 81-89.
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conservation of health and labor standards; protection of un-
skilled workers in war industries against a lowering of existing
wage scales and conditions of work.
Labor Adjustment Boards. Early in August, 1917, the
Council of National Defense took a step toward a practical solu-
tion of the problem of industrial unrest by creating a Labor Ad-
justment Commission composed of nine members, three repre-
senting the government, three the employers, and three the em-
ployees. This commission was given jurisdiction over all dis-
putes regarding wages or conditions of employment in establish-
ments having government contracts in accordance with the eight-
hour law of June 19, 1912, or March 3, 1913. The commission
was given power to appoint labor adjustment committees to hear
and determine such disputes as the commission saw fit to assign
to them, involving less than 1,000 workers. Cases involving more
than 1,000 workers were handled by the commission itself.
Awards of the commission or any of the committees appointed
by it were binding on employers and employees, and were made
within thirty days after the case had been submitted for adjudi-
cation. Decisions were for specified periods but were not bind-
ing longer than sixty days after the end of the war. At all
hearings both the employers and the workers were represented.
Government contracts made under the two acts cited above in-
clude the basic eight-hour day for all employees, with overtime
rates at not less than time and one-half for all hours in excess
of eight. Whenever disputes could not be settled by employers
and workers or their representatives in accordance with these
specifications, the Department of Labor was given power on its
own initiative or at the request of employers, workers, or the
department whose contract was affected, to appoint a mediator.
If this mediator failed to adjust the dispute the case was then
submitted to the Adjustment Commission of the Council of Na-
tional Defense for its adjudication, work always to continue
pending decision.19
The labor program of the Council of National Defense, sum-
marized above, was comprehensive and anticipated almost every
i Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, September, 1917,
pp. 71-73.
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conceivable problem that might arise.20 Its main purpose was
to secure maximum production, and at the same time to safeguard
the interests and welfare of American workers. The weakness
of the program is not difficult to discover. The multiplicity of
committees were primarily investigating, advisory, or educa-
tional agencies, possessing few if any of the specific executive
and administrative powers that are essential to successful labor
administration. This coterie of committees, however, were very
valuable as supplementary agencies to the more authoritative
and powerful governmental bodies.
Labor Committee of the War Industries Board. Closely
connected with the labor program of the Council of National
Defense was the Committee on Labor of the War Industries
Board. The latter Board appointed Mr. Hugh Frayne as direc-
tor of the Committee on Labor, and he handled the mediation
problems that arose within the Board's jurisdiction. These
cases, however, were usually submitted by Mr. Frayne to other
governmental agencies of mediation, altho he personally made
some adjustments in an informal way.21
3. ACTIVITIES OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT
Emergency Construction Adjustment Commission. The
necessity of constructing in the quickest possible time the six-
teen cantonments and camps to house and train the millions of
men made available for the army by the selective draft law
entailed a serious labor problem. It was to be expected that
contractors would proceed with the work regardless of labor
union standards. Results were imperative, and in their eager-
ness to achieve these results government officials and contractors
failed to take into consideration the possible interference by
trades-unions in demanding adherence to union standards. The
rapid spread of disputes and unrest soon forced attention to the
necessity of incorporating into government contracts for can-
tonment construction definite stipulations concerning standards
of wages, hours, and other conditions of employment that in-
volved the building trades unions.
20 The committee on labor alone consisted of approximately 500 persons.
Handbook of Information, Army Ordnance Industrial Service Section, Nov.
1918, p. 4.
21 Ibid.
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The Secretary of War was soon convinced that continuous
production was dependent upon the cooperation of the workmen,
and that cooperation was obtainable only upon the grounds of
adequate wages and proper working conditions. On June 19,
1917, Secretary of War Baker and Samuel Gompers signed a
memorandum of agreement which provided that the basic stand-
ards of employment in cantonment construction should be the
union scale of wages, hours, and conditions in force on June 1,
1917, in the locality where such cantonment is situated. Con-
sideration was to be given to special conditions requiring changes
in these standards subsequent to the above date. It was further
provided that there should be an adjustment commission for the
adjustment and control of wages, hours, and conditions of labor
in the construction of cantonments. This body, originally known
as the Cantonment Adjustment Commission but later called the
Emergency Construction Adjustment Commission, consisted of
three persons appointed by the Secretary of War one to rep-
resent the Army, one the public, and one labor. The last mem-
ber was nominated by Samuel Gompers. All adjustments made
by the commission were binding on all parties. The term union
standards as used in the agreement referred only to union scales
of hours and wages and did not include union shop.22
The procedure under the above memorandum provided that
(1) the commission should sit at Washington, unless ordered by
the Secretary of War to go to the site of construction; (2) data
should be secured relative to the union scales of wages, hours,
and conditions in force on June 1, 1917, in the several localities
where cantonments were being constructed, and through the De-
partment of Labor the data on standards prevailing in the locali-
ties at the time of construction; (3) for each district a re-
sponsible, impartial examiner was to be appointed to act under
orders of the commission; (4) in case employees and the con-
tracting officer failed to settle the dispute the latter was author-
ized to issue a provisional order which was subject to the affirma-
tion, revision, or readjudication of the Adjustment Commission ;
(5) whenever this provisional order was not accepted, there was
to be no cessation of work, but details of the dispute and order
were to be sent to the member of the commission representing
22 Ibid., Appendix, No. 3.
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the Army, and a report of the matter was to be secured by a
member of the commission designated by Mr. Gompers; (6) on
hearing of the failure to reach a satisfactory settlement the com-
mission immediately was to dispatch an examiner to the site of
the trouble; (7) the examiner possessed authority, under orders
of the commission, to mediate between the parties, and in case
he failed to effect a settlement he was instructed to file a report
with a recommendation to the commission. The rulings of the
commission were binding upon all parties concerned, notice of
the decision being sent to the contracting officer and to the
spokesmen of the parties involved in the dispute. Application
of the commission's award was supervised by the examiner, and
he saw to it that hours, wages, and conditions of labor conformed
to the rulings. The commission was empowered also to make
additional regulations in order to achieve the purpose of the
agreement and to decide all questions arising under it.
On August 8, 1917, the construction of aviation fields was
placed under the jurisdiction of the above commission. On Sep-
tember 4, 1917, the construction of warehouses and storage facil-
ities was also placed under the authority of the same commission,
and on December 28, 1917, the Secretary of War directed that
all construction work undertaken by the "War Department dur-
ing the war was to be carried out under the original memo-
randum of June 9, 1917, and the supplementary memorandum
of July 27, 1917.23 This wide extension of the jurisdiction of
the commission is indicative of the acceptability and effectiveness
of its work. No commission was confronted with more serious
problems and none accomplished its task in a more creditable
manner than did the Emergency Construction Adjustment Com-
mission. Much of the commission's success was due to the ap-
pointment of special examiners to supervise the enforcement of
its awards, for these men came in close contact with the problems
at issue and performed a good service in maintaining industrial
peace.
General Orders of the Chief of Ordnance relative to Labor
Conditions. In General Orders No. 13, issued by the Chief
of Ordnance, November 15, 1917, the attitude of the War De-
partment toward the labor problem was clearly set forth in a
23 Ibid.
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group of fundamental principles that conform to the standards
generally endorsed by social reformers in the field of labor wel-
fare and legislation.24 The memorandum unmistakably pointed
out the intimate relation between desirable working conditions
and efficiency in production, and prescribed the following: (1)
Daily hours of labor not to exceed ten, and better efficiency might
result from an eight-hour day; adjustment of hours to the age
and sex of the worker and the nature of the employment; dis-
couragement of excessive overtime, eight-hour shifts being the
maximum in a continuous twenty-four work-day; Saturday
half
-holiday or, if necessary, longer hours paid for on the basis
of overtime. Furthermore, the policy of resting one day in
seven was recognized, and for the sake of rest and relaxation
national and local holidays were to be observed. The memo-
randum urged: (2) precautions against dangers and provision
for comfort and sanitation, including good light, adequate venti-
lation, sufficient heat, and proper temperature; (3) maintenance
of existing wage standards in the given industry and locality,
and reasonable adjustment of wage scales to the rapidly chang-
ing level of prices of the necessaries of life; provision of every
facility for the preservation of existing and the creation of addi-
tional methods for settling industrial controversies. (5) There
was to be restriction of the work of women to eight hours, prohi-
bition of night work, provision of rest periods, adequate time
and desirable place for meals, the guaranty of a half-holiday on
Saturdays, provision of seats with backs and their use permitted
for women workers, and a weight of twenty-five pounds was to
constitute the maximum single load lift for women employees.
When women replace men tasks should be adapted to their
strength, and the principle of equal pay for equal work should
be applied. (6) The employment of children under fourteen
years of age was prohibited by this order, and children between
the ages of fourteen and sixteen years were not to be employed
for more than eight hours a day, or forty-eight hours a week,
and night work was forbidden. Minors under eighteen years of
age were to be protected as to hours as in the case of women
limited to eight hours a day with no night work. (7) No work
2* Similar orders were issued by the Quartermaster General on November
19, 1917, known as "Circular No. 18."
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was to be given out to be done in rooms used for living purposes
or in rooms directly connected with living rooms in any dwelling
or tenement. 25
Standards of Labor in the Manufacture of Army Cloth-
ing. On August 24, 1917, the Secretary of War appointed a
board of control for labor standards in the manufacture of army
clothing. The function of this board was to execute the regula-
tions of the Quartermaster General relative to the ' ' maintenance
of sound industrial and sanitary conditions in the manufacture
of army clothing, inspect factories, see that the proper standards
are established on government work, pass upon industrial stand-
ards maintained by bidders on army clothing, and to act so that
just conditions prevail." The report of this committee which
was submitted to the Secretary of War, August 18, 1917, recom-
mended among other things that contracts should contain pro-
vision for the eight-hour law of June 19, 1912; equal pay for
equal work without distinction as to sex or race ; the right of
collective bargaining; employment of no persons under sixteen
years of age ; strict compliance with local labor laws ; completion
of garments in the factory under control of employers making
the contracts, whose establishments have passed inspection of a
government agent. In addition the committee recommended that
deference should be given to normal location of trade, and capac-
ity and equipment of manufactories. In all cases contracts should
be granted to centers of industry with avowed preference for
manufacturers who operate under collective agreements, which
also include machinery for adjustment of industrial disputes,
and who have a good record for compliance with local labor
laws.26 The provisions outlined in the recommendations of the
committee were incorporated in the government contracts for
the manufacture of Army clothing ; they included an eight-hour
work-day, compliance with state labor laws and regulations, right
of collective bargaining, amicable adjustment of industrial griev-
ances, a minimum wage scale, licensing of premises and sanita-
tion inspection, compliance with the provisions of the Federal
Child Labor Law of September 1, 1916, and non-transfer of con-
tracts.
25 Monthly Review, U. 8. Bureau of Labor Statistics, December, 1917,
p. 51.
26 Hid., October, 1&17, pp. 30-33.
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The above form of contract was approved by the Secretary of
War and the Quartermaster General. The War Department in
announcing the new form of agreement was confident that :
' ' The
grievances which have arisen in the past in connection with the
performance of clothing contracts will be entirely removed by
the enforcement of this contract, and decent industrial standards
not only established but also enforced by the Government. The
Department feels that there will be no justification for any delay
hereafter in the delivery of clothing for our soldiers.
' ' 27
Harness and Saddlery Adjustment Commission. Other en-
deavors of the War Department to solve the problems of labor,
especially the element of industrial unrest, included the creation
of the Harness and Saddlery Adjustment Commission whose
duty it was to fix wage rates for employees in all those
factories supplying leather goods and harness and accessories,
but not to include shoes.28 On September 26, 1917, an agree-
ment was entered into between the government and the repre-
sentatives of the leather manufacturers and leather workers
whereby there was created a National Harness and Saddlery
Adjustment Commission composed of four members, of whom
two were appointed by the Secretary of War to represent the
public, one by the manufacturers, and one by the United Leather
Workers International Union. 29 One of the members of the com-
mission was designated by the Secretary of War as chairman.
Each member, including the chairman, was entitled to one vote,
and a majority of votes governed in all cases. The duties of the
commission were to adjust all existing and future disputes as to
wages, hours, and conditions of labor under government con-
tracts, and to prescribe regulations for enforcement of decisions.
Awards were binding on all parties concerned. The agreement
was to remain in force during the war period, no interruption of
work on government contracts was to be allowed, manufacturers
were to be compensated when wage scales increased under the
agreement, wage standards were not to be less than those in effect
27 ibid., p. 31.
28 Handbook of Information, Army Ordnance Industrial Service Section,
November, 1918, p. 8.
29 Eeport of the Proceedings of the Thirty-seventh Annual Convention of
the American Federation of Labor, 1917, pp. 86, 87.
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in the community, and the same rates of wages were to be paid
for union and non-union labor.
Arsenals and Navy Yards Commission. In addition to the above
there was established, under the authority of the Secretary of
War and the Secretary of the Navy, the Arsenals and Navy
Yards Commission, with Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roose-
velt as chairman. This commission had jurisdiction in all cases
that could not be settled by representatives of the Army and
Navy. Major B. H. Gitchell, of the office of the Secretary of
War, had charge of wage adjustments in the arsenals, while
adjustment in the Navy Yards were handled by Louis McHowe,
confidential assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
The work of these commissioners was so successfully accom-
plished that there was never any need for reference to the Com-
mission.30
4. SHIPBUILDING LABOR ADJUSTMENT BOARD
Maximum production in the shipbuilding industry during the
war was of the utmost importance, on account of the increasing
menace of enemy submarines. The necessity for increased pro-
duction, however, did not prevent the spread of industrial unrest
and disputes, the increase of labor turnover, and the conscious
withdrawal of efforts in the shipyards on the Atlantic, Pacific,
and Gulf coasts, and on the Great Lakes. To solve these and
other serious problems of labor the Emergency Fleet Corpora-
tion of the United States Shipping Board established the Ship-
building Labor Adjustment Board and other conciliatory
agencies.
The Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board was instituted by
agreements entered into on August 29, 1917, and December 8,
1917, by the Navy Department, the Emergency Fleet Corpora-
tion, and certain labor leaders. This board dealt exclusively
with adjustments of wages, hours, and conditions of labor in the
construction or repair of those shipbuilding plants for which
funds were provided by the United States Shipping Board Emer-
gency Fleet Corporation or the Navy, and in the construction
or repair of ships carried on under contract with the Emergency
Fleet Corporation, exclusive of work done in the Navy Yards.
so Handbook of Information, Army Ordnance Industrial Service Section,
November, 1918, p. 12.
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The board consisted of three persons, one appointed jointly by
the Emergency Fleet Corporation and the Navy Department;
one representing the public, appointed by the President of the
United States
;
and one representing labor, appointed by Samuel
Gompers.
31 In fact, Mr. Gompers nominated two members, one
to represent the metal trades in all disputes concerning the con-
struction of shipyards and steel ships, and one to represent the
trades primarily concerned in the construction of wooden hulls.
In the event that both of these trades were involved in a dispute
the two members would determine which one should sit in the
conference, or if they failed to agree in this matter Mr. Gompers
made the selection. Representatives of employers and employees
of the production plants in which grievances arose were given
the right to sit with voting power as associate members of the
board. In all controversies in private plants in which there was
also construction for the Navy Department, the Navy Depart-
ment was represented by the Secretary of the Navy or a person
designated by him to sit with voting power as a member of the
board. In case of a tie when the board was so constituted, the
decision was left to the Secretary of War as chairman of the
Council of National Defense or to some person appointed by him.
The construction plants coming under the jurisdiction of the
board were geographically districted. In each district the con-
tractors and the representatives of international labor organiza-
tions concerned in the construction work selected a person or per-
sons to act as examiner or examiners in the said district, or the
board itself selected these officials in case it seemed advisable, or
if the above parties could not agree. All disputes with reference
to wages, hours, or conditions of labor were reported by the dis-
trict officer of the Emergency Fleet Corporation to the board
and to the district examiner.
The Adjustment Board was instructed to use as basic stand-
ards the wage rates prevailing in the district in which the dispute
arose, provided such wage rates had been established through
agreements between employer and employees and were accepted
as equitable. Consideration was given, however, to any circum-
stances arising after such wages, hours, or conditions were estab-
3i Memorandum for the Adjustment of Wages, Hours, and Conditions of
Labor in Shipbuilding Plants, United States Shipping Board, p. 1.
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lished, and which seemed to call for changes.32 In the absence
of such an agreement between employers and workmen, as in a
new industrial district, the standards introduced in districts hav-
ing similar living conditions and cost of living were established.
It was wisely provided that the board should keep itself fully
informed as to the relation between living costs in the several
districts and their comparison at specific interevals. This latter
provision was generally adopted by the numerous boards and
commissions in dealing with the labor situation.
The decisions of the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board
were made retroactive, and at any time after six months had
elapsed following ratification of the agreement or final decision
by the board the questions could be reopened by it for readjust-
ment, upon request of the majority of the craft or crafts con-
cerned, provided it could be demonstrated that there had been a
general and material increase in the cost of living. The board's
decisions were final and binding on all parties within these pre-
scribed limits, altho either party possessed the right of appeal
to a Board of Review and Appeal consisting of three members
named jointly by the United States Shipping Board Emergency
Fleet Corporation and the United States Navy Department, and
three named by the President of the American Federation of
Labor.33
The accomplishments of the Shipbuilding Adjustment Board
should be noted.34 The principal characteristics of the decisions
of the board in cases that arose in shipyards on the Atlantic,
Pacific, and Gulf coasts and on the Great Lakes were: (1) the
establishment of a uniform national scale of wages for all skilled
trades and the adjustment of wage standards to meet the increase
in the cost of living. For example, the average increase in the
cost of living on the Pacific Coast from October, 1917, to October,
1918, was 20 per cent, and the board in applying this average
32 Ibid., p. 2.
ss Ibid., p. 3.
s* For the greater details of the operation of the Board the reader is re-
ferred to the following: Decision as to Wages, Hours, and other Condi-
tions in Pacific Coast Shipyards by the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment
Board, October 1, 1918, and the Decision as to Wages, Hours, and other
Conditions in Atlantic Coast, Gulf and Great Lakes Shipyards by the Ship-
building Labor Adjustment Board, October 1, 1918.
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increase to the basic daily wage of $5.25 established by an earlier
decision, made the new basic wage $6.30 or 78% cents an hour,
while for the Atlantic Coast, Gulf, and Great Lakes for the eight
months from December, 1917, to August, 1918, the cost of living
advanced 15 per cent and the basic hourly rate of 70 cents was
replaced by a new rate of S0y2 cents. In the interests of uni-
formity and the prevention of labor unrest and turnover the
basic hourly wage rate for the principal skilled crafts was made
80 cents. No such uniform scale was made for common laborers,
but the wages were advanced as much or more than increases in
the cost of living. (2) Payment of transportation expenses of
employees incurred in going to and from their work in the ship-
yards.
35
(3) Organization of shop committees for the adjust-
ment of grievances between management and labor, especially
where no joint agreement between shipyard owners and labor
organizations had been effected. The organization and work of
these committees is worthy of note. The employees of each craft
or calling in a shop or yard selected three of their number to
represent them as members of a shop committee. Each member
served for a term of six months and was selected by majority
vote through secret ballot, in such manner as the workers
directed. Vacancies for an unexpired term were filled by ballot,
and out-going committee members were eligible for reelection.
The chairman of each shop committee was a member of a joint
shop committee, which by ballot selected five of its members to
act as an executive committee to represent it in conferences with
the superintendent or higher officials of the company. The dis-
trict examiner was authorized to pass upon the validity of the
election of a shop committee in case a protest was filed, and to
supervise a new election when such an election seemed to him
necessary. When a grievance arose it was taken up by the craft
or laborers' committee with the foreman or general foreman.
Failing an adjustment, the craft or laborers' committee took the
matter up with the superintendent, and if deemed necessary by
the committee it selected a special representative to assist it in
the conference with the superintendent or higher officials. In
35 Decision as to Wages, Hours, and Other Conditions in Atlantic Coast,
Gulf and Great Lakes Shipyards, by Shipbuilding Adjustment Board, Octo-
ber 1, 1918, p. 1-3.
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case the dispute concerned more than one craft, the matter was
negotiated through the joint shop committee, first with the super-
intendent and then, failing a settlement, with the higher offi-
cials of the company. In these conferences the joint committee
of the crafts had the right to call in a special representative to
assist it. Whenever this conference failed to effect a settlement
of the grievance, the matter was submitted to the district exam-
iner. To prevent discrimination against duly elected committee-
men, it was provided that in case such a committeeman was
found to have been discharged without just and sufficient cause,
after due investigation by the committee, he was reinstated with
full pay for all time lost. Other phases of the board's
awards included the prohibition of discrimination against union
or non-union men, weekly payment of wages, prompt payment on
withdrawal from employment, provision of medical aid, provi-
sion of adequate toilets, washing facilities and drinking water,
and prevention of reduction in wages of individual employees.36
5. ADJUSTMENT OF LABOR DISPUTES IN LOADING AND UNLOAD-
ING SHIPS
The importance of prompt and uninterrupted action in the
loading and unloading of vessels is too obvious to need emphasis
here. All our efforts in prosecuting the war would have been
futile had our machinery broken down at this point. To assure
the dispatch of vessels from our Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific ports,
therefore, it was necessary to find adequate means for the ad-
justment of grievances over wages, hours, and other conditions
of labor in this field. During the latter part of August, 1917, an
agreement was reached and announced by the United States
Shipping Board, the Secretary of War, the International Long-
shoremen's Association (numbering about 150,000 members on
all coasts), the Secretary of Labor, the President of the Amer-
ican Federation of Labor, and the Chief of Shipping Operations.
This agreement provided for a national commission to consider
and adjust all disputes arising in connection with loading and
unloading of vessels in Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific ports. The
terms of the agreement which was formally assented to by the
United States Shipping Board and the International Longshore-
se ma., pp. 7-10.
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men's Association included the following provisions: (1) The
union scale of wages, hours, and conditions in force August 1,
1917, in a given port was to constitute the basic standard. (2)
All differences in a particular port were to be adjusted by a
local commission when possible. This commission was appointed
in each case by the national commission mentioned above, and
consisted of one member representing the Shipping Board and
the War Department, one nominated by the Longshoremen's
Association to represent labor, and one nominated by the carriers
to represent the shipping interests. In each case an appeal could
be made from the decision of the local commission to the national
commission. (3) Consideration was to be given to the necessity
of changing standards to meet the changes in the cost of living.
(4) There was to be no interruption of work pending the action
of the local commission or the decision of the national commis-
sion. (5) The decision of the national commission was to be
binding on all parties concerned.37
6. RAILWAY BOARDS OF ADJUSTMENT
Railroads have been aptly described as the arteries of national
life. Should these arteries cease to function even for a brief
time national existence is threatened and individual activity par-
alyzed. The labor situation on American railroads has been ex-
tremely acute at no infrequent intervals, and one of these crit-
ical periods was during the great war, especially before the gov-
ernment assumed control of the roads. Labor unrest did not sub-
side with the enactment of the Adamson eight-hour law, but
gathered momentum with the demands for higher rates of wages
to cover the increasing cost of living.
To settle all controversies arising over wages, hours, and other
conditions of labor on the railroads, the United States Railroad
Administration formulated a definite policy and provided ma-
chinery of adjustment. Boards of adjustment were organized
by agreement between representatives of the Railroad Adminis-
tration and the "big four" brotherhoods engineers, conduc-
tors, trainmen and firemen, and enginemen. Railway Board of
Adjustment No. 1 consisted of eight members four selected
by the regional directors of the lines and compensated by the
37 Report of the Proceedings of the Thirty-seventh Annual Convention of
the American Federation of Labor, 1917, pp. 85, 86.
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railroads, and one each by the chief executive officer of each of
the railroad brotherhoods and compensated by them. Railway
Board of Adjustment No. 2 consisted of twelve members six
selected by the regional directors and paid by the roads, and one
each by the chief executive of the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers' Inter-
national Alliance, Brotherhood of Railway Car-men of America,
International Brotherhood of Blacksmiths and Helpers, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders and
Helpers of America, and International Association of Ma-
chinists. 38
The boards of adjustment just described met in Washington
at stated times each month and continued in session until all
matters before them were considered. Subdivisions of the boards
were provided for to conduct hearings and pass on controversies
when properly submitted at any place designated by the boards,
but such subdivisions were not authorized to make final decision,
these decisions being reserved for the consideration of each of
the boards as a whole. The boards were authorized to adjust
disputes over the application of the eight-hour law, formerly
cared for by the Commission of Eight. The question of wages
and hours was generally left to the Railroad Wage Commission,
but matters of dispute arising from interpretations of wage
agreements, not including matters passed upon by the Railroad
Wage Commission, were decided by the adjustment boards. Dif-
ferences arising between management and employees on the re-
spective roads, regarding the incorporation in existing agree-
ments of wages and hours fixed by the Director General of the
Railroads, were decided by the boards, subject to review by the
Director General. Personal grievances or controversies arising
under interpretation of wage agreements, and all other disputes
between officials of the railroads and their employees, when fail-
ing of adjustment by the local authorities, were submitted to the
Director of the Division of Labor of the United States Railroad
Administration who in turn presented the case to the appro-
priate Railway Adjustment Board for consideration and deci-
sion. In all cases coming before these boards both parties were
ss For detailed account of these boards and their functions see United
States Eailroad Administration Bulletin, No. 4, 1918, pp. 46-49, 100-103.
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accorded representation. A majority vote of the board in each
case was necessary for final decision, and, if impossible to secure
a majority vote, the final determination rested with the Director
General. All agreements became effective upon their approval
by the Director General, and continued in force for the duration
of the war, and thereafter, unless a majority of representatives
of the railroads or of the employees desired to terminate the
agreement, in which case thirty days formal notice was neces-
sary. The Director General, however, possessed the power to
terminate all agreements at his own discretion, upon serving
similar notice.39
7. THE RAILROAD WAGE COMMISSION
Previous to the establishment of the above boards of adjust-
ment the Director General had, on January 18, 1918, in his Gen-
eral Order No. 5, provided for the organization of a Railroad
Wage Commission.40 When Director General William G. Mc-
Adoo assumed control of railway operation in the United States
on December 28, 1917, he was confronted with serious labor
troubles expressed in terms of demands for higher wages and
general improvement of working conditions. The commission
which he appointed to handle the situation consisted of Franklin
K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior; Charles C. McChord, mem-
ber of the Interstate Commerce Commission
;
J. Harvey Coving-
ton, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Col-
umbia
;
and William R. Willcox, of New York. The function of
this Commission was to "make a general investigation of the
compensation of persons in the railroad service, the relation of
railroad wages to wages in other industries, the conditions re-
specting wages in different parts of the country, the special
emergency respecting wages which exists at this time owing to
war relation between different classes of railroad labor." The
commission was instructed to begin its work immediately and to
recommend in general terms changes in compensation of railroad
employees which seemed to it necessary. This investigation was
facilitated by the order of the Director General instructing offi-
so Bulletin No. 4, United States Railroad Administration, 1918, pp. 46-49,
101-103.
40 Eailway Adjustment Boards No. 1 and No. 2 were established on
March 22, 1918, and May 31, 1918, respectively. Ibid., pp. 46 and 100.
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cers, agents, and employees of the roads to furnish upon request
all information required.41
The report of the above commission is a noteworthy document,
the result of comprehensive and intensive study of the general
labor situation on the railroads of the United States, together
with a general study of the experience of Great Britain and
France.42 Many of the major suggestions made by the commis-
sion were embodied in and made effective by General Order No.
27 of the Director General, issued March 25, 1918. This order
provided for an annual increase in wages aggregating about
$300,000,000, the adoption of the basic eight-hour day, special
rates of pay for overtime, equal pay for equal work when women
perform tasks similar to the ones performed by men, protection
of the health and lives of employees, equal pay for colored em-
ployees doing the same service as white workers, and the estab-
lishment of a board of railroad wages and working conditions.
The Director General in creating the Board of Railroad Wages
and Working Conditions stated that the problem of doing justice
to the 2,000,000 railroad employees of the country could not be
settled and disposed of by one decision or order and for this rea-
son a permanent board of investigation and administration was
necessary.
43 This statement takes cognizance of a principle long
desired but not until recently instituted in programs and policies
of labor administration in the United States, namely, the inade-
quacy of temporary commissions and boards, and the necessity
of providing permanent commissions. Permanently organized
and continuously operating labor boards are one of the most
necessary prerequisites to a successful solution of industrial un-
rest and other serious labor problems in the United States.
The functions of the Board of Railroad Wages and Conditions
were outlined by the Director General as follows: To investi-
gate all matters presented by railroad employees or their repre-
sentatives affecting (1) inequalities as to wages and working
hours, whether of individuals or classes of workers; (2) condi-
tions arising from competition with employees in other indus-
41 Bulletin No. 4, TL S. Railroad Administration, 1918, p. 25.
42 See Report of the Railroad Wage Commission to the Director General
of Railroads, April 30, 1918.
43 See General Order No. 27, U. S. Bailroad Administration, May 25,
1918.
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tries; (3) rules and working conditions for the several classes of
employees, either for the country as a whole or for different
parts of the country. In addition, the board was empowered* to
hear and investigate other matters affecting wages and conditions
of employment referred to it by the Director General. It should
be notedf however, that the board was solely an advisory body
and all its recommendations were submitted to the Director Gen-
eral for his determination.44 This was the essential weakness of
the board. Had it been clothed with final disposition of cases
and authority to enforce awards and findings, its success could
have been greater.
8. LABOR POLICY OF THE FUEL ADMINISTRATION
The development of a comprehensive plan of labor administra-
tion in the United States was bound to include the Fuel Admin-
istration, whose work was so intimately related to the production
and distribution of one of the most essential commodities. In
July, 1918, a conference was held at Washington between Mr.
Garfield, fuel administrator, and the officers of the United Mine
Workers of America, at which an agreement was made whereby
all questions relating to mine labor were to remain under the
jurisdiction of the Fuel Administration. 45 A bureau of labor
was established, to which all problems pertaining to mine labor
were to be referred. Certain fundamental principles were ac-
cepted to govern the settlement of all controversies that might
arise. In the main, these principles were the same as those out-
lined by the War Labor Board, which are summarized elsewhere
in this study.
46 A rule, peculiar to the mining labor situation,
provided that the so called automatic penalty clause then in
force was to be accepted as a primary principle by the mine
workers in collective bargaining during the war, and was to be
included in all agreements as a prerequisite to any advances in
the fixed prices granted by the Fuel Administration to the mine
operators. The penalty clause here referred to developed out of
the President's Orders of October 27, 1917, which provided that
miners who struck without cause would be fined $1.00 a day
44 ibid., p. 24.
45 Official Bulletin, July 25, 1918, p. 13.
46 See pp. 165, 166.
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each, and mine operators locking out their employees would be
fined $2.00 a day for each man not working.47
The labor policy of the Fuel Administration was created only
after most serious difficulties had arisen at frequent intervals.
Mine workers everywhere were restive. For this situation the
mine operators themselves were partly responsible, because they
did not hesitate to bid against each other in their eagerness to
obtain workers. This competition encouraged labor turnover
and greatly decreased the productivity of the mines. In an at-
tempt to remedy this situation Mr. Garfield issued a warning
against the payment of bonuses in any form as being a violation
of the spirit of the agreement made by the operators and the
miners with the President. He urged that such practices cease,
and threatened that if the payment of bonuses continued he
would assume that the prices of coal were too high and would
order a reduction.48 Moveover, it had been necessary frequently
for the administrator to exert pressure on both miners and oper-
ators to prevent a shutdown of the mines. For instance, in
October, 1917, when the question of coal prices was being con-
sidered, Mr. Garfield warned the miners of the southwestern
district in the following words :
' ' There are evidently some who
fail to understand the gravity of the situation and who do not
hesitate to advocate strikes at the present time as a means of
forcing the government to at once decide whether the wage in-
crease agreed to at meetings recently held at Washington by the
operators and miners of the Central District should justly be
covered by an advance in the prices fixed by the President. . .
If either the operators or the miners attempt to bring pressure
upon me to reach a decision, I shall postpone it and use what-
ever powers are necessary to compel the production of coal to
meet the country 's needs.
' ' 40 Similar warnings were given the
mine operators in Oklahoma.50
9. UNITED STATES BOARD OP MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION
When the government assumed control of the railroads on De-
cember 28, 1917, it took over less than 200 of the 2700 railroads
47 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, December 1, 1917, p. 240.
48 Official Bulletin, August 6, 1918, p. 7.
49 Commercial and Financiaal Chronicle, October 20, 1918, p. 1586.
so
Ibid., December 1, 1917, p. 2139.
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in the United States. 51 Obviously the agencies described above
were not sufficient to deal with the multiplicity of labor troubles
that were evidencing themselves on the various transportation
systems throughout the country during the war. The contro-
versies that arose on the railroads not under government con-
trol were, therefore, taken care of by the United States Board of
Mediation and Conciliation, created under the authority of the
Newlands Act of 1913, to have jurisdiction over labor disputes
in connection with common carriers in interstate commerce.52
During the period of the war this board was more active than it
had been since its inception, and it accomplished greater results.
10. THE PRESIDENT'S MEDIATION COMMISSION
The problem of industrial unrest became so acute in the west-
ern states during the summer of 1917 that Samuel Gompers in a
conference with President Wilson urged government interfer-
ence and action a somewhat unusual suggestion for a leader
of American organized labor who generally frowns upon govern-
ment interference. The President soon appreciated the gravity
of the situation, and requested the Council of National Defense
to give the matter its earnest and immediate consideration with
a view to devising some means of dealing with the problem. This
has been characterized as the first concrete evidence during the
war of an attitude toward the labor problem on the part of the
President himself.53 In response to the President's request the
Council made a counter proposal that the President appoint a
commission to investigate the conditions in the western and Paci-
fic coast regions, and to adjust, if possible, the many grievances
that had arisen there. The necessity of government interference
was obvious to organized labor which feared possible develop-
ments of a radical nature. Labor's conception of the situation
was plainly expressed in the following words at the annual con-
vention of the American Federation of labor :
The extent and nature of industrial unrest that has been manifested in
the western part of this country has been the cause of deep concern to those
responsible for the conduct of the nation's affairs. This unrest has a back-
si Handbook of Information, Army Ordnance Industrial Service Section,
November, 1918, p. 12.
M United States Laws, 1913, 0. 6.
53 Wehle, Louis B., Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXXII (February,
1918), p. 335.
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ground of discontent growing out of industrial and social conditions. . .
From Washington, Montana, Idaho, Michigan, New Mexico, Arizona, and
other places come reports that wage-earners and representatives of the
organized labor movement were illegally arrested, denied the rights of free
citizens, and in some cases driven out of the state or locality. The most
audacious of these invasions of the rights of free citizens were the deporta-
tion of wage-earners and others from New Mexico and Arizona. . . In
Arizona the deportation of over a thousand people from the state was a
part of the tactics to defeat a strike that was in progress. Over 10,000
Mexican copper miners were on strike for the right to organize.5*
Appointment of a Mediation Commission. Accepting the
above statement as fairly descriptive of Mr. Gompers's pre-
sentation of the western labor situation, President Wilson was
bound to realize the necessity of a speedy solution, especially in
view of the important relation of the copper mining industry to
the nation's war program. Accordingly, in a memorandum for
the Secretary of Labor, September 18, 1917, the President, ex-
pressing a deep interest in and concern over the labor troubles
in the West and stating his desire to have formulated some kind
of working agreement for the future, appointed a labor commis-
sion. This commission, known as the President's Mediation
Commission, consisted of William B. Wilson, Secretary of Labor,
Colonel J. L. Spangler, of Pennsylvania, Verner Z. Reed, of
Colorado, John H. Walker, of Illinois, and E. P. Marsh, of Wash-
ington. Felix Frankfurter of New York acted as secretary to
the commission. 55 Thus constituted the commission left Wash-
ington, September 30, 1917, to carry out its mission of personal
mediation, going direct to the field of grievances.
Duties of the Commission. The duties of the Mediation
Commission were denned by President Wilson as follows: (1)
To visit in each instance the Governor of the State, advising him
of their position as personal representatives of the President in
an endeavor to lend sympathetic counsel and aid to the state
government in the development of a better understanding; (2)
to deal with employers and employees in a conciliatory spirit
with a view to the settlement of disputes and the formulation of
an agreement that would guarantee a maximum of output; (3)
to learn the real causes of discontent on the part of either labor
s* Beport of the Proceedings of the Thirty-seventh Convention of the
American Federation of Labor, 1917, p. 88.
ss Official Bulletin, September 21, 1917, p. 1.
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or capital, or both ; (4) to improve labor conditions in the Pacific
Northwest; (5) to report to the President from time to time such
information as may require immediate attention. 56 The method
of approaching the problem was to consist of personal confer-
ences with employers, employees, and state officials.
The Problem. The task that confronted the commission
was not a simple one. Disputes were prevalent in four copper
districts of Arizona in which is mined twenty-eight per cent of
all the copper produced in the United States. During the sum-
mer of 1917 there were widespread strikes and shutdowns for
three months, entailing a loss of 100,000,000 pounds of copper.
The oil fields of California, averaging an output of 8,000,000 bar-
rels a month, or about one-third of the total output of oil for the
United States, were the scene of unprecedented labor unrest. In
the states of California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Nevada
the telephone industry was tied up, there being about 13,000
employees involved in the disputes. The lumbering industry,
the products of which were sorely needed for the nation's aero-
plane program, suffered a breakdown of several months during
1917, and afterwards operated below normal productivity. Dis-
putes in this industry involved 70,000 men.
57 Controversies in
the packing industry centering in Chicago, threatened at an
early date to paralyze the entire meat industry of the United
States because of the idleness of 100,000 employees that would
result from a general strike.
Report and Recommendatio^is. In its investigations the
commission discovered that the causes of the widespread labor
unrest consisted of: (1) The absence of safeguards against
strikes, such as boards of investigation, conciliation, and arbitra-
tion. "In place of orderly process of adjustment workers were
given the alternative of submission or strike." (2) Distant own-
ership of industries. Western industries are owned and con-
trolled largely by eastern capitalists who entrust the operation
of establishments to salaried managers who fail to understand
the point of view of the workmen. (3) The desire of the work-
ers to organize and bargain collectively instead of individually as
in the past, and the relentless opposition of employers to collec-
se Official Bulletin, Sept. 21, 1917, p. 1, and Feb. 11, 1918, p. 9.
ST Ibid., February 11, 1918, pp. 9, 12.
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tive action. (4) The demand of the workers for the basic eight-
hour day, which was also opposed by the employers. Employers
that did introduce the change in the work-day suffered discrim-
ination by employers' associations. (5) A general demand for
higher wages commensurate with the rise in the cost of living.
(6) Autocratic control of industry which prevents labor from
having a voice in the determination of working conditions.
Other causes of industrial unrest included abnormal labor turn-
over due to the prevalence throughout the West of a migratory
laboring population, the polyglot character of the working class
which made unification and cooperation among them very diffi-
cult, the spread of the philosophy of international solidarity and
other socialistic doctrines, and unhealthful social conditions
in the camps.
58
In a period of five weeks the commission disposed of two hun-
dred and fifty disturbances in industrial establishments, and con-
tinued its work for several subsequent weeks with equally satis-
factory results. Among the results of the commission's work
were the submission of all disputes to a United States admin-
istrator or conciliator if employers and employees failed to reach
an agreement ; provision of a channel of communication between
the men and employers by organization of a committee free from
the company's influence, to consider all agreements; recognition
of the right of workmen to organize, protected by the prohibi-
tion of any form of discrimination against union men; reem-
ployment of strikers except inefficient workers and those guilty
of seditious utterances.
Among the recommendations made by the commission the most
notable were the guaranty of some form of collective relation-
ship between management and men ; the elimination of profiteer-
ing; the establishment of continuous administrative machinery
for the immediate and scientific adjustment of disputes; the
adoption of the basic eight-hour day, except for emergencies in
war industries; a unified labor administration in the United
States to replace the existing decentralized administration; the
surrender by labor of all practices conducive to the withdrawal
of maximum efficiency ; constructive education of both parties to
ss Official Bulletin, February 11, 1918, pp. 10-13.
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the industrial conflict in order to guarantee a national solution
of disputes and other serious labor problems.59
The Bisbee Deportations. Consideration of the work of
the President's Mediation Commission would be incomplete with-
out some reference to its investigation of the Bisbee deporta-
tions. No other incident in recent years, outside of the Mooney
case, has proved more irritable to organized and unorganized
labor forces than the deportation of workmen from the Warren
district, Arizona, to Columbus, New Mexico, on the morning of
July 12, 1917. The sheriff and an armed force of deputies
numbering about two thousand men rounded up 1,186 workers
and deported them, according to the report of the commission
submitted to the President on November 6, 1917. The authori-
ties at Columbus refused the deportees permission to stay, and
the train carried them back to the desert town of Hermonas,
New Mexico, a nearby station. The men were without adequate
food, water, and shelter for two days, having been abandoned
by the guards and left to shift for themselves. The situation was
immediately brought to the attention of the War Department
and on July 14, the men were escorted by troops to Columbus,
New Mexico, where they were maintained by the government
until the middle of September.60
According to the report of the Mediation Commission the de-
portations were carried out under the authority of the sheriff of
Cochise county, and had been planned at a meeting of citizens
on the night of July 11, 1917, participated in by the managers
of the Copper Queen Consolidated Mining Company and the
Calumet and Arizona Mining Company. There was evidently
no consultation of the United States attorney in Arizona, nor of
law officers of the state or county, nor of any legal adviser what-
soever. Rather were attempts made to conceal news of the de-
portations by control of the Bell company 's local telephone offices
and the telegraph lines.
The reason advanced for the deportations was that officials
and citizens believed the strikers were threatening violence and
injury to persons and property. The commission, however,
found that this belief had "no justification in the evidence in
5 Official Bulletin, February 11, 1918, pp. 10, 12.
eo Ibid., November 17, 1917, p. 6.
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support of it presented by the parties who harbored it," and no
such fear had been communicated to the Governor or other au-
thorities, either state or federal, by those who planned the de-
portations. "The deportation was wholly illegal and without
authority in law either state or federal.
' ' Governor Campbell of
Arizona stated that "the constitutional rights of citizens and
others have been ignored by processes not provided by law, viz.,
by deputy sheriffs who refused persons admittance into the dis-
trict and the passing of judgment by a tribunal without legal
jurisdiction, resulting in further deportations." So called "Vig-
ilance Committees" or "Loyalty Leaguers" were dissolved at
the request of the Governor. It was claimed that the strikers
were a dangerous group of enemy aliens, but this contention is
not supported by the Army census which was taken at the time.
According to this census 199 of the men deported were native
born Americans, 468 were citizens, 472 were registered under
the selective draft law, and 433 were married. Of the foreign
born 82 were Serbians, and 179 were Slavs. There were only a
few Germans and Austro-Hungarians, other than Slavs.
The commission recommended to the President that steps be
taken to stop all illegal practices and denial of rights safe-
guarded by the Constitution and statutes. On account of the
fact that many persons subject to the selective draft law were
refused reentrance to the district there was sufficient ground for
action by the Attorney General of the United States. Further-
more, the interference with interstate lines of communication
justified action by the Interstate Commerce Commission. These
recommendations were adopted by the President and it was em-
phatically urged that such actions should by Act of Congress be
made criminal under Federal law. 61
The data of the preceding pages indicate the multiplicity of
boards and commissions and the plethora of principles that were
constructed to help solve the increasingly serious labor problems
that were arising throughout our industrial life during the first
year of our participation in the world war. The fundamental
defect of this new labor administration was, as already sug-
gested, its differentiation of organization and decentralization of
i Official Bulletin, November 17, 1917, pp. 6, 7.
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control. Each agent and department of the government was a
law unto itself in handling the labor situation ; this resulted in
much duplication, positive waste of money and effort, and gen-
eral dissatisfaction among both employers and employees. This
decentralization ignored the conspicuous tendency of recent
years to centralize labor administration in industrial commis-
sions, bodies having comprehensive administrative functions
and powers for marshaling independent agencies into a well or-
ganized and centrally directed whole. The much desired effi-
ciency in labor administration during the war was not possible
without greater correlation of effort.
CHAPTER VI
COORDINATION IN LABOR ADMINISTRATION
The facts set forth in the preceding chapters suggest that in
spite of our industrial development and efficiency in production,
the United States up to the second year of our participation in
the war possessed no adequate administrative and judicial ma-
chinery for dealing successfully with the serious problems that
from time to time arose in the sphere of industrial relations.
We had formulated no definite set of principles and evolved no
comprehensive labor policy. A year of unprecedented unrest
was necessary to demonstrate to the government that a decen-
tralized labor administration could not bring relief. The convic-
tion gradually spread among government officials, representa-
tives of employers and of employees, and the general public, that
uniformity of methods, concentration of control, and coordina-
tion of administration in handling labor was just as necessary
to national productive effort as were similar policies in the field
of fuel, food, ships, and munitions production. Summing up the
situation Mr. Felix Frankfurter, chairman of the War Labor
Policies Board, stated: "Since the outbreak of the war, the
United States Government has come to be the greatest single
employer of labor in the country. . . But it has had no
operating policy with regard to the plants as a whole. Each
one has been operated individually as a separate enterprise,
quite apart from others and, so far as the labor supply has been
concerned, in active competition with the others.
" * A more
elaborate interpretation of the situation was given by the Sec-
retary of Labor in the following words :
Never before in history was it so essential as now for a government at
war to have a central labor administration and a consistent labor pol-
icy. . . Last fall it became apparent that in order to prosecute the war
efficiently the government should have a central labor administration to take
i Monthly Labor Beview, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, July, 1918,
pp. 25, 26.
157
158 DEVELOPMENT OF WAR LABOR LEGISLATION [372
care of problems not only of conciliation but of many- others matters of
concern to both laborers and manufacturers of war materials. Questions of
apprenticeship, of dilution of labor, of standards of safety and sanitation,
of employment of women in industries formerly occupied exclusively by
men, and of wages paid to women; problems of housing; of recruiting and
placing labor all needed, and still need, adjustment to the present emer-
gency. . .
Up to a recent time the labor questions most vitally connected with the
business of turning out the materials for war have been handled by a num-
ber of agencies. The Ordnance Bureau has taken care of its own interests,
the Shipping Board has concerned itself with its own production, and so
on. When it came to matters of labor, each section managed its own af-
fairs; each had its own adjustment commission; and as a result there
were as many policies for labor problems as there were purchasing agencies.
Outside of them all the Department of Labor has tried to survey the whole
field and cooperate everywhere. . . Each bureau was charged with the
responsibility of showing results in its own field. It had to fight its own
battles, to look out for its own interests everywhere.
There was a strike in a large munitions plant last fall and mediators
from four departments of the government at once stepped in, each with
different orders and a different policy for settling the dispute. Only the
good sense of the mediators themselves enabled them to get together and
bring about a satisfactory settlement.
Moreover, these various producing bureaus of the government, acting
independently, began to compete against one another for skilled workmen,
increasing the costly and inefficient labor turnover as men kept moving
from job to job for higher pay.2
1. THE GENESIS OF THE NEW LABOR POLICY
In response to the general demand for more efficient adminis-
tration of labor conditions President Wilson early in January,
1918, inaugurated a new labor administration. In a memoran-
dum to the Secretary of Labor on January 4, 1918, he outlined
a comprehensive program designed to provide machinery for
effective mobilization of labor, its standardization in all war in-
dustries, equitable adjustment of industrial disputes, and co-
ordination of action between the departments of the government
in matters pertaining to labor. This program was the result of
a series of conferences on the subject of a labor policy, held
under the direction of the Council of National Defense and the
Department of Labor. 3 The express purpose of these confer-
2 Saturday Evening Post, June 22, 1918.
3 The President 's Mediation Commission in its report had also sug-
gested the necessity for centralized administration.
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ences was to create uniformity of administration among the sev-
eral agencies dealing with the discovery, distribution, and hous-
ing of the labor force and otherwise adjusting the labor situation.
The need was not only for new agencies but also for more in-
timate relation and cooperation between the existing ones. The
government already possessed administrative machinery for
meeting many difficulties in the situation, among which agencies
were the United States Board of Mediation and Conciliation, the
Division of Information in the Bureau of Immigration, through
which the Employment Service operated, the Division of Medi-
ation and Conciliation, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. An
extension of the functions of these bodies, however, and the
creation of new agencies were necessary antecedents to the train-
ing of workers, the priority of labor demands, the dilution of
labor, the standardization of conditions of employment, the
protection of living conditions (including housing and trans-
portation), and the provision of publicity.4
The war labor administration that grew out of the above con-
ferences and which President Wilson requested the Secretary of
Labor to organize may be briefly outlined as follows: (1) A
means of furnishing an adequate and stable supply of labor to
war industries. The execution of this part of the program would
involve: (a) an efficient system of labor exchanges; (b) a suc-
cessful means of training workers; (c) a method of determining
priorities of labor demand; (d) facilities for dilution of skilled
labor. (2) Machinery for the immediate and equitable adjust-
ment of labor disputes in accordance with the principles agreed
upon between employers and employees, in order that there
might be no cessation of work. This would necessitate successful
methods and means of dealing with demands for increase in
wages, shorter hours, and better conditions of employment. (3)
Administrative machinery for the protection of labor safeguards
in the production of war materials, such as the welfare and
safety of women and children, and industrial hygiene. (4)
Agencies for improving living conditions, such as housing, trans-
portation, recreation, and education. (5) An investigating body
to gather and present data collected through various existing
* Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, February, 1918,
p. 77.
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governmental agencies or by independent research, such data to
furnish the basis for effective executive action. (6) An informa-
tion and education division with the function of promoting
sound public sentiment, the interchange of information between
the several departments of labor administration, and the devel-
opment of local agencies in industrial establishments for the
purpose of carrying out the national labor policies.
5
The organization of the above labor administration program
was no mean task, and the Council of National Defense suggested
that the Secretary of Labor summon to his aid as advisers and
administrators a well balanced corps of experts representing
capital, labor, and the general public, to assist in the formulation
and execution of labor policies, with a view to introducing great-
er uniformity and coordination. Furthermore, if necessary, con-
gressional action was to be sought in establishing the new plans.
The Secretary called to his assistance an advisory council of
seven persons representing the three groups of interests named
above.6 To assure unity of action among the several depart-
ments of the government, the War and Navy Departments and
the Shipping Board were given representation on the council.
The appointment of the Advisory Council was announced on
January 16, 1918, and it immediately began its work of coordi-
nating labor administration. On January 28, 1918, a program
of organization had been completed and was approved by Secre-
tary Wilson on the same day. This program provided recogni-
tion and extension of the existing organizations within the De-
partment of Labor and for additional services and means of
5 Ibid., p. 78.
6 This council was comprised of the following persons : Ex-Governor
John Lind of Minnesota, as representative of the public and chairman of
the council; Mr. Waddil Catchings of New York and Alabama, president
of the Sloss-Sheffield Steel and Iron Company, and Mr. A. A. Landon of
Buffalo, New York, general manager of the American Radiator Company, as
representatives of the employing interests; Mr. John B. Lennon, ex-presi-
dent of the International Tailors' Federation, and Mr. John J. Casey,
former United States representative from Pennsylvania, as representatives
of labor. Miss Agnes Nestor, president of the Chicago Women's Trade-
Union League, was designated as representative of the interests of women
workers. Professor L. C. Marshall of the University of Chicago was chosen
as economist to the council. Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics, February, 1918, p. 77.
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correlation of effort between the various departments of the gov-
ernment in matters relating to labor conditions.
7 In addition to
the Division of Conciliation, the United States Employment Ser-
vice, and the investigating bureaus of the Department of Labor,
six supplementary agencies were created as follows: (1) A Con-
ditions of Labor Service to administer working conditions in
industrial establishments, including safety, sanitation, etc. (2)
An Information and Education Service to promote sound public
sentiment and provide appropriate local machinery and policies
in industrial plants. (3) A Woman in Industry Service to cor-
relate the activities of various agencies dealing with matters per-
taining to women workers. (4) A Training and Dilution Ser-
vice to provide a supply of skilled workers. (5) A Housing and
Transportation Service. (6) A Personnel Service. 8
The creation of these new agencies did not do away with the
several industrial service sections of the Ordnance bureau,
the Shipping Board, the Quartermaster department, and other
successful departmental bodies discussed in the preceding chap-
ter. The objective was rather to supplement and especially to
correlate and centralize the endeavors of these numerous services,
and to make the Department of Labor a sort of clearing house
for them. Moreover, it was found necessary to modify the orig-
inal program and to add other agencies as conditions demanded,
as, for example, the organization of a Division of Negro Eco-
nomics, the Civilian Insignia Service, and the Investigation and
Inspection Service. The advantages of the new system were set
forth as follows : (1) It would guarantee immediate operation of
effective administrative machinery by using already existing effi-
cient personnel in the several bureaus; (2) it would conform to
accepted theories of business administration for it involved neces-
sary centralization of control with wise decentralization of ad-
ministration by agencies which come in touch with the prob-
lems at issue; (3) the plan would in no way inflict limitations
upon the freedom of the Department of Labor in creating neces-
sary supplementary agencies; (4) there would be definite loca-
tion of responsibility and power for decisions, for these were to
7 See diagram, p. 173.
s MonthJy Eeview, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, February, 1918,
. 79.
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rest with the Secretary of Labor; (5) the plan would be flexible
in that it would permit consolidation of agencies under the direc-
tion of the Department of Labor.
9
2. WAR LABOR CONFERENCE BOARD
At the time of his approval of the program submitted by the
Advisory Council (January 28, 1918), the Secretary of Labor
requested the managing director of the National Industrial Con-
ference Board, a federation of employers, and the president of
the American Federation of Labor to constitute a war labor con-
ference board for the purpose of formulating and concluding
agreements upon definite principles and policies for the govern-
ment of the relations between capital and labor.10 This board
was subsequently appointed.
11
The Purpose and Recommendations of the Board. The
appointment of the Labor Conference Board was an attempt to
bring employers and employees to a fuller appreciation of their
mutual interests and to impress upon the minds of each group
that prejudice and bitterness must give way to harmony of
action and cooperative endeavor in the common task of maximum
production, without which the war would inevitably be lost.12
Among the important questions demanding attention were a
basis for wage determination, strikes and lockouts, piece work
Ibid., pp. 79, 80.
lo/fcid., April, 1918, p. 104.
11 The personnel of the National War Labor Conference Board was as
follows: Ex-Presiclent William H. Taft, and Frank P. Walsh, ex-chairman
of the United States Commission on Industrial Eelations, representing the
public. L. F. Loree, New York City, president of the Delaware and Hudson
Bailroad Company; C. Edwin Michael, Eoanoke, Virginia, president of the
Virginia Bridge and Iron Company; Loyall A. Osborne, New York City,
vice-president of the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company;
W. H. Van Dervoot, East Moline, Illinois, president of Root and Van Der-
voot Engineering Company; B. L. Worden, New York, vice-president of the
Submarine Boat Corporation, representing the employing interests; Frank
J. Hayes, Indianapolis, Indiana, president of the United Mine Workers of
America; William L. Hutchison, Indianapolis, president of the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America; William H. Johnston,
Washington, D. C., president of the International Association of Machin-
ists
;
Victor A. Olander, Chicago, representative International Seamen 's
Union of America
;
T. A. Eickert, Chicago, president of the United Garment
Workers of America, representing employees.
12 Monthly Beview, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, April, 1918, p. 103.
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prices and price fixing, elimination of improper restrictions on
output, the need for dilution of labor, discrimination against
union and non-union workmen, admission of union agents to in-
dustrial plants, adjustment of industrial disputes, the right of
workers to organize and bargain collectively. Upon the calling
of the first session of the board by the Secretary of Labor, Ex-
Governor Lind, chairman of the Advisory Council, said regard-
ing its possibilities: "Tomorrow's conference may easily
prove one of the most significant developments in the history of
America's participation in the war. In a sense it is unprece-
dented in American industrial history.
' ' 13
Certainly no recent
event should do more to hasten industrial peace and to demon-
strate the possibility of such a peace than this convocation of rep-
resentatives of labor and capital for the purposes of considera-
tion of their mutual interests and common difficulties.
On March 29, 1918, the War Labor Conference Board sub-
mitted a unanimous report of its decisions to the Secretary of
Labor. The recommendations of the board provided for the
creation of a National War Labor Board consisting of an equal
number of members and selected in the same manner and by the
same interests as had chosen the conference board itself. The
new board, whose functions are outlined below, was in general to
consider all controversies arising between employers and em-
ployees with a view to guaranteeing uninterrupted operation of
industry and maximum production of war materials. Two
things were necessary: (1) Some sort of truce must be declared
between labor and capital during the continuance of the war,
and (2) some category of employment standards must be set
forth and agreed upon by both sides, so that productive industry
could continue without cessation.
3. THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD
The National War Labor Board which had its inception in the
recommendations of the War Labor Conference Board was ap-
pointed by the Secretary of Labor and was comprised of repre-
sentatives of employers, employees, and the public. 14 The ap-
is
Ibid., p. 104.
n The personnel of the board was the same as that of the War Labor
Conference Board. Mr. W. Jett Lauck acted as secretary to the board.
See p. 162.
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pointment of the board was approved and affirmed by President
Wilson in his proclamation of April 8, 1918, in which he sum-
marized its powers, functions and duties. 15
Duties and Powers of the Board. The duties and powers
of the National War Labor Board were outlined in the report of
the War Labor Conference Board, March 29, 1918, and the
Proclamation of the President of April 8, 1918. These duties
and powers may be summarized as follows : ( 1 ) Settlement by
mediation and conciliation of every controversy arising between
capital and labor in the field of production essential to the con-
duct of the war. (2) Exercise of the same jurisdiction in all
other fields of national activity, where stoppage or threatened
cessation of production would be detrimental. (3) Provision, by
direct appointment or otherwise, for committees or boards to sit
throughout the country where disputes arise, so that settlement
may be effected where and whenever possible by local mediation
and conciliation. In case of the failure of these local boards to
effect a settlement the parties were to be summoned by the na-
tional board. (4) In case the efforts of the national board
should fail to settle the dispute, as a last resort an umpire could
be appointed. For the appointment of an umpire unanimous
agreement among the members of the board was necessary, but
if such an agreement could not be reached he was to be drawn
from a list of ten suitable and disinterested persons nominated
by the President of the United States. On July 12, 1918, the
President announced the names of ten persons who were to act
as umpires.16 (5) The board was vested with the power to alter
its methods and practice in settling disputes, as experience sug-
gested. (6) Regular meetings of the board were to be held at
Washington but it could convene at any other convenient or
necessary place. (7) No cognizance was to be taken by the
board of disputes between employers and employees in any field
of industrial activity where by federal law or by agreement
there already existed means of settlement which had not been
invoked. 17
IB Proclamation of the President of tlie United States, April 8, 1918,
creating the National War Labor Board.
10 Official Bulletin, July 15, 1918, p. 1.
i? Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, May, 1918, pp.
55, 56.
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The board was authorized to appoint a secretary and to create
necessary clerical organization. Subsequent to its creation, the
board provided for the appointment of alternates, each member
being privileged to name one permanent alternate who had the
power to act and vote in behalf of the principal, during the lat-
ter 's absence. 18 Upon application to the Secretary of Labor the
board was given the privilege of using the machinery of media-
tion and conciliation of the Department of Labor, thus introduc-
ing one of the many changes that led to coordination of admin-
istration. Furthermore, the action of the War Labor Board
could be invoked, in respect to controversies within its jurisdic-
tion, by the Secretary of Labor or by either party to the dispute
or an authorized representative of either party. Consideration
of such controversies, however, could be declined by the board
if their character and importance did not in its opinion warrant
such action. Employers and employees were given equal repre-
sentation on all the committees of the board's own members ap-
pointed to act in general or local matters, and in local com-
mittees. The representatives of the public presided alternately
at successive sessions of the board as agreed upon between them-
selves. 19
Principles and Policies to Govern Industrial Relations.
For the purpose of guiding the National War Labor Board in
its considerations of industrial disputes a set of fundamental
principles and policies was formulated by the War Labor Con-
ference Board. These principles included the following provi-
sions: (1) The abandonment of strikes and lockouts for the
duration of the war. (2) Full recognition of the right of both
employers and workers to organize in their trade unions and
associations respectively and to bargain collectively through their
chosen representatives. This right was in no way to be denied,
abridged, or interfered with by either side, and all discrimina-
tion for legitimate activities with such organizations was for-
bidden. In addition, workers in their collective action were to
refrain from the use of coercive measures either in inducing per-
sons to affiliate with the union or in forcing employers to bar-
gain. (3) In union shops the union standards of wages, hours,
is Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 99.
is Monthly Eeview, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, May, 1918, p. 56.
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and conditions of labor were to be maintained, while in estab-
lishments employing union and non-union workers the status quo
was to be maintained, allowing the utmost freedom in joining or
refraining from membership in the union. This provision,
however, did not prevent the board from improving conditions
as to wages, hours, and conditions of labor when deemed neces-
sary, nor was there to be any relaxation of labor safeguards.
(4) When employed on tasks ordinarily performed by men, wo-
men were to be given equal pay and were not to do work dis-
proportionate to their strength. (5) The basic eight-hour day
was to apply in all cases where existing law required it, while in
all other cases hours were to be determined with due regard to
the needs of the government and the welfare of the workers.
(6) Under all circumstances the maintenance of maximum pro-
duction was to be assured. (7) In fixing wages, hours, and con-
ditions of employment due regard was to be paid to standards
prevailing in the localities affected. (8) Recognition of the
right of all workers, including common laborers, to a living
wage, such a minimum to insure health and reasonable comfort
to the worker and his family. (9) Information concerning the
available supply of labor and its effective distribution was to be
secured from the Department of Labor.20
The above operating principles and policies contributed much
to the splendid success that attended the efforts of the National
War Labor Board. Not only were they comprehensive in char-
acter, touching upon almost every problem that might arise in
industrial relations, but they were also reasonable in that due
cognizance was taken of the rights, welfare, and interests of the
three parties involved in any industrial controversy employ-
ers, employees, and the general public. Furthermore, they in-
corporated the basic standards of employment set forth by social
reformers in the field of labor problems.
Method of Presenting Complaints. Any person who de-
sired to present an issue between employers and workers was
required to do so by written statement of the specific grievance
and to designate his own post office address and the address of the
persons or corporations involved in the dispute. A similar state-
so Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, May, 1918, pp.
56, 57.
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ment was necessary when employers and employees themselves
presented a complaint. Controversies in which the Secretary of
Labor invoked the action of the board, together with documents
transmitted by him, were filed by the secretary of the board. In
case any other board than the National War Labor Board pos-
sessed jurisdiction in any case filed with the secretary, the plain-
tiff was so informed by him and he reported the disposition of
the case at the following meeting of the National "War Labor
Board. It was the duty of the secretary to digest all cases pre-
sented and bring them to the prompt attention of the board for
action. 21 The cases that came before the board have been care-
fully digested and published.
Procedure for Hearing and Adjusting Disputes. In all con-
troversies between employers and employees two members of
the National War Labor Board, one from the employers' side
and one from the side of the employees, were appointed to act
for the board, the members in each case being named by the joint
chairmen at the instance of the respective groups of the board.
These two members constituted what was known as a section of
the board to hear and adjust cases assigned to them. If these
sections failed to effect a settlement it was their duty to sum-
marize and analyze all the facts in the case and present the same
to the board with necessary recommendations. Local committees
in any city or district could be appointed by the board to act in
cases arising locally. In the selection of these local committees,
associations of employers, organizations of employees, and other
local interest groups were entitled to make recommendations to
the board. In localities where no permanent local committee had
been appointed sections of the national board were authorized
to make temporary appointments.22
If after due deliberation and effort through the various agen-
cies named above the National War Labor Board found it im-
possible to settle a controversy, the board itself then convened
as a board of arbitration to decide the dispute and make an
award, if a unanimous decision could be reached. In case such
unanimity could not be secured the board selected an umpire
21 See Report of the War Labor Conference Board, March 29, 1918, sum-
marized in the Sixth Annual Eeport of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, pp.
100-104.
22 See Eeport of the War Labor Conference Board, March 29, 1918.
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who sat with the board, reviewed the issues and rendered his
award. The umpire was a last resort always, and was appointed
only after a unanimous vote of the board deemed such an ap-
pointment necessary. If the board failed to reach a unanimous
agreement regarding the choice of an umpire he was drawn by
lot from a list of ten "suitable and disinterested persons,"
nominated by the President of the United States. 23
In compliance with the principles of settlement of industrial
disputes set forth in the President's proclamation of April 8,
1918, the National War Labor Board heard appeals in the fol-
lowing cases: (1) Where there had been violations of the prin-
ciples of the President's proclamation relative to uninterrupted
production ; (2) where employers failed to put into effect or em-
ployees refused to accept or abide by an award of any board of
settlement; (3) where it became necessary to determine ques-
tions of jurisdiction as between government boards. The Na-
tional War Labor Board was not empowered to hear appeals
from the decision of ' ' regularly constituted boards of appeal, nor
from any other board to revise findings of fact.
' ' 2*
What the War Labor Board Accomplished. The opera-
tion and results of the board's efforts deserve consideration.
During the seven months of its work under war conditions the
War Labor Board had unprecedented authority and success in
enforcing its awards. This success was the more remarkable
because the board itself was non-statutory in character and its
decisions not enforceable by law. The fundamental principles
upon which this new agency of industrial peace was founded
were essentially democratic and contained none of the repressive
force of law. "What was desired was not an order imposed from
above or without but a solemn contract by both parties volun-
tarily entered into," hence "the necessity for employers and
employees to agree upon their own law and their own judges.
' ' 25
Up to October 31, 1918, in only four cases was the board unable
to reach a unanimous agreement upon awards and decisions,
23 Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, May, 1918, pp. 55,
56. See also the Eeport of the War Labor Conference Board, March 29,
1918, appended to the published dockets of the National War Labor Board.
2* Monthly Eeview, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, June, 1918, p. 56.
25 Sixth Annual Eeport of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, pp. 99, 100.
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and on three occasions only during the war period were its
awards not willingly accepted and applied.26
The first resistance to a decision of the board occurred in a
dispute between the Western Union Telegraph Company and a
group of its employees who had joined the Commercial Teleg-
raphers
' Union. The employees accused the company of denying
them the right to organize, and of discharging members of the
union which, of course, constituted a violation of one of the basic
principles upon which the War Labor Board was established.
The company was instructed against such discrimination but re-
fused to abide by the award and recommendation made by the
board and, as a consequence, the facts were laid before President
Wilson by the Secretary of Labor, and on June 11, 1918, the
President communicated with both the Western Union Telegraph
Company and the Postal Telegraph Commercial Cable Company
which had been accused of similar violations. In his communi-
cation the President urged acceptance of the recommendations
of the War Labor Board and the latter company immediately
acknowledged the necessity of subordinating private to public
interests and accepted the award. The Western Union Com-
pany, however, refused to comply and denied the right of the
board to enforce the decision, whereupon President Wilson ap-
pealed to Congress for authority to take over the telegraph and
telephone lines. Authority .was granted and these utilities were
placed under the control of the Postmaster General who immedi-
ately stopped all discriminatory practices against union em-
ployees.
27
A second case of refusal to accept the award of the War Labor
Board occurred at Bridgeport, Connecticut, where early in Sep-
tember, 1918, a group of organized employees expressed dissat-
isfaction with an award and ceased work. Ninety per cent of
the workers at Bridgeport had accepted the award and to the
ten per cent who stopped work President Wilson wrote a letter
in which he urged acceptance of the decision and return to work.
He threatened government interference which would result in
withdrawal of draft exemptions based on industrial grounds.
The striking workers acceded to the request of the President,
26
Ibid., pp. 104, 105.
2T Ibid., pp. 105. 106.
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accepted the award, and resumed work. The Smith and Wesson
Company, of Springfield, Massachusetts, refused to accept the
instructions of the War Labor Board against continuation of
discrimination between organized and unorganized workers.
Again the President announced that the decision of the board
must be upheld, regardless of the attacks that might be made
upon it. The company refused to abide by the award on the
grounds that it was contrary to the traditional policy of the
plant. On September 13, 1918, therefore, the President directed
the Secretary of War to commandeer the Smith and Wesson
establishment and to operate it thereafter for the government.28
The work of the National War Labor Board is one of the re-
markable accomplishments of our industrial readjustment for
war, and it has done much to produce historic and desirable
changes in industrial relations. It demonstrated the practicabil-
ity of an amicable settlement of industrial grievances by a
democratically constituted body representing capital, labor, and
the public. Furthermore, it secured the adoption and enforce-
ment of principles in the government of industry which a cen-
tury of agitation had failed to procure. The limits of this study
do not permit a complete analysis of the awards and findings of
the board, but a brief consideration of these is necessary in order
to appreciate the value of this great agency of industrial peace.
Recognition of the right to organize and to bargain collectively,
together with rigid enforcement of these rights in prohibiting
discrimination against union employees, was probably the most
important change in industrial relations that has ever been ef-
fected by a governmental agency in the United States. Workers
were given free choice in selecting shop committees from among
their number, free from any ulterior influences, to represent
them in negotiations with employers, and the employers were
instructed to meet with these committees for the purpose of ad-
justing grievances involving wages, hours, and other conditions
of work.
Reinstatement with back pay for lost time was the penalty for
discharging a man because of union activities. On the other
hand employees in exercising the right to organize were strictly
2 Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 106. See also
letter of the President to the striking employees of Bridgeport, Conn.
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forbidden to use coercive measures of any kind for the purpose
of compelling individuals to join the union, and no compulsion
on the part of the unions was permitted to force employers to
bargain with them. The status quo ante was maintained in re-
gard to recognition of trade unions, the board sustaining the
right of employers to refuse to deal with the union during the
war where such negotiation had not been tolerated before the
war, and upholding the right of unions to continued recognition
by employers who had previously given such recognition.
Accepting the principle that the worker is entitled to a wage
sufficient to maintain his family and himself in reasonable com-
fort, the War Labor Board, after studies in the cost of living, set
a minimum wage for male workers which generally approx-
imated 42 cents an hour, and for women workers approximately
32 cents an hour. These minima differed with the cost of living
in different localities, but an attempt was made, as in the case of
the shipbuilding districts, to approach uniformity in order to
prevent migration of labor. When increases in wages so in-
creased the cost of production as to threaten discouragement of
business enterprise, the board suggested to the proper rate
making agency that an advance in rates be permitted, as in the
case of street railways. The rapidly changing level of prices
caused the board to allow a review of awards and findings at
intervals of six months upon request of either party to the
compact.
The eight-hour day was recognized in principle and was gen-
erally incorporated in the awards of the board, altho the nine-
hour day was sometimes allowed. The rights of women in in-
dustry were rigidly safeguarded with respect to wages, health,
and general welfare. In all cases equal pay for equal work was
an accepted principle of the board 's decisions.
Effective enforcement of awards was made possible by the
provision for trained examiners who conducted public hearings,
where both sides were given an opportunity to submit data hav-
ing to do with the questions involved. It was the duty of these
examiners to summarize and analyze the data so presented and
to report to the board. Examiners were also assigned to super-
vise the application of awards and to interpret in behalf of the
board those points which were not clear and to which both par-
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ties failed to agree. These examiners rendered valuable service
in organizing the shop committees that were so largely re-
sponsible for the establishment of industrial peace. The im-
portance of the work of the National "War Labor Board cannot
yet be fully appraised, for the effort it put forth will continue to
bear fruit for some time to come. It is clear, however, that in
defending the principle of just and proper conditions, the right
of organization and of collective bargaining, a minimum comfort
wage, and communication between management and workers
through shop committees allowing rational consideration of
grievances, the board has made a significant contribution, not
only toward the winning of a war for democracy, but also toward
the solution of perplexing industrial problems and the realiza-
tion of what promises to be the next great step in social prog-
ress the democratization of industry.29
There is no better index of the value of the work performed
by the War Labor Board than the cases it adjusted. Its efforts
were comprehensive and constructive, altho not always accept-
able to both parties concerned. To October 1, 1918, the offices of
the board considered 531 controversies, of which 266 were still
pending. Awards had been made in 44 cases ; 136 cases had been
referred to other governmental agencies ; 2 were withdrawn ; 30
were settled; 9 were settled without intervention of the board;
jurisdiction was denied in 8 cases ; and 32 were dropped or sus-
pended. 30 By November 11, 1918, when the armistice was
signed, 83 awards had been made, and by the middle of Febru-
ary, 1919, the number of findings announced totaled 198, in-
volving 34 industries scattered over 35 states. The number of
cases that had entered on the docket up to April 15, 1919, aggre-
gated 1,244, only 33 of which had not been disposed of in some
way. Of this number of cases, awards were issued in 394 ; agree-
ments or dismissal were reached in 428 cases; and 389 were re-
ferred to subsidiary agents having original jurisdiction.31
29 Fifty shop committees had been organized by February, 1919. See
Shop Committees in Action, by William L. Stoddard, The Survey, Vol.
XLII, No. 1 (April 5, 1919), pp. 28-30. This number has been greatly in-
creased since that date.
so Sixth Annual Eeport of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 105.
si The Survey, Vol. XLII, No. 5 (May 3, 1919), p. 192. The National
War Labor Board passed out of existence at the end of the fiscal year 1919.
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4. COORDINATION OP THE WORK OP THE DEPARTMENT OP LABOR
The creation of the War Labor Conference Board and the re-
sultant organization of the National War Labor Board were only
the initial steps in an extensive program of reorganization for
war labor administration. The aim of this vast program was the
centralization of control coupled with a judicious decentraliza-
tion of administration. Control was centralized under the direc-
tion of the Secretary of Labor, assisted by the War Labor Pol-
icies Board comprised of representatives of the various produc-
tion departments of the government and heads of bureaus and
services of the Department of Labor.32 At the beginning of the
fiscal year, 1918, the Department of Labor consisted of four
bureaus, together with such agencies as had been created in
the office of the Secretary of Labor for conciliation and media-
tion in labor disputes. At the close of that year there were
thirteen separate bureaus and services, and two boards, the one
a court of last resort the War Labor Board and the other
an agency to correlate the work of the Department of Labor with
other production departments of the government the War
Labor Policies Board. 33 Correlation of the activities of existing
agencies was the first logical step in readjustment for the admin-
istration of the increasingly difficult labor situation ; the creation
of necessary additional agencies as conditions necessitated was
the second step. The unfortunate situation was that efficient
administrative machinery had not been created before the coun-
try entered upon the prosecution of a great war. It was not
until July 15, 1918, about four months before the armistice was
signed, that the Secretary of Labor announced the completion of
the War Labor Administration Cabinet which was a very com-
prehensive body of officials in touch with the numerous boards,
serevices, and bureaus interested in the solution of our labor
problems. 34
' ' Since industry is but the application of man power
32 Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, August, 1918,
p. 63.
33 Sixth Annual Eeport of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 9.
34 This cabinet was composed of the following representatives : Secre-
tary of Labor Wilson, Labor Administrator; Felix Frankfurter, assistant
to the Secretary and chairman of the War Labor Policies Board; Assistant
Secretary of Labor, Louis F. Post; Solicitor John W. Abercrombie; Royal
Meeker, Commissioner, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Anthony Caminetti,
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to raw material, the efficiency of industry was wholly dependent
upon the efficiency of labor. The greatest essential, therefore,
for our Government was the adoption of a central labor admin-
istration and a consistent labor policy.
' ' 35
5. WAR LABOR POLICIES BOARD
On May 13, 1918, the Department of Labor announced the
creation of the War Labor Policies Board, with Professor Felix
Frankfurter as chairman, who was also made assistant to the Sec-
retary of Labor.36 In determining wages and working condi-
tions, in the supervision of housing and other functions, the
numerous boards and agencies that existed in the production
departments of the government were often in conflict regarding
authority. It was highly desirable, therefore, to unify the activ-
ities of these agencies, and to bring them into cooperation. The
Commissioner General, Bureau of Immigration; Julia C. Lathrop, Chief,
Children's Bureau; John B. Densmore, Director General, U. S. Employment
Service; Roger W. Babson, Director, Information and Education Service;
Grant Hamilton, Director, Working Conditions Service; Herman Schneider,
Director, Training and Dilution Service; Ethelbert Stewart, Director, In-
vestigation and Inspection Service; Mary Van Kleeck, Director, Woman in
Industry Service; Otto M. Eidlitz, Director, Bureau of Industrial Housing
and Transportation; Charles T. Clayton, Director Civilian Insignia; Samuel
J. Gompers, chief clerk of the Cabinet. Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics, August, 1918, pp. 63, 64.
ss Secretary of Labor Wilson, Sixth Annual Report, 1918, p. 9.
36 The personnel of the War Labor Policies Board was as follows : De-
partment of Labor, Felix Frankfurter, chairman; Max Lowenthal, assistant
to the chairman; Miss Mary Van Kleeck, Director of Woman in Industry
Service; War Department, Dr. E. M. Hopkins, assistant to the Secretary of
War; Navy Department, F. D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy;
Department of Agriculture, G. I. Christie, assistant to the Secretary of
Agriculture, in charge of Farm Labor Activities; War Industries Board,
Hugh Frayne, general organizer, American Federation of Labor; Fuel Ad-
ministration, John P. White, ex-president United Mine Workers of America;
Shipping Board, Robert P. Bass, ex-governor of New Hampshire; Emer-
gency Fleet Corporation, Charles Piez, general manager; Food Administra-
tion, M. B. Hammond, Ohio State University; Railroad Administration,
W. I. Tyler, assistant director Division of Operations; Committee on Public
Information, W. L. Chenery, Chicago; Executive Secretary, George L. Bell,
San Francisco; Industrial Adviser, H. F. Perkins, Chicago; Labor Adviser,
John R. Alpine, vice-president, American Federation of Labor; Economic
Adviser, L. C. Marshall, Dean, University of Chicago. Monthly Labor Re-
view, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, July, 1918, p. 25.
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War Labor Policies Board was designed to accomplish this. As
finally constituted the board represented the Department of La-
bor, the National War Labor Board, the Department of Agricul-
ture, the Shipping Board, the Eailroad Administration, the War
Industries Board, the Fuel Administration, the Food Administra-
tion, the War Department, the Navy Department, the Emergency
Fleet Corporation, the Committee on Public Information, and
the American Federation of Labor. The wisdom of this inti-
mate relation between the administrative agencies entrusted with
the prosecution of the war can hardly be overestimated. It was
evident that the first year of the war had uncovered many diverse
policies emanating from a single government, and the inevitable
result was that "the Nation, operating through different agen-
cies, was saying and doing irreconcilable things. Each of the
war policies announced by each of the branches of the admin-
istration could not be right because many of them were mutually
contradictory.
' ' 37
Duties of the War Labor Policies Board. The primary
duty of the War Labor Policies Board was the consideration for
war industries of all questions pertaining to wages, hours, the
supply and proper distribution of labor, and the standardization
of working conditions. More specifically the duties of the board
included: (1) Coordination of every government agency whose
activities in any way involved the employment or direction of
labor; (2) centralization of the various production departments
of the government in so far as these related themselves to the
problems of labor, in which capacity the Policies Board exer-
cised merely an administrative function, for its decisions were
carried out by the agencies and departments represented in its
membership ; (3) fixation of wage standards for all industries in
a given section of the country after thoro investigation of the
conditions of living, including the cost of living and services,
such information to be secured from organizations of workers,
associations of employers, and government bureaus ; (4) careful
direction of the sources of labor supply, allocation of the supply
according to the productive needs of the country and the priority
of labor claims; (5) determination of the needs of industry with
ST Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 114.
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regard to housing and transportation facilities; (6) regulation
of hours of labor in various industries.38
When the Policies Board reached final decisions in cases aris-
ing in industrial relations in war industries, the execution of
these decisions was left directly in charge of each department
represented on the board, in so far as the particular decision
affected that department. As an aid to the board in formulating
a set of operating principles and policies several temporary com-
mittees were selected with membership from branches of the
government represented on the Policies Board. Committees were
organized also to inquire into government contract clauses affect-
ing industrial relations, to control labor recruiting, to secure
exemption of skilled workers from military service, to centralize
industrial statistics, to standardize wages and conditions of
labor, and to provide war industry badges.39
Contrary to a general impression regarding the War
Labor Board and the War Labor Policies Board, the functions
of the two bodies were not identical, altho they were both integral
parts of the Department of Labor. The duties of the National
War Labor Board were fundamentally judicial in character. It
was primarily a court of last resort and assumed no jurisdic-
tion in any controversy between employers and employees in
any field of industrial or other activity where there was by
agreement or federal law a means of settlement which had not
been invoked.40 In all cases where the enunciated principles of
the board were involved it exercised jurisdiction. The board,
however, sometimes assumed legislative functions when the enun-
ciation of a new principle to govern industrial relations was con-
templated. Its findings were final and binding in all disputes
between employers and employees where its principles of ad-
justment were in any way involved.41
The War Labor Policies Board, on the other hand, devoted
itself to administrative work. It was created to determine and
develop policies for a unified labor administration, and to co-
ordinate into one consistent policy the differentiated and fre-
ss Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, July, 1918,
pp. 24, 26.
39 Ibid., pp. 24, 25.
*o Official Bulletin, June 12, 1918, p. 4.
41
Ibid., June 8, 1918, p. 13.
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quently inconsistent methods of important governmental depart-
ments dealing with the problems of labor that affected produc-
tion, always excluding from its field of administration agree-
ments between employers and their workers.
Altho the basic functions of these two important boards were
different, the fundamental principles that governed their pro-
cedure and decisions were similar, for on July 12, 1918, the
Policies Board adopted the principles laid down by the War
Labor Board.42 In March, 1919, the Policies Board was dis-
continued.
6. THE UNITED STATES EMPLOYMENT SERVICE
The war activities of the United States soon gave rise to an
extraordinary demand for laborers in those industries that were
manufacturing large quantities of ships, munitions, ordnance,
and other materials necessary to equip our military and naval
forces. Excessive labor turnover soon appeared. The move-
ment of workers from the less profitable forms of production to
the "war industries" which were paying much higher wages
resulted in a marked scarcity of labor in some communities. The
direction of the labor supply, therefore, became an urgent need.
The recruitment and distribution of labor was administered
through the United States Employment Service, which, as has
been shown, was established by the Department of Labor in
1914. It will be recalled that authority for this service was de-
rived from the statutory powers of the Division of Information
in the Bureau of Immigration,43 supplemented by the broader
powers of the Department of Labor itself in regard to the in-
terests of the wage earners and the advancement of their oppor-
tunities for profitable employment.44 The service began in a
small way with the creation of the Division of Information in
1907, and the establishment in that year of a public employment
system in connection with the immigration station at New York.
Later (1914) the Department of Labor entered into cooperative
42 See pp. 215 fl. Also Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, August, 1918, pp. 65, 66.
43 "An Act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United
States," approved February 20, 1909, sec. 40. Also "An Act to regulate
the immigration of aliens to, and residence of aliens in, the United States,"
approved February 5, 1917, sec. 30.
44 An Act to create a Department of Labor, March 4, 1913, sec. 1.
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relations with the Post Office Department by which the facilities
of both these departments were used jointly to relieve the labor
shortage during the harvest season in the wheat growing, states.
In 1916 the service was still further extended by the creation of
a Women's and Girls' Division and of a division for young men
and boys. The end of the Mexican border trouble in 1917
strained the facilities of the service, because returned national
guardsmen were seeking employment. Through the various
branch offices scattered over the United States profitable employ-
ment was found for no less than 15,577 of the national guards-
men.45
These early experiences furnished an advantageous basis for
the reorganization and expansion of the service necessitated by
conditions incident to the greatest war in history. The service
cooperated with the United States Shipping Board in the loca-
tion of large numbers of ship carpenters, calkers, and skilled
workers available for immediate employment. For this purpose
a survey was made. The Department of Labor established such
additional war-emergency employment offices as were deemed
necessary for the recruitment of these workmen, detailed trav-
eling field agents to locate qualified workers for the yards, and
explained to the shipyard owners the way in which to derive the
most help from the use of the central service organized by the
Department of Labor.46
The construction of cantonments entailed the employment of
a vast army of laborers. To aid in the recruitment of the neces-
sary labor the Department of Labor secured from the War De-
partment a list showing the location of the army cantonments
and training camps to be constructed, and the names and ad-
dresses of contractors awarded the work of building them. Con-
tractors were instructed by the War Department to inform the
United States Employment Service of the number and the class
of workmen required. Not only did the Employment Service
recruit for this task thousands of workers carpenters and
other skilled mechanics, as well as skilled and unskilled labor-
ers but when the construction work was completed representa-
tives of the service were detailed to register the names, addresses,
43 Sixth Annual Report of tlie Secretary of Labor, 1918, pp. 199, 200.
46
Ibid., p. 200.
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and occupations of the workmen immediately so that when they
were finally laid off they could be directed to the industrial
plants that were in need of labor.
A serious labor shortage threatened to result in a disastrous
loss of crops in the vicinity of Norfolk, Virginia, during the
early part of July, 1917. Upon investigation the Department of
Labor discovered that the major difficulty was inadequate trans-
portation facilities. The trouble was called to the attention of
the Food Administrator, who immediately communicated with
the vessel owners. At a later conference, held in Norfolk, the
Food Administration and the Department of Labor were repre-
sented jointly. The result was that two additional sailings
weekly from Norfolk were obtained for the benefit of the pro-
ducers in that vicinity, and loss of foodstuffs was prevented.
Moreover, an additional representative was placed in the Nor-
folk employment office to aid in securing workers for local in-
dustries.
Centralization of the employment agencies of the country was
a necessary expedient during the war. To effect such central-
ization the Department of Labor was willing to go to the utmost
effort. Employers engaged in essential industries were bidding
against one another for labor, thereby stimulating disastrous
labor turnover and industrial unrest. "In consequence, wage
earners engaged in very necessary war service were solicited to
accept other service no more essential than that upon which they
were engaged." Under such conditions it was imperative that
the government, through the Department of Labor, try to cen-
tralize the work of recruiting labor under direction of public
agencies. This development, however, was retarded by the fact
that public agencies themselves were not united. Coordination
of federal agencies with those operated by the several states and
municipalities was the first requisite to success in solving this
problem. Measures were taken to accomplish such coordination.
"As a result, practically all the public agencies other than the
Federal were united with the United States Employment Service
prior to January 1, 1918. Under this arrangement many em-
ployees of the non-Federal units were designated as departmental
employees at nominal consideration ; in other cases the State and
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municipal offices were simply absorbed and lost their separate
identity."
47
On June 14, 1917, the Secretary of Labor created the United
States Public Service Reserve. The purpose of this organization
was to be the registration of patriotic citizens who desired to
offer their services to the government, either with or without
compensation, and to work either directly on government enter-
prises or in enterprises engaged in service for the government.
The reserve was empowered to make for the war industries lists
of available volunteers, showing their experience and ability,
and indicating the location of the persons registering. The spe-
cial functions of the reserve and its activities are discussed later.
Mobilization of women for war work constituted one of the
most serious labor problems incident to the great crisis, because
of the danger of exploitation of unorganized workers under the
guise of patriotism, and the menace of over-fatigue that speed-
ing up of industrial machinery and personnel produced. The
Secretary of Labor summarized the problem in the following
words :
Even before the declaration of war it became evident that conditions de-
manded the use of some central agency for the mobilization of woman work-
ers. Demands for workers from concerns holding contracts with European
belligerents were extremely heavy, with the added certainty that if the
United States became involved those demands would be multiplied.
In the mills and factories upon which the Government had to rely for
munitions and materials of war, and upon which the civilian population
must depend for its daily needs, there are nearly a million and a half woman
wage earners. But notwithstanding the importance of these woman wage
earners in winning the war, there was grave danger to industry, to labor,
and to society unless at the very outset a discriminating control over the
mobilization of woman labor in war industries was exercised. The demoral-
ization of the labor market, due to the transformation of so large a pro-
portion of the country's industries into manufactories of war materials and
to the vast requirements of shipyards and cantonments, was accentuated
by the withdrawal from industry of more than half a million men affected
by the draft. The dangers to labor and life, as well as to military success
lay in the overstraining of the regular workers and in an unintelligent draft
of industrial recruits.
It/was urgent at the beginning of the war to develop a system of assort-
ing and collecting data involving both man and woman labor on war con-
tracts in order to present a clear chart of the location and character of war
industries and the present and prospective need for woman labor in them.
*7 Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 201.
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This was the initial step in supplying the woman labor necessary to fill war
orders under reasonable working conditions.48
At the time we entered the war the Department of Labor did
not possess sufficient funds for handling the problem of women
in war industries. The National League of Woman's Service,
however, offered assistance in the form of adequately financed
plans, and the Department of Labor accepted these on the con-
dition that all the activities of the league affecting wage-earning
women should be subject to the control of the Secretary of Labor,
and that the department should have an official representative
on the governing board of the bureau which the league estab-
lished in "Washington. The department secured from the Secre-
tary of War and the Secretary of the Navy a list of contracts
which was used by the United States Employment Service and
the bureau of registration and information of the National
League for Woman's Service as a basis for the mobilization of
woman labor for war industries. These arrangements made pos-
sible the immediate formulation of methods and policies relative
to the supplying of women for these industries. Over two thou-
sand contracts a month from the United States government had
to be assorted and collated, the holders of such contracts had to
be communicated with in order to ascertain their needs for wo-
men workers, and the supply of workers had to be recruited.
Under the agreement made with the National League for Wo-
man's Service, the Department of Labor on October 1, 1917, took
over the phases of the work which had been conducted by the
league for the previous six months.
The successful harvesting of crops was a first essential of suc-
cess in the struggle with the Central Powers. Recruiting harvest
hands became one of the most important duties of the Depart-
ment of Labor, beginning with the season of 1914. There was
annual need for harvest hands in the wheat belt, extending from
Texas through Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, North and South
Dakota, eastern Montana, to the Canadian border. In 1917 the
Department of Labor and the Department of Agriculture co-
operated under a memorandum of understanding concluded be-
tween the two departments on April 24, 1917. ''With local
authorities, railway officials, and other public and private in-
*8 Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 202.
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terests these departments worked in the fields of Texas, Okla-
homa, Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, Missouri, Iowa, Montana,
and the Dakotas. Splendid results followed, not a bushel of
grain being lost for lack of harvesters. Nor did the cooperation
end with the American harvests. By agreement with the Cana-
dian government the two departments extended their service
across the Canadian line in aid of harvesting the wheat crops of
Manitoba and Saskatchewan, in return for which Canada helped
the United States to obtain extra workers for the potato crops
and lumbering operations in Aroostook County, Me.
' ' 49 Con-
stant communication was maintained between the United States
Employment Service and farm organizations, railway officials,
and service agents in the field in order to ascertain the nefts of
particular communities. Eastern and middle-western states also
received immeasurable benefit from the activities of the Employ-
ment Service in regard to the recruitment and distribution of
agricultural labor.
Reorganization of the Employment Service. Long be-
fore the war students of the labor problem had urged the crea-
tion of a coordinated and centralized system of national labor
exchanges, but it took a great emergency to reveal the necessity
for such a system. There was much experimentation. For ten
years previous to October 15, 1917, the Employment Service was
a part of a division of the Department of Labor, namely, the
Division of Information of the Bureau of Immigration, with less
than one hundred branches mere desks in the immigration
offices. At the time of its reorganization in the office of the Sec-
retary of Labor on the above date it had a personnel of less than
one hundred persons, and a placement of 1,000 workers a day.50
On the eve of the inauguration of the first step of the govern-
ment's centralized war labor policy August 1, 1918 the Em-
ployment Service had more than 500 branch offices for the dis-
tribution of labor and 20,000 agents for the work of labor re-
cruiting. It was placing at that time more than 10,000 workers
a day in war industries, some of the branches placing more
workers than the entire service seven months previous. When
reorganization was fairly complete the branch offices constituted
49
Ibid., p. 205.
so U. 8. Employment Service Bulletin, July 30, 1918, p. 6.
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a network offering facilities for labor recruitment to every coun-
ty and township in the country. In the most important agricul-
tural and industrial sections special divisions were created to
care for shipyard, dock, railroad, farm, and woman labor, with
experts to determine the fitness of each worker for the particular
job. A system of clearances was established between districts,
states, and communities in which employers and employees,
through the medium of state advisory and community labor
boards and state organization committees, were given a share
with other officials in the administration of the program insti-
tuted by the Employment Service. It is worthy of note that
''every step of the reorganization and upbuilding process has
been taken with the advice and counsel of experts in industrial
management and labor.
' ' 51 The Employment Service soon be-
came one of the most important government agencies for the
prosecution of the war and preparation for the reconstruction
period.
Such extensive reorganization and expansion could be accom-
plished only with the expenditure of a considerable amount of
money. Prior to October 15, 1917, the United States Employ-
ment Service had been conducted as an integral part of the Divi-
sion of Information in the Bureau of Immigration, as explained
in the preceding pages. Consequently the funds for operation
of the service came out of the appropriations of that bureau, and
its officers in the field acted in the dual capacity of immigration
and employment officials. The exigencies of a war period, how-
ever, necessitated the establishment of public employment ex-
changes as a distinct and separate branch of the Department of
Labor. In order to effect this and some other changes in the
Employment Service, Congress was asked to make adequate ap-
propriation. Congress responded with an ''Act making appro-
priations to supply urgent deficiencies in appropriations for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1918, and prior fiscal years, on ac-
count of war expenses, and for other purposes,
' '
approved by the
President on October 6, 1917, which provided for an appropria-
tion of $250,000 to "enable the Secretary of Labor during the
present emergency, in addition to existing facilities, to furnish
such information and to render such assistance in the employ-
si U. S. Employment Service Bulletin, July 30, 1918, p. 6.
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ment of wage earners throughout the United States as may be
deemed necessary in the prosecution of the war.
' ' 52
With funds available the work of reorganization was begun.
Employment matters not emergent in character were continued
in the Division of Information in the Bureau of Immigration,
while those emergent in character were managed directly from
the office of the Secretary of Labor without intervention from
the Bureau of Immigration, and at the expense of the recently
granted congressional appropriation. Emergency matters that
came to the attention of the Division of Information were re-
ported through the Commissioner of Immigration to the As-
sistant Secretary of Labor. The Boys
'
Working Reserve and the
United States Public Service Reserve were transferred to the
office of the Secretary of Labor to be supported out of the emer-
gency appropriation.
53 This really was the first step in the work
for the reorganization of the Employment Service.
The task of the Employment Service was greater than had
been anticipated, and the congressional appropriation proved in-
adequate to sustain the service. On December 5, 1917, President
Wilson rescued the service from the alternative of restricting its
activities in a critical period by allotting to the Department of
Labor $825,000 from the appropriations for national security
and defense, and thus made possible the continuation of the work
of distributing productive labor throughout the country.
These additional funds permitted greater expansion of the
Employment Service, and it became necessary to establish con-
centration of control and coordination of activities. With this
purpose in view, the Department of Labor on December 13,
issued a departmental order providing that all work of the Divi-
sion of Information, whether emergent or otherwise, should be
reported thereafter to the office of the Secretary of Labor and
the division should receive its instructions in the future from the
assistant secretary. On January 3, 1918, the Secretary of Labor
directed that the Division of Information should thereafter be
an integral part of the Employment Service and should be
known as the Division of Information, Administration, and
Clearance. On July 1, 1918, the Division of Information was
again restored to the Bureau of Immigration.
B2 Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 205.
53
Ibid., pp. 205, 206.
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Organization and Administration of the Enlarged Em-
ployment Service. The creation of a distinct and separate em-
ployment service thus took place on January 3, 1918. The plan
of reorganization set forth in the memorandum of that date pro-
vided for a director, an assistant director for field work and
quasi-official bodies, and an assistant director for administrative
work. The service was placed directly under control and super-
vision of the office of the Secretary of Labor. State, county, and
municipal employment offices throughout the nation were co-
ordinated under the authority of the United States Employment
Service. This does not mean, however, that state employment
services lost their identity when they beca'me component parts of
the national system. What actually happened was that these
agencies were confederated with the national system, which en-
hanced both their prestige and their efficiency.
The Employment Service was organized with a director gen-
eral and one assistant director, who with the chiefs of the divi-
sions constituted a policies board. This board, however, was
abandoned shortly after it was organized. Divisions were cre-
ated to take charge of specific duties as to information, adminis-
tration and clearance, woman labor, reserves, farm labor, etc.
In all, seven regular divisions were provided for, namely:
a Woman's Division, a Division of Information, a Division
of Service Reserves which included the Public Service Re-
serve and the Boys' Working Reserve, a Farm Service Divi-
sion, a Division of Investigation, a Statistical Division, and a
Division of Service Offices.54 Under the direction of these divi-
sions the service reached out into the remotest districts of the
country effecting correlation of effort between local, state, and
national employment agencies. The introduction of the new
system was endorsed and supported by the Council of National
Defense, forty-eight State Councils of Defense, four thousand
county councils, and innumerable community councils, which
was striking evidence of the need for such a system of labor ex-
changes and of its possible development.55
Even as early as May, 1918, the problem of securing an ade-
quate supply of skilled and unskilled labor for war industries
64 Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, pp. 206, 207.
56 U. S. Employment Service Bulletin, July 30, 1918, p. 3.
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had become acute, and two special sections were created the
Skilled Labor Section and the Unskilled Labor Section. Co-
operation between labor organizations and the Skilled Labor
Section made possible the transfer of a large number of workers
from nonessential to essential war work. Moreover, furlough
from army duties was secured for many skilled workers whose
services were sorely needed in emergency employments. Later,
as we shall see, the Unskilled Labor Section became the exclusive
agency for recruiting all unskilled workers for war industries,
with the exception of labor for railroads, farms, and enterprises
employing less than 100 men. Experience soon taught those in
charge of the recruitment of labor that additional readjustments
was necessary if the service was to perform its duties creditably.
Toward the end of June, 1918, plans were adopted providing
for a system of state advisory committees, community labor
boards, and state organization committees, consisting of repre-
sentatives of employers, employees, and the United States Em-
ployment Service. These were to aid in recruiting unskilled
labor for war industries and in the extension of the activities of
the Employment Service throughout the country.
The labor mobilizing and distributing machinery of the reor-
ganized Employment Service was effected on July 19, 1918, when
two men representing employers and employees from every state
east of the Mississippi met in Washington to hear details of the
labor recruiting plan. The state divisions of the Employment
Service sent a third member who was chairman ex officio of the
state representatives. These three men composed what was
known as the state organization committee of the United States
Employment Service. A similar conference west of the Missis-
sippi met at Denver July 25, 1918. In eleven and five days re-
spectively, preceding August 1, 1918, each state organization
committee established a state advisory board composed of rep-
resentatives of employers, employees, and the Employment Ser-
vice. In addition to the state advisory boards there were pro-
vided for local community boards created according to the vol-
ume of war production, transportation facilities, and other eco-
nomic conditions, to be composed of representatives of local
employers and employees. Industrial advisers were also pro-
vided for.
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The changes introduced as a result of the conference referred
to above may be summarized as follows: Abandonment of the
system of thirteen districts originally established by the Em-
ployment Service, thereby making the state the unit, and gradu-
al elimination of the district superintendencies ; the centraliza-
tion of responsibility for field organization in the hands of the
federal directors of employment for the states; the introduction
of uniform methods of office operation ; and the reorganization
of the administrative work at Washington into five divisions
control, field organization, clearance, personnel, and informa-
tion each in charge of a director.
The organization and functions of the state organization
committees, the state advisory boards, and the community
labor boards are worthy of note. The state organization com-
mittee was composed of representatives of the employing and
the laboring interests of the respective states, together with a
representative of the state employment service. Its duty was
to assist the state director in organizing the state advisory
board, and the community boards. It continued in existence
only until these boards were formed.
The state advisory board in each state consisted of the fed-
eral director of employment as chairman, two representatives of
labor, two of management, and two women, one of the latter to
represent the workers and the other to represent the employers.
The chief functions of these boards were: (1) To advise the
federal director of employment in matters of policy and to aid
him in selecting the members of his staff and the officers to be
placed in charge of the main local offices, including the superin-
tendents of women's divisions; (2) to recommend, when neces-
sary and expedient, the removal of these officers; and (3) re-
vision and approval of the apportionment among communities of
their respective states of the quota assigned thereto for purposes
of recruitment.
The community labor boards comprised five members, repre-
senting the United States Employment Service, local employers,
and local employees. At the end of hostilities, November 11, 1918,
there were 1,644 of these boards in operation. Their functions
were: (1) Determination of all questions involving the recruit-
ment and distribution of labor in the community, subject to ap-
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peal by any member to the state advisory board ; all decisions of
both state advisory boards and community labor boards being
subject to regulations issued and approved by the War Labor
Board; (2) distribution of the community's quota of employees,
assigning to industries and employers in non-war work the pro-
portionate share which each should contribute to the army of
workers needed by essential industries; (3) consultation of the
employers' committee, represented in the community labor
board, concerning the distribution and assignment of workers;
(4) enjoying no executive powers, and depending upon the good
will of employers and employees for its success, each community
board had to encourage and develop the spirit of cooperation
among these interests. 56
The industrial advisers, who were selected by the Department
of Labor, furnished the district draft boards information as to
the need for skilled labor and the supply of such labor in each
community, and assisted these boards in arriving at their deci-
sions as to whether or not individuals were performing work
necessary to the effective prosecution of the war.
Experience taught new lessons and suggested additional im-
provements for the Employment Service. Almost every phase
of governmental regulation during the war period was char-
acterized sooner or later by centralization of control and co-
ordination in administration. The recruitment and placement
of unskilled labor became an increasingly difficult problem as
the war continued, and it was obvious to those most intimately
acquainted wjith the Employment Service that centralization and
coordination must be introduced into the control and adminis-
tration of the work of recruiting and distributing labor. The
War Labor Policies Board recommended that exclusive authority
for the recruiting and placing of unskilled labor be vested in the
United States Employment Service, in order to eliminate appar-
ent duplication of effort and labor stealing. This recommendation
was submitted to President Wilson by the Secretary of Labor
on June 15, 1918. On June 17, 1918, the President issued a
proclamation urging all employers engaged in war work to re-
frain, after August 1, 1918, from recruiting unskilled labor in
any manner whatsoever, except through the United States Em-
56 Seventh Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1919, pp. 266, 267.
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ployment Service, and urging all workers to respond patriot-
ically to calls for labor issued by the service in behalf of essential
war industries. The regulations concerning this new develop-
ment were sent out on August 1, and are so comprehensive and
important that we quote them in full:
REGULATIONS COVERING CENTRAL RECRUITING PROGRAM
I. BY EMPLOYERS IN WAR WORK
To minimize the danger of interruption to war work in effecting the
change from present competitive methods of labor recruiting, the govern-
ment central labor recruiting program, as heretofore announced, provides
that at the outset employers may continue to hire unskilled laborers who
apply for work without solicitation and that private field forces may be
utilized under control of the United States Employment Service.
In order that the United States Employment Sefvice may be as effective
as possible it is highly important that all employers engaged in war work
keep the local office of the United States Employment Service informed
from day to day of their exact needs for unskilled labor.
The regulations which govern private recruiting are as follows:
Recruiting regulations
1. Employers may continue to hire workers who apply at the plant with-
out solicitation, direct or indirect.
2. The Federal director of employment in each State is authorized to
grant permission to employers to use their own field agents for recruiting
unskilled workers under his direction and control for war industries located
within the State.
3. Permission to recruit unskilled laborers in States other than the one
in which the work is located may be secured from the Director General of
the United States Employment Service upon the recommendation of the
Federal director of employment for the State in which the men are needed.
Such permission will be communicated by the Director General to the Fed-
eral directors for the States in which the labor is needed and from which
it is to be recruited.
Transportation of workers
4. No unskilled labor may be transported from one State to another
without authorization from the Director General, to be secured by applica-
tion through the Federal director of employment for the State in which the
labor is recruited. No laborers may be* removed from one employment dis-
trict to another within a State without authorization from the Federal
director of employment for the State.
5. Employers who receive permission to transport workers from one
State to another or from one district to another within any State must file
a statement with the nearest Employment Service office of the number of
men transferred, the wages offered, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment promised to the men.
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No fee agencies or advertising
6. Employers who are permitted to use their own field agents for re-
cruiting labor must in no case use any fee-charging agency or use any
agents or labor scouts who are paid for their work on a commission basis.
7. All advertising for unskilled labor, whether by card, poster, news-
paper, handbill, or any other medium, is prohibited after August 1, 1918.
This applies to all employers engaged wholly or partly in war work whose
maximum force, including skilled and unskilled laborers, exceeds 100.
Recruiting skilled labor
No restrictions are for the time being placed upon employers engaged in
war work in recruiting their own skilled labor, other than that they should
so conduct their efforts as to avoid taking or causing restlessness among
men who are already engaged in other war work, including railroads, mines,
and farms, as well as work covered by direct and subcontracts for depart-
ments of the United States Government.
Federal directors of the United States Employment Service for the sev-
eral States are instructed to give every possible assistance to employers en-
gaged in war work who desire to recruit skilled labor.
Employers in war work are at present under no restrictions as to adver-
tising for skilled labor, other than that all advertising should be designed
and conducted so as to avoid creating restlessness among men in war work
(as above described).
II. EMPLOYERS IN NON-WAR WORK
Non-war industries should not offer superior inducements or in any other
way undertake to compete for labor with the Government or with employers
engaged in war work (as above described). Observance of the letter and
spirit of this provision is necessary for the efficient prosecution of the war.
Methods of recruiting and of advertising which do not offend against it are
permitted.57
United States Employment Service,
J. B. DENSMORE, Director General.
August 1, 1918.
Centralized labor recruiting which was inaugurated under
these regulations materially reduced labor turnover, established
priorities of labor distribution, and transferred unskilled work-
ers from non-war industries to war-emergency work. Employ-
ers, labor union officials, and workers alike supported the entire
program.
Thus in less than three weeks from the date of reorganization
the reconstructed employment system was ready to function as
the only agency for the recruiting and distribution of unskilled
labor for war industries, since it was early in July that the War
Seventh Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1919, pp. 267-269.
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Labor Policies Board decided to establish state organization
committees. To announce this labor recruiting campaign 35,000
four-minute men, movies, papers, and other agencies were used
by the service.58 In a short time branch offices had been estab-
lished in 500 localities with a total personnel of about 3,000 paid
employees. The foundation for the success of the reorganized
employment program of the government had been laid on April
30, 1918, when the United States was divided into thirteen em-
ployment districts, each under the direction of a district em-
ployment superintendent. Each district superintendent's office
received reports from all public employment offices within the
district, kept in close touch with the employment situation,
supervised the work of state directors of employment in the
states comprising the district, and managed the fiscal operations
of the service. Thus a broad system of labor clearances was
established, making possible clearance of labor between local
offices within the state through the medium of the state office
and between the states within each district through the district
office, while clearances between districts were provided for
through the main office at Washington. 59 The experiences ob-
tained under this arrangement proved an invaluable asset and
contributed much to the ease with which the readjustments in
the service were made, and to the subsequent success of the re-
organized service.
Activities of the Divisions
With this general survey of the development, structure, and
operation of the United States Employment Service, we are in
a position to appreciate more fully the achievements of the sev-
eral divisions that contributed to the success of the general ser-
vice.
The rapidity with which readjustments were made in the Em-
ployment Service to meet new problems and an ever increasing
demand for its assistance was due largely to the efficient admin-
istrative machinery of the service. The administrative structure
of the Employment Service, including the divisions, was deter-
mined by the memorandum of the Secretary of Labor issued on
58 U. S. Employment Service Bulletin, July 30, 1918, pp. 3, 4.
59 Monthly Labor Eeview, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, August,
1918, p. 64.
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February 22, 1918, and effective on March 1, 1918, which modi-
fied the departmental order of January 3, 1918, to which refer-
ence has been made in previous pages. The new memorandum
contained the following provisions:
1. The Employment Service shall be administered by the Department.
2. There shall be a director, who shall have general supervision of all
activities of the Employment Service.
3. There shall be an assistant director, who shall perform such duties
as may be assigned to him by the director and shall act as director in the
absence of his chief.
4. There shall be a Policies and Planning Board composed of chiefs of
the different divisions, with a permanent secretary assigned to it.
5. The Division of Information shall be known as the Division of In-
formation, Administration, and Clearance, which shall have charge of the
ordinary administrative questions arising within the service, including files,
correspondence, accounts, statistics, and other matters normally cared for
by administrative divisions, and shall continue to conduct clearing-house
operations connected with employment-exchange work. It shall also have
under its supervision field work, quasi-official bodies, and service offices.
6. The other divisions will remain as at present, except the Division of
Investigation, which shall be abandoned.60
(1) The Public Service Reserve. The United States Public
Service Eeserve has been called the recruiting arm of the Em-
ployment Service. It was in charge of a national director, and
in each state there was a federal director of the reserve, who in
most cases was the same person who held the position of federal
director of the Employment Service. The reserve supplemented
the employment offices with 15,000 enrollment agents, who
reached ' ' down into the smallest village and hamlet to tap poten-
tial supplies of wage earners.
' ' These agents assisted greatly in
the recruitment and the distribution of labor for the more essen-
tial supplies of wage earners.
' ' These agents assisted greatly in
to fill special positions for whose services a heavy demand was im-
minent.
When the reserve was first organized by the Secretary of
Labor on June 14, 1917, its activities were confined to the index-
ing and classifying of applicants at Washington for govern-
mental service. In this way numerous governmental depart-
ments were furnished with thousands of men, chiefly of the
eo Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 208. The
accompanying diagram of the organization of the service is from the Sev-
enth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1919, p. 279.
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highly skilled types, such as engineers, technical experts, and
skilled mechanics. Even heads of governmental departments
organized for war-emergency work were selected from lists fur-
nished by the reserve. Among the achievements of the Public
Service Reserve the following are most noteworthy: over 1,500
aviation motor mechanics enlisted within three weeks, in Janu-
ary and February, 1918, for service overseas ; over 4,500 railway
men listed for induction and enlistment into the Division of
Military Railways; 470 for the Tank Corps; 472 as towermen
for the Navy ; all kinds of civilian help for the Ordnance Depart-
ment. Up to June, 1918, the reserve had registered and indexed
more than 300,000 men of various skilled and unskilled trades.
In appraising the work of the Public Service Reserve the Secre-
tary of Labor stated: "Undoubtedly production has been
appreciably increased and efficiency improved by its ability to
furnish on short notice men of almost any qualifications.
' ' 61
(2) The Boys' Working Reserve. As a branch of the Em-
ployment Service the United States Boys' Working Reserve had
charge of the mobilization and placement of boys between the
ages of 16 and 21 in civilian war work. From the date of its
organization, April, 1917, the boys' reserve fulfilled a useful
function in recruiting juvenile workers to maintain food produc-
tion, which threatened to break down on account of the with-
drawal of 3,000,000 to 4,000,000 adults from productive enter-
prises. Besides conserving the labor of farm boys for the farm,
the reserve during 1918 enrolled approximately 250,000 boys of
high-school age, chiefly for agricultural work under direction of
the agricultural division of the reserve. An illustration of the
achievements of the boys' reserve is found in the fact that in
Illinois 21,000 boys worked on the farms ; in Connecticut, 10,000
boys helped to care for the largest crops in the history of the
state; in New York, 12,000 boys rendered invaluable service on
farms; in Indiana, 15,000 boys helped to cultivate the soil and
harvest the crops.
62 In Michigan, Georgia, Oregon, California,
and other states special crops which were jeopardized because of
lack of labor were rescued by lads who enlisted in the boys' re-
e 1 Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 210.
62 Ibid., p. 211.
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serve, and the country was thus assured of its supply of apples,
beets, berries, cherries, apricots, plums, and grapes.63
Voluntary enlistment, physical examination, and prelim-
inary instruction were among the features of the reserve 's activ-
ities in the several states. Central training camps were financed
by state councils of defense or private subscription, while the
boys
'
transportation expenses to and from the camps were usual-
ly paid by local communities from which the boys were taken.
The pay received by the boys varied from $1.00 to $2.00 a day,
and it is officially stated that the records from employers them-
selves show that over 95 per cent of the boys placed on farms
were satisfactory workers.
64 In all this work the Y. M. C. A.
and other constructive agencies aided materially.
By March, 1919, the boys' reserve had completed its organiza-
tion with a federal state director in every state, the District of
Columbia, and the territory of Hawaii ; had enrolled and placed
300,000; given intensive training in farm practices and farm
mechanics to more than 50,000 city high school boys; promoted
many successful training camps for boys ; supervised the leisure
and recreational hours of these young workers ; safeguarded the
interests of the boys during hours of employment; and encour-
aged a large number of the recruits to return to complete their
school work, after they had served their country on the farms.
The economic value of the services which these lads rendered
to the nation in a great crisis is seen by the estimate, which is
declared to be conservative, that they added a hundred million
dollars' worth of food to the world's supply. The economic
value to the boys themselves was significant. One-fourth of the
boys in Indiana earned a total of $1,111,722. They worked an
average of 114 days each at an average wage of $1.51 a day, ex-
clusive of board. In Colorado, 3,500 boys earned $609,823. In
Massachusetts, 2,500 boys added nearly $2,000,000 to the food
supjply in 1918, and the earnings of 600 of these boys gave an
average of $166.66. In Oregon, 1,950 boys earned $253,778.
New York City boys of whom records were kept earned $368,-
938.76 net. Over 3,000 reserve boys in Texas averaged a little
over 90 days' work each, and earned an average of $1.10 a day
es Seventh Annual Eeport of the Secretary of Labor, 1919, pp. 372, 373.
e* Sixth Annual Eeport of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 211.
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net. In Oklahoma a record of 860 boys showed that in 79,537
days' work they earned $111,198.38, exclusive of board about
$1.40 a day net. Of 145 reserve boys in a South Dakota high
school, 117 reported bank accounts with a saving of $10,040 for
the season of 1918. Actual records were used as the basis of
these statistics.65
The ideals and purposes of the United States Boys' Working
Reserve have been expressed by Secretary of Labor Wilson in the
following words:
Reserve officials feel that the record of the year's activities can not be
accurately expressed alone in terms of food production, school extension, or
industrial control. The effect of the public policies of the organization
upon the spirit, ideals, and social attitudes of the boys as citizens of a
great Republic at war is known to be profound, but can not yet be set
forth in concrete terms. The movement has been and will be guided by
the principles that in dealing with adolescence the latent boy power of the
Nation can not and shall not be manipulated merely as a productive
mechanism.66
(3) The Farm Service Division. In the work of recruiting
and placing agricultural labor the Employment Service func-
tioned through the Farm Service Division, created December 13,
1917. To supervise this work a special assistant to the director
general was appointed. Temporary offices were established
throughout the country, especially in the states of Oklahoma,
Nebraska, Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, and the Dakotas, and a
volunteer representative was selected in each county in these
states to make crop reports and collect information regarding
the need for farm labor. Working from the employment office
at Kansas City as a center, excellent service was accomplished
through these volunteer field agents. "As an evidence of the
efficient manner in which this work was carried on, it may be
stated that many letters have been received from chambers of
commerce and individuals in the territory concerned, conveying
the information that not a bushel of wheat has been lost through
lack of sufficient help."
67 Between July 1, 1918, and April,
1919, the Farm Service Division placed 221,096 persons out of
393,933 called for. These figures do not include the thousands
65 Seventh Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1919, pp. 285, 286.
ee Sixth Annual Eeport of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 213.
67 Hid.
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of harvest hands recruited through the Kansas City office. The
division was discontinued in April, 1919.68
(4) The Women's Division. The Women's Division of the
Employment Service performed the important task of enlisting
and placing women in essential occupations and emergency work.
Recruiting was engaged in only when there were special calls
for female help, or when women with special qualifications ap-
plied for positions. Subdivisions of the Women's Division were
established in various localities throughout the nation, and these
increased in number from 9 on January 1, 1918, to 55 on July
1, 1918, and soon to 57 separate divisions. These divisions were
established by the creation of new offices or absorption of state,
municipal, or other public employment offices. Data for the last
six months of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1918, indicate the
excellent work that was being done by this division through its
local agencies :
No. of per-
Month sons placed
January 9,667
February ; 7,074
March 7,758
April 17,442
May : 22,344
June 19,127
Total 83,412
While these placements for the most part consisted of women
for industrial and domestic work, many women were placed in
high-grade clerical and secretarial positions. On April 1, 1918,
the Employment Service incorporated into the Women's Divi-
sion the Women's Collegiate Section, which took charge of calls
for women with special qualifications. 69
The centralized policy and decentralized operation principle
which led to the establishment of the War Labor Policies Board
and the Woman in Industry Service in May and June, 1918,
respectively, resulted in the abandonment of the Women's Divi-
sion. The purpose of this change was to enable the states and
localities to handle their own problems of recruiting and placing
women in industry in the way that seemed best to those who
68 Seventh Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1919, p. 289.
6 Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, pp 214, 215.
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were in immediate contact with conditions. A woman assistant
to the director general of the employment service was appointed
to take charge of all matters concerning the employment of
women, and in the administrative offices at Washington sections
were created to supervise the work connected with the employ-
ment of women farm laborers, professional women, juvenile
workers, reference information, publicity, interstate clearance,
and the like. Moreover, a large number of the general offices of
the Employment Service were handling both male and female
labor in small cities. On November 11 women's divisions were
operating as separate agencies in 40 states, with a variation in
number from one in Arizona and Vermont to 20 in Illinois and
46 in New York. Women workers were represented on more
than 500 community labor boards, and nearly 368,000 women
were reported placed by the United States Employment Service
during the ten war months of the year 1918. This number was
equal to approximately 13 per cent of all placements made dur-
ing that period. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1919,
about 739,013 women workers were reported placed.70
(5) The Negro Division. The Negro Division was created
by an amendment to the organization of the United States Em-
ployment Service, as provided for in a memorandum of the Sec-
retary of Labor dated February 22, 1918. The purpose of this
division was the more complete and efficient utilization of col-
ored workers. This work was in charge of a chief of division,
acting in conjunction with and partly under the supervision
of the director of Negro economics.71
(6) Special Services. The problem of proper employment of
longshoremen made imperative some kind of machinery for
eliminating the inefficient and wasteful use of that type of labor.
Conferences were held in New York, at which representatives
of the Department of Labor, the longshoremen, the Army, the
Navy, the Shipping Board, the Railroad Administration, and the
ship owners, agreed that an elastic pool of dock labor should be
provided. Consequently the Stevedores and Marine Workers'
Division was organized and supervised by the United States
70 Seventh Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1919, pp. 271, 272,
287.
71 Sixth Annual Eeport of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 215.
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Employment Service. Distribution of labor so as to promote the
greatest efficiency was the primary purpose of the new division.
In New York seven branches of the division were established,
while other branches were located at Philadelphia, Baltimore,
Norfolk, Newport News, Charleston, S. C., Mobile, New Orleans,
Galveston, Boston, Portland, Buffalo, Seattle, and Duluth. The
success of this service is evidenced by the fact that the port of
New York increased its efficiency at least 30 per cent.72
Another special problem which called for particular attention
was the shipyard labor for Puget Sound yards. In January,
1918, the Employment Service and the Emergency Fleet Cor-
poration established a central office for the distribution and re-
cruitment of labor for these shipyards.
(7) Mining Division. The recruitment and placement of
mine labor was assigned to the Mining Division of the United
States Employment Service. The executive officers of this divi-
sion were selected from representatives of mine operators and
mine workers who were thoroughly acquainted with the mining
industry and its labor problems. A shortage of mine workers
arose on account of the abnormal demand for coal and metals
and the drafting of large numbers of mine workers for military
service. Through the cooperation of the officers of the United
Mine Workers of America the division secured the names of
15,000 practical miners, engaged in non-war work, who were
available for transfer to essential or war-emergency duties. The
majority of these men were induced to give up more lucrative
and remunerative positions to enter the mines in patriotic ser-
vice to their country.
73
(8) War Placements of the Employment Service. Some idea
of the magnitude of the task which the Employment Service had
to perform may be gathered from the statistical data that is
available concerning its activities. Eeports were not always
obtainable, so statistics do not give a complete story of the
achievements of the service. Nor, indeed, can its accomplish-
ments be measured in terms of placements. Its influence upon
the production of food and materials, and in building up the
morale of our adult and juvenile working force can not be esti-
75 Seventh Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1919, p. 276.
id., 274.
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mated. During the eleven months of its wartime operation on
a reorganized plan January, 1918, to November, 1918 the
United States Employment Service took care of the following
registrations, applications, references, and placements:
TABLE X. SHOWING THE NUMBER OP BEGISTRATIONS, APPLICATIONS, REF-
ERENCES, AND PLACEMENTS MADE BY THE UNITED STATES EMPLOY-
MENT SERVICE DURING THE PERIOD JANUARY TO
NOVEMBER, 1919, INCLUSIVE 1*
Month
January
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cancellation of regulations governing centralized recruiting.
Moreover, control over the recruitment and distribution of un-
skilled labor was withdrawn. The wartime problem was re-
versed. Whereas the service had been burdened with the task
of finding men for jobs, the end of hostilities brought to it the
task of finding jobs for men. The abandonment of huge war
contracts forced the release of thousands of wage earners within
a short time, and as soon as a mass of returned and demobilized
soldiers and sailors added to this number the problem became
extremely difficult.
Cancelation of war contracts was bound to react unfavorably
on the labor situation. To avoid disastrous results from this
source the War Industries Board cooperated with the Depart-
ment of Labor. On November 20, 1918, instructions were sent
out to all federal directors of the Employment Service under the
provisions of which a survey in 122 cities was made, and weekly
reports of labor conditions in those industrial centers were sent
to the War Industries Board. Information secured in this way
furnished the basis for cancelation of war contracts by the
board, acting as the agent of the government.
75 Needless to
say, these steps had much to do with the prevention of serious
unemployment and its attendant problems which abrupt can-
celation of war contracts would have precipitated.
The demobilization of the military and naval forces contained
even more possibility of serious effects upon the labor market
than could have resulted from the sudden cancelation of war
contracts, since demobilized soldiers and sailors could not so
easily locate the opportunities for employment. As a precau-
tionary measure the Employment Service called a conference of
the representatives of national welfare organizations and gov-
ernment bodies concerned with demobilization to meet in Wash-
ington on December 2, 1918, for the purpose of outlining a pro-
gram for assisting soldiers, sailors, and war workers in finding
employment. A plan was adopted whereby a central board was
formed at Washington, with a representative of the Department
of Labor as chairman, consisting of numerous governmental and
welfare organizations. Immediate steps were taken to establish
throughout the country bureaus for returning soldiers and
is Seventh Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1919, p. 276.
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sailors. More than 2,000 of these bureaus were organized. In
addition, the Employment Service placed its representatives at
demobilization camps and supplied information concerning em-
ployment in this country to service men at the embarkation
camps and on board transports.
Soon the Employment Service established the following sec-
tions : The Junior Section, for the purpose of giving vocational
guidance to boys and girls between the ages of 16 and 21; the
Handicap Section, which dealt with the placement of persons
handicapped by age or some other physical disability; the Pro-
fessional and Special Section, which had as its function the
placement of highly trained persons, such as the engineer, the
executive, or the teacher.
76
In August, 1918, it was estimated that for the fiscal year end-
ing June 30, 1919, about $14,801,382 would be required to carry
on the work of the Employment Service. This estimate was
based upon the assumption that the war would continue for the
period of another year at least, and that about 1,000 branch
offices and a personnel of 6,000 employees would be necessary.
Only about $4,634,325.92 was asked for finally. Post-war activ-
ities resulted in the expenditure of an amount exceeding the
appropriation of $5,500,000 which had been made for the cur-
rent year's work. Consequently, a deficiency appropriation was
asked and was included in the "Third Deficiency Appropria-
tion Act, 1919," which was voted on favorably by the House
of Representatives on February 22, 1919. This carried an item
of $1,800,000 for the Employment Service work until July 1,
1919. The Senate failed to pass this measure, and the service
was deprived of much needed funds. The Department of Labor
communicated with President Wilson, who was on his way to
France, with the hope of securing from the President an allot-
ment from funds appropriated for the national defense and
safety. The President was unable to grant the request on ac-
count of the fact that this appropriation was practically ex-
hausted. Thereupon, the Department of Labor notified the fed-
eral director of the employment offices in each state to reduce
the organization to a skeleton, beginning March 22. Assistance
from state and municipal authorities and community organiza-
76 Ibid., pp. 276, 277.
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tions was so generous that in place of reducing the number of
employment offices, which the Employment Service was able to
maintain out of its own funds from March 22 to July 1, to 56,
the number of offices kept in operation during that period was
490. In a special session of Congress, May 19, 1919, appropria-
tions for deficiency items were recommended, and the Employ-
ment Service received $272,000, available at the beginning of
the next fiscal year.
77
In spite of financial troubles the United States Employment
Service did admirable work in the trying months immediately
following the cessation of hostilities. Between November, 1918,
and June, 1919, inclusive, the service interviewed at the various
camps and on the transports approximately 2,055,985, out of a
total of 2,561,894. Of the number interviewed 706,509 were in
need of assistance, of whom 115,096 were referred directly to
employers, and the remainder to bureaus. In addition to this
number, a total of 16,360 were registered by the Emergency
Fleet Corporation, the United States Merchant Marine, and the
United States Railroad Administration. Between December 1,
1918, and June 28, 1919, the number of service men registering
for employment totaled 517,902, of whom a total of 321,077
were placed.
78
(10) Summary of Employment Statistics. The activities of
the United States Employment Service from January, 1918, to
June, 1919, inclusive, are shown in the statistical data that have
been compiled, altho, as already suggested, the true value of the
service cannot be thus measured. In the period under considera-
tion the Employment Service received calls for 12,104,184; it
registered 7,133,831 ; referred 6,470,516 to positions ; while
4,976,320 persons were reported placed. This means that in a
period of eighteen months about 91 per cent of the persons
registered with the service were referred to positions, and of
these about 78 per cent were placed. Approximately 10,000
persons were placed in jobs of all kinds each day during this
period, without any expense to the employers and at the expense
of only $1.34 per placement. It is estimated that the saving in
fees to the persons directed to employment by the federal gov-
77 Seventh Annual Eeport of tJie Secretary of Labor, 1919, pp. 277, 278.
78 Ibid., p. 292.
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ernment in cooperation with states and municipalities aggregated
fully $10,000,000, while many millions more were saved for the
nation through increased hours of labor due to reduction of
labor turnover and the rapid placement of unemployed workers.79
The nature of the employment secured by the service ranged
from common labor and domestic service to high-salaried profes-
sional and technical workers. "It was not uncommon for an
$1,800 examiner to place a $15,000 engineer or executive."
Farm recruitment was, of course, one of the chief accomplish-
ments of the service. Common-labor placements constituted
about 23 per cent of the total of slightly under 5,000,000 per-
sons placed, while the other 77 per cent comprised skilled labor
and other workers qualified for special positions. Women con-
stituted 20 per cent of the total number of persons placed, and
"many a woman has found in the Federal Employment Service
a gateway to the industrial, commercial, or professional life she
has desired to enter. Large numbers of college-trained women
have used the service, which has been working in conjunction
with alumni associations throughout the country.
' ' 80
7. OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Woman in Industry Service
Some of the most serious labor problems of recent years, espe-
cially during the war period, have arisen out of attempts to use
women workers effectively in various processes of production.
So intimate is the relation between woman and the future welfare
of the nation that it is now generally recognized that especial
care must be exercised in safeguarding the physical and moral in-
terests of women engaged in industrial work. Profits rather
than the welfare of the workers are likely to be uppermost in
the mind of the entrepreneur, and for this reason it has become
increasingly necessary for the state, through the exercise of its
police power, to establish necessary safeguards. The announce-
ment of the inclusion in the draft of all men between the ages
of eighteen and forty-five years forced the attention of the gov-
ernment and employers to the problem of replacing men workers
in industry by women.
79 Ibid., p. 293.
so Ibid.
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To deal with this aspect of the labor problem during the war
the Woman in Industry Service of the Department of Labor
was organized early in July, 1918, with Miss Mary Van Kleeck
as director, and Miss Mary Anderson as assistant director. The
duties of this service were summarized as follows: (1) Consid-
eration of all general policies with respect to women in industry
and advice to the Secretary of Labor regarding the principles
and policies to be followed; (2) coooperation with the several
divisions of the Department of Labor in matters pertaining to
women in industry; (3) collection of data and the useful tabula-
tion of these data for distribution when of particular interest
and help to those concerned with the problems of women in in-
dustry; (4) establishment of relations with the governmental
departments and divisions and voluntary agencies in so far as
these related themselves to or were interested in the subject of
women in industry.
81 Altho this statement of the duties of the
Woman in Industry Service presumes that the service was organ-
ized primarily to determine policies concerning women in in-
dustry, it has performed administrative functions and has co-
operated extensively with state departments of labor in matters
involving women workers.
82
The War Labor Policies Board adopted, and all production
departments of the government approved, certain principles gov-
erning the work of the Woman in Industry Service. Accord-
ing to these principles women might be placed in essential occu-
pations easily filled by them, such as cashier, clerk, and account-
ant positions; they were prevented from entering occupations,
such as service in barrooms and saloons, mines, and smelters,
which are unfit for them on account of moral and physical con-
ditions; the introduction of women into hazardous industries
such as those using industrial poisons must be guided by stand-
ards as to health, comfort, and safety established by the War
Labor Policies Board and those already defined by the United
States Government and state departments of labor; due regard
must be given to regulation of hours, night-work, and over-time
when women are placed in new occupations such as street rail-
si Monthly Labor Beview, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, August, 1918,
p. 67.
82 For details of the organization of the service see Sixth Annual Report
of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, pp. 116-122.
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way service, public messenger service, and elevator service;
recruiting of mothers of young children must be discouraged;
the possibility of hiring women must not be made a pretext for
unnecessary displacement of men ; employers were urged to seek
the aid and advice of the Woman in Industry Service as to
methods of introducing women workers and the establishment of
required working conditions.
Two things were desired relative to the employment of wo-
men in essential industries, namely, the most efficacious applica-
tion of woman labor, and the protection and conservation of the
health and welfare of women workers. The necessity of guaran-
teeing these two conditions led to the organization of agencies
in the government to study the problems underlying the employ-
ment of women and to advise the industries regarding hours,
wages, and proper working conditions. To these ends, the Ord-
nance department organized as part of its Industrial Service Sec-
tion a women 's branch with representatives in every district office
of the department and in the arsenals employing women. The
United States Railway Administration established a women's
section in its Labor Division. Then, of course, with the intro-
duction of coordinated war labor administration the Woman in
Industry Service began its work as a part of the Department of
Labor, its peculiar functions being to advise the Secretary of
Labor on all matters affecting the employment of women and to
cooperate with all those agencies concerned with the production
of war materials in so far as their problems involved the employ-
ment of women. 83 The principles cited above and the organiza-
tion of woman in industry divisions in the several production
departments of the government will prove a valuable asset to
the nation even after return to normal conditions.
In order to secure coordination in policies and practices in
dealing with the problem of woman in industry the Secretary of
Labor authorized during the war the formation of a Council on
Women in Industry, a discussional group composed of repre-
sentatives from all federal agencies having organized work re-
lated to problems of women workers. At the beginning of the
83 See ' ' Federal Policies for Women in Industry, ' ' by Miss Mary Van
Kleeck, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
Vol. LXXXI, No. 170 (January, 1919), pp 87-94.
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fiscal year 1920 the title of the Woman in Industry Service was
changed to the Women's Bureau. The continuation of this
branch of the Department of Labor is a testimony of its success
and value during the war.
Bureau of Industrial Housing and Transportation
We have already touched upon the problem of housing and
transporting workers attracted by high wages to the centers of
war industries. Recognition of the seriousness of this problem
led to the establishment in February, 1918, of the United States
Bureau of Industrial Housing and Transportation as a part of
the Department of Labor. Thus for the first time earnest atten-
tion was given to a problem which, even before the war, had
assumed a perplexing aspect. European countries had long
since created remedial measures, but the United States was slow
to act. The newly created bureau operated through the United
States Housing Corporation of the Department of Labor. This
corporation was incorporated under the laws of the State of
New York, in June, 1918, the capital stock amounting to one
thousand shares of $100,000 each, 998 of which were held by the
Secretary of Labor for the government. The expenditure of
$110,000,000 appropriated by Congress for housing war workers,
not including the $60,000 set aside for this purpose by the
United States Shipping Board, was placed under the direction of
the Housing Corporation.84 This corporation endeavored to
solve the housing problem by : (1) making available housing facil-
ities through carefully conducted investigations in particular
communities where the need was great; (2) connecting through
improved transportation those places where labor was in demand
with the communities that possessed surplus housing facilities ;
(3) encouraging and aiding private capital to build; (4) assist-
ing in the proper distribution of the labor supply and the plac-
ing of war contracts in such a manner as to avoid congestion;
(5) constructing and operating of houses, apartments, and dor-
mitories; (6) registering vacant houses and rooms and com-
mandeering dwellings not otherwise in use. 85 The organization
of the bureau included the following divisions: Architectural,
s* Monthly Labor Eevieiv, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, August, 1918,
p. 69.
85 Ibid., February, 1919, p. 248.
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Construction, Engineering, Fiscal, Homes Registration and In-
formation, Industrial Relations, Legal, Operating, Real Estate,
Requirements, Surveys and Statistics, Town Planning, and
Transportation.
By the end of October, 1918, allotments for house construction
had been provisionally made for 76 cities in need of additional
facilities to shelter war workers on army and navy contracts;
26 developments were under construction, involving an expendi-
ture of $37,306,778.88, estimated to house 9,000 families aggre-
gating 45,000 individuals. Up to October 10, financial allot-
ments had been made for 50 projects. Allotments for projects
where work had not already been contracted for represented on
that date an estimated expenditure of $94,416,350. On the 26
projects then under way the estimated expenditure was $66,-
560,650.
86 At "Washington Navy Yards new construction was
planned as follows : 14 apartment houses, 8 stores, 14 two-story
dormitories, and one mess hall a total of 37 buildings with a
housing capacity of about two thousand persons. In the city of
Washington 12 dormitories, 2 cafeterias, 2 administration build-
ings, and 2 infirmaries a total of 18 buildings with accommo-
dations for approximately two thousand people were constructed ;
and additional facilities planned included 10 dormitories, 28
apartments, 1 administration building, I infirmary, and 1 cafe-
teria a total of 41 buildings to house 2,,800 persons. Financial
allotments for Washington exceeded the $10,000,000 appropri-
ated by Congress for this purpose. In addition to the above,
116 houses in Washington alone were requisitioned by the bu-
reau.
87
On November 11, when hostilities ceased, the United States
Housing Corporation had under consideration 94 housing enter-
prises and projects. For 60 of these contracts had been let,
and plans had been completed for contracts in 25 cases. In the
case of seven plans were in preparation or had been ordered,
while in the case of four projects construction had been post-
poned. With the signing of the armistice 54 projects were
abandoned and 15 were curtailed, while 25 were proceeded with
as planned. It was estimated that it would require $45,000,000
se Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, pp. 131, 132.
87 Ibid., pp. 134, 135.
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to complete the 25 projects which were under way. 88 By May
19, 1919, construction contracts to the extent of $4,517,897.92
had been almost completed, work was under way on contracts
valued at $27,843,226; contracts to the value of $25,111,794.79
had been canceled at an approximate cost of $5,224,477.81.
There were canceled without loss projects to the value of
$5,706,614.27, and projects to the value of $275,000 were taken
over by the Army. Contracts amounting originally to $63,454,-
532.98 had been reduced to a final cost of $40,782,288.43.89
Labor Adjustment Service
To the Division of Conciliation and Labor Adjustment Service
was entrusted the important task of mediation and jurisdiction
over the settlement of strikes, lockouts, and other manifestations
of maladjustment in industrial relations. There was already in
existence a large force of conciliators, and the National War
Labor Board constituted a court of last appeal. These facilities
reinforced by those introduced with the Labor Adjustment Ser-
vice did much to prevent the spread of strikes and lockouts dur-
ing the emergency. Nearly two and one-half millions of wage
earners, or about three times as many as during the preceding
year, came within the peace-making activities of the Conciliation
Division of the Department of Labor during the fiscal year 1918.
Most of these cases were either adjusted outright by the division
or referred to the War Labor Board. The importance of the
activities of the Labor Adjustment Service may be judged from
the fact that in 1918, the number of men indirectly affected in
the cases handled totaled 1,315,657, and the total number direct-
ly affected, 1,041,342. In the cases adjusted and those referred
to the National War Labor Board, 859,239 workers were affected
directly and 1,122,205 indirectly.90 The development of these
mediation activities is shown more in detail in the statistical
data already presented in this study.91
ss Monthly Labor Review, TJ. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, February,
1919, p. 248.
8 Seventh Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1919, p. 185.
so Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, pp. 30, 31.
9i See p. 126.
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Information and Education Service
The Information and Education Service was organized on
July 1, 1918, under the act providing for appropriations to take
care of sundry civil service expenses for the fiscal year 1918, and
for other purposes, approved by the President on the above date.
The purpose of the act was to enable the Secretary of Labor to
acquire and diffuse information on the subjects connected with
labor. The appropriation for this work amounted to $225,000.92
Mr. Roger W. Babson was director of this service. Under his
direction the service endeavored to develop sound public senti-
ment on labor questions, to combat unsound industrial philoso-
phies, and to present, especially to working men, the real issues
of the war. In addition, it secured the exchange of information
between the departments of labor administration and private
agencies in industrial plants for the execution of the national
labor program.
93 The following divisions were created under
this service : Education, Information, Industrial Plants, Eco-
nomics, Posters. During the reconstruction period a sixth divi-
sion was added known as the Division of Public Works and Con-
struction Department. These divisions did a comprehensive
work. Material was sent out daily to over 5,000 newspapers, to
magazines, and business periodicals; a staff of 19 speakers and
several hundred volunteer agents addressed trade unions, clubs,
chambers of commerce, and other organizations ; about 1,000,000
posters were distributed monthly and displayed in workshops,
about 30,000 stores, and 30,000 railway stations; committees
known as government committees to promote contact between
workers, their employers, and representatives of the Department
of Labor were organized in over 12,000 plants, and the extension
of this scheme to cover 14,000 establishments was planned.94
Summary of Activities. The clipping service maintained
by the Division of Education covered 150 papers, with a daily
circulation ranging from 20,000 to 400,000, in cities with popu-
lations from 32,000 to 5,000,000. In this way information was
disseminated among an average of about 12,000,000 readers each
92 Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 127.
3 Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, August,
1918, p. 69 ; Seventh Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1919, p. 162.
94 Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, pp. 128-130.
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day. Its staff of special writers contributed to magazines and
newspapers, and the facilities of the division were placed at the
disposal of all persons desiring information for personal use or
for publication. Special agencies were also used, including the
Carnegie Institute, the Military Intelligence, the American Edu-
cational Association, the Federal Board for Vocational Educa-
tion, the Signal Corps of the "War Department, and the Red
Cross. The Information Division through its efficient staff of
speakers, and a volunteer speaking force of 400, contributed
much to the upbuilding of an industrial morale, the stimulation
of production, the reduction of labor turnover, and the promo-
tion of industrial peace. Fifty of the volunteer speakers alone
reported that they had delivered 1,200 addresses for this pur-
pose, their message reaching business men, employers, and work-
ers. They emphasized the need of a new vision in industry. To
carry this message more intimately to the industrial workers
and employers the Industrial Plants Division was organized on
July 5, 1918. Its plan of organization proposed the establish-
ment of war industries committees to encourage production,
reduce absenteeism and tardiness, eliminate unnecessary labor
turnover, and promote patriotism. The Division of Economics
was largely an advisory body. It summarized policies and deci-
sions that were made by the various labor adjustment agencies,
compiled the experience of Great Britain in solving her many
labor problems, and made recommendations to other divisions
that sought advice in these things. The Poster Division did
much to maintain the national morale, distributing from 700,000
to 1,000,000 posters monthly.
Hostilities ceased at the time of the year when unemployment
is most pronounced. To meet this situation the Department of
Labor made every effort to promote certain industrial activities
that had been more or less dormant during the war period, espe-
cially public construction works and private building. The In-
formation and Education Service was used to encourage building
and buying. The Division of Public Works and Construction
Development was created to supervise such activities as were
related to building and consequently to employment. A con-
ference of economists was called to discuss these important prob-
lems, and an investigation of economic conditions was made.
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About 26,000 questionnaires were sent out to determine the
amount of building suspended during the war and the reasons
why this work was not resumed subsequent to the signing of
the armistice. Approximately 7,000 replies were received, and
these showed a total amount of suspended building operations of
$2,000,000,000. Of this amount more than two-thirds was for
public works and the remainder for private construction.95
A home-owning campaign was instituted. Campaigns were
projected in 92 cities and were well organized in 78. Corre-
spondence was conducted by the Department of Labor with
nearly 2,000 cities. A special bill was drafted and presented to
Congress providing for a system of banks to be known as Fed-
eral Home Loan Banks. It involved the building and loan asso-
ciations of the country, 7,269 in number, with a total member-
ship of 3,838,612 and total assets of $1,750,000,000. To advance
loans more abundantly to home builders was the primary object
of this scheme.
The Department of Labor, through its Information and Edu-
cation Service, was active in other ways, endeavoring to solve the
labor problems of the reconstruction period. Of special interest
was the sending to Europe of a commission of representative
employers for the purpose of ascertaining the following facts:
(1) The attitude of employers toward problems of labor with
special reference to their idea of adjustment of disputes; (2) the
views of the working classes and the attitude of the labor lead-
ers; (3) the methods and plans of governments to allay labor
unrest. Among other subjects of interest the commission in-
vestigated the shop-steward movement, the Whitley plan for
joint standing industrial councils, unemployment insurance,
health insurance, hours of labor, housing, minimum wage, and
compulsory arbitration.
The valuable report of this commission is summarized as
follows :
1. Employers in Great Britain generally recognize the desirability of
bargaining collectively with labor.
2. Employers nearly all agree that collective bargaining should always
be undertaken between associations of employers and the regularly estab-
lished well-organized trade-unions.
3. Most employers freely recognize the right of labor to organize; they
s Seventh Annual Eeport of the Secretary of Labor, 1919, p. 168.
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regard organization as greatly contributing to the stability of industry.
Some large manufacturers declare that they wish to see every workman
within the unions, so that they must all come under organization control.
Others feel that 100 per cent organization might lead to dangerous types of
universal strikes and lockouts. The more conservative employers appear to
make no effort to help along organizations of labor, merely dealing with
such organizations when they appear on the scene.
4. Employees in Great Britain are divided into sentiment shading from
those who want to maintain the trade-unions along the regularly established
so-called "constitutional" lines to ultraradical socialists.
5. Employees are nearly a unit, however, in expressing opposition to the
use of force. The most radical desire ' ' now ' ' a complete overturning of
the present social structure, but usually admit on close questioning that
"now" may mean many years. They want to "start" now. Practically
none appear to approve of a sudden change, as in Kussia.
6. Employees of the ultraradical type look askance at collective bar-
gaining and organizations of labor and capital. They freely express the
view that they do not wish harmony between employees and employers, since
harmony would help to continue the present system of society.
7. Employees of the more conservative type . . . are largely in
accord with employers in the desire (1) to head off labor unrest at this
period; (2) to strengthen the unions by holding members under control;
(3) to increase production for the sake of the nation, workmen included
with no restriction on output except as it affects the health of the worker;
(4) to leave control of business policies in the hands of those managing
the business.
8. Government officials appear to be uniformly of the opinion that the
Government should function in labor unrest only as an absolutely last un-
avoidable resort. On the other hand, they maintain the right of the Gov-
ernment to step in when necessary in order to protect public interests
against minorities which try to force their terms upon the people.
9. In general the Government, and most employers and conservative
employees, appear to be agreed:
That the spirit of cooperation between capital and labor is highly desir-
able.
That the spirit of conciliation is important for the benefit of the em-
ployer in stabilizing his business and for the benefit of the employee in pre-
serving his regularly organized unions.
That in collective bargaining the right-minded employer will not attempt
to return to the pre-war industrial era, and that the right-minded employee
will not attempt to crowd his demands to the point at which the stimulus
for private business enterprise will disappear.
The spirit of a genuinely better new (and not novel) era is thus being
fostered by widely varied elements of Great Britain's industrial system.sa
**Ibid., pp. 171, 172. The members of this commission were: E. T.
Gundlach, Chicago, chairman; E. J. Caldwell, New York; Dor E. Felt, Chi-
cago; William H. Ingersoll, New York; Eldon B. Keith, Brockton, Mass.;
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The Information and Education Service, under the direction
of the Secretary of Labor, arranged a conference of governors
and mayors on March 3, 4, and 5, 1919. At this conference there
were present the chief executives or their representatives from
47 states, 22 governors attending in person; mayors from 184
cities; and representatives of municipalities from 41 out of the
48 states. The purpose of this conference was to consider
means for facilitating industrial readjustment in the recon-
struction period. Steps were taken to make this conference a
permanent institution.
Training and Dilution Service
As suggested elsewhere in this study, the war made manifest
the dearth of skilled labor in the United States, and we were
forced to adopt a policy of intensive training in order to meet the
demand for technically trained workers. To devise and execute
a program for providing a supply of skilled workers the Train-
ing and Dilution Service of the Department of Labor was created
under authority of the War Labor Administration Act, which
appropriated $150,000 for this work. Mr. Charles T. Clayton
was appointed director of this service. Its duties were to ascer-
tain the best methods used in industrial establishments for train-
ing workers to do specific kinds of work; to discover the need
for such training; to provide information on this subject to in-
dustrial managers and employees; to inspect the operation of
training schemes and make a report concerning them; to pro-
vide for dilution of labor if necessary, with a view to turning
over to unskilled laborers a large part of industrial processes
formerly performed by skilled workmen; to promote special
training wherever necessary; and to cooperate with the United
States Employment Service in all of this work. 97
The Training and Dilution Service as instituted on July 16,
1918, constituted of the following divisions:
88 (1) Planning
Division, having charge of all studies with regard to ways and
R. R. Otis, Atlanta, Ga. Dr. Royal Meeker, Commissioner of Labor Statistics
in the Department of Labor accompanied the commission as economic
adviser, and Mr. B. M. Squires, a commissioner of conciliation in the De-
partment of Labor, as statistician.
97 Sixth Annual Eeport of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 124.
" The name of the service was later changed to
' '
Training Service.
' '
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means of training and dilution, and conducting these studies
through the Training, Research, and Information Sections;
(2) Administrative Division, comprising Personnel and Ac-
counts, Statistics and Reports, Correspondence and Files
Sections, and fulfilling the functions indicated by the names of
these agencies; (3) Training Division, including a field service
with a chief, and superintendents in each of twelve districts
throughout the United States, whose duties were to stimulate
production of war materials by organizing vestibule training
departments in industrial plants and to encourage industrial
training in public schools in connection with plans provided by
the Federal Board for Vocational Education
; (4) Dilution Divi-
sion, whose functions included the study of needs of industrial
plants for competent, skilled workers, and the ascertaining of the
available supply by the aid of the United States Employment
Service. In addition, this division made special studies of hy-
gienic fitness of factories for the dilution of labor, through co-
operation with the Public Health Service."
The nation's need for workers with special training may be
gathered from the fact that during the nineteen months of our
active participation in the war 1,000,000 persons were examined
for civil service positions and 400,000 were actually supplied for
governmental work. The number of civilian employees in the
District of Columbia increased from 35,000 to 95,000 ; the civilian
forces of the Navy and naval stations increased from less than
21,000 to more than 100,000, and in government ordnance plants
from 11,000 to about 40,000.100 Everywhere the need for trained
workers was great and the supply scarce. The investigations
and work of the Training Service did much to revive interest in
vocational education and industrial training in the United
States.
The operation of the service, including methods of field work,
may be summarized as follows: (1) Visiting employers who
were in need of higher average output; (2) explaining industrial
training; (3) analysis of plant operation; (4) preparation of
plans for introducing training adapted to the special needs of
89 Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, pp. 124, 127.
100 The Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science,
LXXXII, No. 171 (March, 1919), p. 100.
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the plant under consideration; (5) assisting the employer in
selecting his own personnel to supervise the training. On June
30, 1919, 359 companies had training departments; 67 training
departments had been discontinued; 247 establishments were
requesting information and advice concerning training work;
and 125 companies were preparing to install training systems.
The greatest service rendered by the Training Service consisted
in the plans it designed and disseminated in behalf of plants
desiring training methods. It was thus a clearing house of in-
formation for industries.
The experience of the Training Service taught the nation the
lesson that any system of industrial training designed for the
United States must include the following elements: (1) A clear-
ing house of methods and experience; (2) a staff of well-trained
experts to study and analyze the special problems of particular
industries; (3) classification of results and the dissemination of
knowledge thus gained; (4) frequent conferences of representa-
tive employers and representative labor officials to discuss the
general aspects of industrial training and efficiency.
The value of a Training Service to a country, especially to the
United States, has been well expressed by the Secretary of Labor
in the following passage :
The experience of the service indicates that out of the 10,000,000 wage
earners now employed in American factories, probably three-fourths are
not properly qualified for their chosen occupations. This great body of
seven and a half million workers today has no recourse for education suited
to its needs. With workers stumbling along from day to day, oppressed
with a sense of inferiority and hampered in ability to produce the goods
the Nation needs and to earn the wages they must have to live, industrial
unrest is not surprising. It is the duty as well as the privilege of the
Nation to meet the need for industrial education by showing employers how
to establish adequate training schools for the workers. No single remedy
can be found for industrial unrest; its causes are complex. But no element
in its causes is larger or more important than the feeling of denied oppor-
tunity that oppresses the worker who knows that his knowledge of his work
is insufficient, and who charges that denial upon a society that ignores his
situation and will not give him even advice and suggestions.
The sum of the findings of the United States Training Service is that
labor wants an open way to self-development, a real opportunity for self-
advancement, and that through a system of practical industrial training,
intensive but thorough, lies more of such opportunity than in any of the
present accepted types of education.m 1
101 Seventh Annual Eeport of the Secretary of Labor, 1919, p. 161.
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Working Conditions Service
Throughout this study emphasis has been placed upon the
necessity of supervising working conditions, which under the
demand for increased production during an emergency are very
likely to become intolerable. It was imperative that there be
provided machinery for safeguarding conditions of labor in the
production of war materials. Under the War Labor Administra-
tion Act, approved July 1, 1918, Congress appropriated $45,000
for the establishment of a "Working Conditions Service. English
experience had demonstrated the wisdom of providing super-
visory power to prevent over-fatigue and the consequent under-
mining of health and efficiency. In the United States the laws
of several states provided for safeguards along these lines and
the various production departments of the government had, of
their own accord, instituted strict regulation of working condi-
tions under government contracts, but all this effort lacked uni-
formity of method and centralized control.
The duties of the Working Conditions Service in regard to
war industries were the examination of working conditions, de-
termination of standards, formulation and interpretation of reg-
ulations, establishment of the best and most adequate means of
adoption and application of these rules, and cooperation with
state authorities in all matters pertaining to conditions of em-
ployment.
Early in August, 1918, this service was finally organized with
Mr. Grant Hamilton as director. Administrative policies were
executed by the following divisions: (1) The Division of In-
dustrial Hygiene and Medicine, cooperating with the United
States Public Health Service. The functions of this Division
were to provide medical preventive methods, to maintain the
health of workers, to reduce occupational diseases, and to dis-
cover health hazards with a view to reducing labor turnover.
(2) Division of Labor Administration, the duties of which con-
sisted in studying the general problems of labor administration,
including scientific management, fatigue, auditing; prevention
of regimentation and promotion of individual initiative; and,
finally, examination of
' ' the attitude and policies of management
toward employees and the personal relations between employers
and employed." (3) Division of Safety Engineering, cooperat-
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ing with the Bureau of Standards in the formulation of stand-
ards for mechanical safety. 102 The service offered to industries
a consultant coterie of specialists in employment management,
industrial relations, sanitation, ventilation, illumination, medical
supervision and service, and accident prevention.103
Investigation and Inspection Service
The War Labor Administration Act appropriated the sum of
$300,000 for the maintenance of an Investigation and Inspection
Service. This service was established and ready for work about
August 15, 1918, under the direction of Mr. Ethelbert Stewart.
The duties of this service included cooperation with the other
services of the Department of Labor in matters pertaining to
methods of inspection, investigation, and examination of em-
ployment conditions, but did not include mediation or expert
training activities. It was really organized to serve the other
branches of the Department of Labor, and was equipped with a
sufficient staff of inspectors and examiners to handle the work
of inspection and investigation for those branches. To October
15, 1918, 156 investigations and inspections had been made in
compliance with requests from other services.104 A corps of
about 50 investigators and inspectors was employed for this
purpose. Numerous other investigations were made prior to the
dissolution of the service on June 30, 1919.
Division of Negro Economics
The war made imperative the expenditure of every effort to
enhance the efficiency of all groups in our population, and
focused immediate attention upon elements in industrial unrest
to which as a nation we had been indifferent. These problems
of inefficiency and unrest were nowhere more perplexing than
among the negro element in our population, comprising over
one-tenth of our people and constituting about one-sixth of those
gainfully employed. Race prejudice in relation to labor turn-
over and unrest is only now beginning to attract attention. Mal-
102 Sixth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 138.
103 The Working Conditions Service was discontinued at the end of the
fiscal year 1918-1919, because of the failure of Congress to appropriate
funds for its maintenance.
104 Sixth Annual Eeport of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, pp. 122, 123.
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adjustment between the colored and white groups of our popula-
tion has penetrated the lines of industrial relations, and there is
little doubt that the efficiency and skill of the black man have
been suppressed as a consequence. Whatever of creative impulse
and initiative lie dormant in the African race have not been
given free play in American industrial life any more than in
American political, social, and intellectual life. Comprehension
of this situation was instrumental in the establishment of a Divi-
sion of Negro Economics in the 1 Department of Labor. This
action was the direct outcome of a series of conferences held by
the Advisory Council. Dr. George E. Haynes was appointed by
the Secretary of Labor to the position of director of Negro Eco-
nomics whose function it is to advise the Secretary on matters
pertaining to the negro wage earner in relation to industrial and
agricultural production, and the promotion of cooperation be-
tween the two races.
To realize the purposes for which it was organized, this Divi-
sion has promoted the establishment of cooperative committees of
white and colored citizens in states and localities where labor
problems arise out of the relation between the races. The ad-
ministration of policies was delegated to a staff of state super-
visors of negro economics, who worked in intimate coopera-
tion with the federal state directors of the United States Em-
ployment Service. Many conferences were held in North Caro-
lina, Georgia, Kentucky, Ohio, Florida, Mississippi, and Illinois,
for the purpose of enlisting the aid of numerous local and state
fraternal, religious, and governmental organizations. In seven
states, state negro workers advisory committees, composed of
representative negroes and cooperating white citizens, were ap-
pointed up to October 1, 1918,105 and the appointment of similar
committees was under way in five additional states.106 Also
county and city committees had been appointed in seven of these
states and were planned for several others. State supervisors of
negro economics, along with special agents cooperating with the
federal state directors of the United States Employment Ser-
105 These states were, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio,
Virginia, and Kentucky.
108 These states were Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and
New Jersey.
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vice, had been appointed in eleven states. 107 No other step of
recent decades has promised to be so constructive in increasing
the industrial efficiency of the negro and in promoting more
amicable relations between the two major races of the North
American continent. The provision for such a division was not
merely a matter of economic expediency but of social justice, for
a race that constitutes so large a part of our population and has
contributed so much to the economic and military effectiveness of
the nation in a great emergency like the recent war is entitled to
representation in that department of the government whose
function it is to advance the welfare of the nation 's workers.
Civilian Insignia Service
The work of this service was purely incident to the war, but
recognizes a principle worthy of wider application in peace-time
production, namely, the value of a recognition of merit as an
incentive to production and industrial good will. Under the
direction of this service war industry badges for excellence in
industrial work were distributed. These badges were awarded
to civilians employed at least four months in certain essential
war industries which conformed to requirements prescribed by
the government, and adopted as a part of their government con-
tracts the principles of the War Labor Board as announced in
the President's Proclamation of April 8, 1918. For employment
beyond four months additional recognition was given.108
Commission on Living Conditions
During October, 1918, the Secretary of Labor appointed a
Commission on Living Conditions. 100 It was the particular func-
tion of this commission to discover where bad living conditions
were a factor in impeding production of necessary war materials
and to devise ways and means of improving such conditions.110
107 These states included Mississippi, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina,
Ohio, Virginia, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Alabama, and Missouri.
Sixth Annual Eeport of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, pp. 109-111.
108 Monthly Labor Beview, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, August,
1918, p. 68.
109 The members of this commission were : Mr. John R. Richards, Mr.
J. Horace McFarland, Mrs. Eva W. White, Mr. John A. Voll, and Miss
Edith Rockwood.
^o Seventh Annual Eeport of the Secretary of Labor, 1919, p. 186.
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The first meeting of the commission was held on October 12,
1918. Conferences were called in which several departments of
the government took part, including the War Department,
United States Housing Corporation, and other government
agencies that related themselves in any way to the problem of
living conditions. At this conference ways and means of mak-
ing a survey of conditions were considered. It was found that
the lack of recreational facilities in war industrial communities
was one of the most important problems demanding attention.
The Playground and Recreation Association of America was
asked to assume charge of the task of coordinating and stimu-
lating local agencies in war industrial communities to meet the
needs of the workers.
In Washington the commission secured the use of the Emer-
gency Hospital for war workers suffering from influenza after
the first epidemic had passed, assisted the War Camp Com-
munity Service in a program for recreation for government em-
ployees, suggested the organization of a Federal Workers Social
Service for the purpose of studying the working and living
conditions of government employees, sponsored government
hotels, and assisted many communities in solving problems of
living conditions. The Commission on Living Conditions was
really an adjunct of the United States Housing Corporation and
was financed out of the allotment of $25,000 set aside by that
corporation for the purpose of investigating and improving liv-
ing conditions.
Summary. The outstanding features of this coordinated
war labor administration are worthy of mention. Unlike the regu-
latory measures devised for the control of food, fuel, finance, and
trade, our labor administration was created largely without the
authority of statute. This non-statutory character was a desir-
able feature, for it permitted a great degree of flexibility and elas-
ticity in effecting the readjustments made necessary by the condi-
tions of the great emergency. Another characteristic of this
labor program was the method used in enforcing the awards and
findings of such bodies as the National War Labor Board.
Threats to cancel contracts made by the government or to com-
mandeer the plants of recalcitrant employers who refused to
accept and abide by the awards constituted an effective means of
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enforcing decisions. During the war this indirect, non-statu-
tory compulsion was made possible by the amenability of indus-
trial management and workers to public opinion, and espe-
cially because of the advantageous relation of the government to
production as a great employer of labor in its own plants, and as
the large purchaser of products during the crisis.
The new war labor administration program resulted in cen-
tralization of control with decentralization of administration by
agencies in intimate touch with the labor problems that arose in
industry; continuation, under a coordinated administration, of
the industrial sections of the production departments of the gov-
ernment, thus eliminating duplication of effort and conflict of
authority; flexibility of organization that allowed prompt re-
adjustment to the exigencies that appeared; protection of exist-
ing labor safeguards ; formulation, adoption, and enforcement of
fundamental regulatory measures designed to promote the wel-
fare of labor and maintain industrial efficiency; mitigation of
the evils accruing from industrial unrest by the elimination of
the causes of such unrest
;
and the promotion of a better under-
standing between management, labor, and the government.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
What have the experiences of the last few years taught the
United States concerning the important problem of industrial
relations and labor administration ? The consensus of opinion is
that much has been learned which will enable us to approach
more scientifically and to deal more successfully with these prob-
lems in the future. There have been significant changes in the
thought of the world regarding the multiplicity of industrial
problems involving labor and their solution. The postulate of
August Comte that ideas rule the world or throw it into chaos
was never more clearly demonstrated than during the recent
crisis. Especially is this true in regard to the relations between
labor and capital, and the numerous elements in the productive
process as these relate themselves to the human factor in pro-
duction. In analyzing the labor problem of war-time we were
forced to readjust our perspective and that readjustment pos-
sesses a fair degree of permanence. Before considering the most
important lessons that have been learned about industrial rela-
tions and labor administration during the war it is necessary to
summarize the tendencies outlined in the foregoing pages.
Summarizing our study it may be said that: (1) In its pro-
gram of economic readjustment for the exigencies of war the
United States, like other belligerent nations, found it necessary
and expedient to abandon its customary policy of laissez-faire
and to adopt in its stead a policy and program of extensive gov-
ernmental interference and regulation. This new policy was
characterized by concentration of control and coordination of
administration. (2) Concentration of control and correlation of
administrative activities were not extended to include the ways
and means of dealing with the multiplicity of labor problems
that grew in magnitude, until we had been in the struggle for
almost a year. During the first year of our participation in the
war our labor policy, in so far as we possessed one, was decen-
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tralized and heterogeneous in respect to methods of control and
administration. (3) Industrial unrest during the war was due
to two sets of causes, the one set general in character and
found in American industry as a whole, while the other group,
more specifically tho not exclusively, was operative in par-
ticular industrial establishments. These two groups of condi-
tions, it will be recalled, included the high cost of living, ab-
sentee ownership of industry and autocratic government of in-
dustrial plants, inequality in wage standards, faulty distribution
of labor and the absence of governmental machinery to effect
desired redistribution, inadequate machinery for the adjust-
ment of industrial grievances, prevalence of profiteering, the
spread of radical philosophies, the movement for a shorter work-
day, insufficient housing and transportation facilities, discrimina-
tion against union workers and opposition to all forms of collec-
tive bargaining, unfavorable conditions of employment, the de-
mand for a minimum wage scale and increasing wages, as well as
some minor causes. (4) American labor, generally speaking,
was loyal to the government and contributed greatly to the suc-
cessful prosecution of the war. Labor's policy was not always
unselfish. In fact there were many evidences of a selfish atti-
tude, but most of the seemingly disloyal conduct on the part of
workers was traceable to enemy propaganda or to bad industrial
conditions, chiefly the latter, for enemy agents merely took
advantage of an existing industrial situation to spread disloyal-
ty. (5) With the development of a centralized and coordinated
labor administration founded upon the broad principles of social
and economic justice, the problem of labor unrest and other
acute industrial difficulties were solved with unprecedented suc-
cess. To this success the broadmindedness and patriotism of
the representatives of management, employees, and the govern-
ment contributed greatly.
1. SOME RESULTS OF THE WAR THAT AFFECT INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS
With the above summary in mind we may return to a consid-
eration of the lessons which the United States has learned in
dealing with the various elements in the labor problem during
the great emergency. If the war has resulted in any construc-
tive effect upon industrial society it has certainly demonstrated
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the possibility and practicability of harmonious relations and
earnest cooperation between the parties to industry capital,
management, labor, and the government. For the first time
in the annals of American industry, management and labor
throughout the entire country accepted certain fundamental
standards of work and convened in joint conferences for the
purpose of considering their grievances and adjusting their diffi-
culties on the basis of these principles and standards. These
joint conferences were common in particular establishments be-
fore the war, but the history of conciliation and mediation dur-
ing the recent war shows that they were never so numerous nor
characterized with so much rationality and amicability as in
this critical period. This intimate association of the representa-
tives of management and capital with the representatives of
labor has done much to modify the harsh opinion each group of
interests has held concerning the other, and should contribute
materially to the elimination of the antagonism that has char-
acterized modern industrial relations and disrupted industrial
peace. Workers have learned that employers are men of like
passions as themselves, actuated by the same motives not only
for economic gain but for fair dealing and social and cultural
progress, not blind to the rights of labor nor indifferent to jus-
tice for the proletariat. On the other hand, employers have dis-
covered that workers possess a keen sense of justice and fair
play, a large measure of rationality, a profound respect for the
rights and deserts of that superior managerial ability without
which the production of wealth could never have attained nor
continue its present efficiency, and that they respond readily
and generously to a proper appeal.
Labor and capital have finally appeared to each other in a
truer light than formerly. Labor is gradually being looked
upon as something more than a marketable commodity to be
bought and sold in obedience to the operation of blind economic
laws or the higgling and manipulation of powerful bargainers.
It is seen that labor is inseparable from the laborer who possesses
the qualities, rights, and dignity of a human being in a civilized
community. To buy labor cheaply is to obey the powerful eco-
nomic motive of self-interest, but many employers have learned
that this is but to sacrifice human welfare and to disregard the
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human factor in industry, and that in the long run cheap labor
may prove to be expensive labor, not only for society but for
the employer himself.
Likewise, capital has appeared in a truer light. Altho differ-
ent from labor in that it is divorceable from its owner, capital,
nevertheless, is but a collective designation for the capitalists
a group of human beings having all the attributes of humanity
and not necessarily selfish. The capitalist like the laborer is, in
the last analysis, a complex of human interests, and a fuller
understanding of the motives and impulses that actuate his fel-
lows may be relied upon to guarantee a fuller measure of indus-
trial fair play and justice. Class hatred and the so called class
struggle have been softened under the war-time practice of
bringing capital and labor closer together and a fuller under-
standing of each other has narrowed the breach that for years
has been widening. 1
Is this changed point of view a temporary phenomenon, an
impulse growing out of loyalty to the nation in a great emer-
gency, or does it presage a permanent change in the perspective
and psychosis of the parties to industry ? There is disagreement
concerning the answer to this query, some holding that the new
attitude is a permanent by-product of the war while others be-
lieve it will pass away with the return to peace and the post-war
struggle for markets and profits. This much can be said: The
prevailing sentiment of the press, the platform, the pulpit, and
the representatives of the commercial and conservative labor in-
terests of the country, as well as of students of the labor problem,
is that the time was never more opportune for the reconciliation
of labor and capital and these parties to industry seemed never
more desirous and willing to understand each other and to estab-
lish conditions of permanent peace.
2 This changed attitude is
1 The writer is cognizant of the fact that radical forces in the United
States, as in Europe, have not surrendered the doctrine of class war and
that expropriation of the property owning class is widely advocated, but
there is abundant evidence of more conciliatory spirit in industrial relations
and of a desire to establish democratic government of industry, both on the
part of capital and of labor.
2 The widespread industrial unrest that has appeared in the United
States subsequent to the war may seem to deny the validity of this conclu-
sion, but it is still true that all parties to the labor controversy are striving
to discover a permanent basis for harmony.
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not universal, but there are many indications of its prevalence.
A second result of the war pertaining to industrial relations
is that it has made very clear the magnitude of the community 's
interest in the industrial system, particularly in the personal
relation in industry and the conditions of employment. The
absolute dependence of national security and progress upon both
hand-workers and brain-workers has been clearly demonstrated
during the recent international cataclysm, and this fact has
stimulated the interest of the community in the conditions of
work and service. Society is directly or indirectly a party to
every industrial compact, for the production, exchange, and dis-
tribution of wealth are in a large measure determined by existing
economic and political institutions which have their basis and
sanction in law. Whatever one may think of the present eco-
nomic and political systems, he cannot gainsay that they have
legal sanction, and in a democracy like ours it is commonly as-
sumed that law is the expression of the will of the majority.
Admittedly, legal institutions and the statutes upon which they
rest may be out of joint with the thought and philosophy of the
present, but the machinery of democratic government affords an
opportunity for orderly readjustment when the will of the ma-
jority so demands. Just as it is the duty of a democratic gov-
ernment to register and obey the will of the majority, so also is
it obliged to protect existing personal and property rights and
other institutions until such time as these institutions and rights,
in the process of social evolution which is the barometer of the
collective will, shall be modified or abandoned. This does not
mean that it is the duty of the government to countenance the
abuse of personal and property rights ; rather should it prevent
such abuse. It is one of the peculiar functions of government
to maintain law and order in industry and in fulfilling this ob-
ligation the state becomes an active participant in the industrial
process.
Industrial organization is not independent of and divorceable
from the general societal organization. The industrial process
is but one phase of the larger social process which, viewed in its
totality, constitutes what is commonly known as the life of soci-
ety. For this reason maladjustment in wealth-producing and
wealth-distributing machinery has serious effects upon the entire
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social structure, and industrial strife involves not only the in-
terests of the direct parties to the labor contract, but the peace,
welfare, and progress of society as well. It has long since been
recognized that conditions of wealth-production and wealth-dis-
tribution, such as wages and hours of labor, sanitation, ventila-
tion, lighting and other factory and mine equipment, have a
direct influence upon the public health, national efficiency, and
welfare, and in order to protect its general interests the state,
through the exercise of its police power, has legitimately regu-
lated industrial conditions. The period of the world war has
done much to emphasize the necessity of these protective meas-
ures and to justify the action of the state, not only in prescrib-
ing regulations that conduce to the general welfare, but also in
formulating principles that will maintain law and order in in-
dustry and guarantee permanent industrial peace. There is
reason to believe that the future will witness greater rather than
less activity on the part of the state as a party to industry. It
would seem, however, that whereas the state in providing regu-
latory legislation in the past has placed the emphasis upon puni-
tive measures, the tendency now is to introduce voluntary cor-
rective regulations by educating the employer on the economy
and efficiency of protective standards in industry.
Increased activity of the state as a party to industry does not
mean nor express a tendency towards collective ownership and
operation of the instruments of production, as is feared by some,
but rather does it indicate a deeper interest on the part of the
community in one of the most important phases of its collective
life the production and distribution of wealth. It is some-
times stated that we have measurably solved the problem of pro-
duction of wealth, and that all that remains to usher in social
and economic justice is an equitable solution of the problem of
distribution. 3 We are becoming more and more convinced, how-
ever, that many aspects of the problem of production, especially
those involving the personal relation or human factor in indus-
try, are just beginning to receive attention. In other words, al-
though we have measurably solved the general problem of the
3 See Professor E. C. Hayes' pamphlet: The Social Control of the
Acquisition of Wealth, p. 127. (Keprinted from the publications of the
American Sociological Society, Vol. XII, 1917.)
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mechanical or technical side of production, the psychology un-
derlying human relations in industry is as yet vaguely under-
stood. Fuller comprehension of these psychic elements is a nec-
essary prerequisite to maximum efficiency in production.4
American industry is replete with demonstrations of this
truth. 5 Welfare schemes of various types which are being
widely introduced into American industry are manifestations of
the increasing desire of our industrial managers to understand
more clearly the impulses and motives that enter into production.
As Professor Irving Fisher has suggested, industry as hereto-
fore conducted has balked the fundamental instincts of the
worker, and in order to secure maximum production the basic
instincts of self-preservation, self-expression, self-respect, loyal-
ty, love of home making, worship, and play must be satisfied.6
Industrial management must learn that it is not sufficient to
give free play to the instinct of workmanship or the socalled
creative impulse, but that it is necessary also to satisfy the acqui-
sitive instinct. If the laborer is to be induced to put forth his
best efforts on production he must first be guaranteed a just
share in the division of the product. The second condition is
the necessary prerequisite of the first, for without a guaranty
of a fair division of the product the worker will not exert his
best efforts in producing that product. This is fundamental to
a clear understanding of the instinctive basis of industrial or-
ganization and operation. In the past the entrepreneur has been
concerned chiefly with technical problems of organization and
systematization of industry in relation to production ; the future
will witness greater emphasis upon the human element in pro-
ductive processes. This new appreciation of the human element
4 See F. S. Lee, The Human MacMne and Industrial Efficiency ; O. Tead,
Instincts in Industry, A Study of Working-Class Psychology; H. Marot,
Creative Impulse in Industry.
6 Among the conspicuous examples of the consideration of the human
factor in industry are the following: Sears Roebuck & Co., Montgomery
Ward & Co., The International Harvester Co., The Colorado Iron and Fuel
Co., The Ford Motor Co., Hart, Schaffner & Marx, The American Boiling
Mill Co., The Harris Trust and Savings Bank of Chicago, and the Standard
Oil Co., of New Jersey.
6 See Professor Fisher 's paper,
' '
Humanizing Industry, ' ' the Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. LXXXII, No.
171 (March, 1919), pp. 83-90.
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in industry is born of the desire for increased efficiency in pro-
duction and of the newer conception of human values. It is a
change that will alter the type of industrial management.
"Heretofore the Chief Executives of important industrial cor-
porations have been selected largely because of their capacity
as organizers or financiers. The time is rapidly coming, how-
ever, when the important qualifications for such positions will
be a man's ability to deal successfully and amicably with
labor. ' ' 7 The war has emphasized the necessity of this new
basis of selecting the managers of industry.
A third result of the war affecting the labor problem is the
discovery of the fundamental weakness in our national labor
policy and the creation of a new labor administration. The old,
decentralized, heterogeneous labor policy and administration
was forced, under the pressure of a great emergency, to give
place to a policy of uniform standards, concentration of author-
ity, and coordination of administrative agencies. With the Labor
Policies Board and the War Labor Board at the apex of our war-
time labor administration, there was little left to be desired in the
way of efficient organization. These two bodies, the former
essentially administrative and the latter primarily, though not
solely, judicial, were responsible for the efficient manner in
which our labor problems were solved during the second year of
our participation in the war. What is to become of this new
policy and administration now that the war is over? There is a
general demand for the continuation of these war labor agencies
that have served the country so acceptably, altho there developed
some opposition to the War Labor Board, many manufacturers
contending that the board "failed to be impartial, judicial, or
conciliatory,
' '
and was really
' '
a labor surrender board. ' ' Not-
withstanding this criticism, however, a good majority of employ-
ers endorse the establishment of a national labor board, properly
constituted, legally created, and vested with adequate authority
to enforce its decisions. 8 It was folly to abandon this new labor
administration. The United States is in great need of such
important agencies as the Labor Policies Board, the War Labor
Board, the Federal Employment Service, the Woman in In-
7 John D. Eockefeller, Jr., The Personal Eelation in Industry , p. 7.
s American Industries, Vol. XIX, No. 9 (April, 1919), p. 9.
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dustry Service, the Industrial Training Service, the Working
Conditions Service, and the Inspection and Investigation Ser-
vice. For, as a noted student of the labor problem has remarked,
"it is with respect to labor policies and their administration
more than aught else that the old order in Industry must give
place to a new.
' ' 9
A fourth by-product of the war is the definite formulation and
general acceptance of certain basic principles and standards of
industrial conduct. 10 The introduction of uniform standards
for American industry as a whole has filled a long felt need in
labor administration. For some decades uniformity has char-
acterized this country's standards for trade and transportation
enterprises. Anti-trust legislation embodied in such laws as the
Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914, together with
the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 and
the subsequent extension of its powers, is evidence of an attempt
to prescribe uniform regulations for competitive business enter-
prises with a view to preventing unjust practices. Labor stand-
ards in the United States, however, have lacked uniformity both
as to the different states and different industries within the same
state. In recent years the creation of state industrial commis-
sions has done much to introduce desired uniformity in labor
standards within the respective states, but until the development
of war labor administration no uniform regulation existed for
the nation as a whole. 11 An exception is found in the Federal
Child Labor Law of 1916, which has been declared unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court of the United States. The lack of
uniformity in labor standards has made difficult the prohibition
of child labor, the establishment of minimum wage scales, rea-
sonable hours of employment, and other improved conditions of
work. Each state feared that in passing regulatory legislation
its industries would suffer in competition with the industries of
the more backward states which would refuse to provide desir-
able standards. During the war uniform regulations were laid
9 King, W. L. Mackenzie, Industry and Humanity, p. 179.
10 See Chapters V and VI.
n Unfortunately Congress has not seen fit to make permanent such ex-
cellent agencies as the War Labor Board, the reorganized United States
Employment Service, etc., etc., so return to normal conditions will find us
again without adequate machinery for labor administration.
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down for all industries in any state or territory of the United
States that were working on government contracts. Continua-
tion of these uniform standards through adoption by all the
states would do much to solve many of the perplexing labor
problems that are likely to arise. Such adoption has been urged
in the multiplicity of reconstruction programs advanced by
trade, financial, and labor associations in this country and
abroad, and a program of international labor standards has been
formulated by the committee on labor at the Versailles Peace
Conference.12
2. THE FUTURE RELATIONS OF LABOR AND CAPITAL
A deluge of literature has appeared on the problems of recon-
struction, and the labor problem has received generous treat-
ment. 13 Running through all these treatises and reconstruction
suggestions there is a note of anxiety. Nations have feared the
period of reconstruction almost as much as they feared the war,
because of the rapidity with which radical political and indus-
trial movements have swept over Russia and Central Europe
and, to some extent, over England and France.14 It is no small
task to divert the energies of a nation from the channels of
organized destruction incident to a great international conflict
into the avenues of peaceful pursuits, and there may well be
some apprehension concerning the outcome of readjustment.
The United States cannot forget the seriousness of conditions
!2 For such programs see Problems of Reconstruction, published by the
American Association for International Conciliation, New York City; The
Eeconstruction Program of the American Federation of Labor; Eeport of
the Employers' Industrial Commission of the United States Department
of Labor on British Labor Problems; Eevised Covenant of the League of
Nations, Article 23, The Peace Treaty between the Allies and Germany;
Reports on Reconstruction from English Sources, published by the United
States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation; Annals of the Amer-
ican Academy of Political and Social Science (January and March, 1919),
Vols. LXXXI and LXXXII; Reconstruction Program of the British Labor
Party ; Labor and Reconstruction in Europe, by Elisha M. Friedman.
13 See bibliography appended to this study.
!* Concerning recent developments in these movements in the United
States see the following articles by the writer: "The Present Status of
Socialism in the United States," Atlantic Monthly, December, 1919, and
"Revolutionary Communism in the United States," American Political
Science Review, February, 1920.
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following the Civil War, and has expected a similar experience
during the present period. Thus far, however, no very critical
situations have arisen here, although there are perplexing prob-
lems. A period of readjustment subsequent to a state of war is
always fraught with uncertainties. The necessity of maximum
production during war-time results in an atmosphere of cer-
tainty and optimism in business life. Prices are high, profits
large; wages, interest, and rents climbing; business is sure of
returns, labor is certain of employment. With the cessation of
hostilities, however, certainty gives way to uncertainty, optimism
to fear. Demands upon industry decline, armies are demobilized,
thus creating a. surplus of labor, and the wheels of industry
slow down. Numerous problems arise, not the least important
of which center about labor. Kedistribution of the labor supply,
prevention of unemployment, adjustment of wages to prices,
regulation of immigration, and the elimination of industrial un-
rest are but a few of the problems which the beginning of the
readjustment period has uncovered in the United States.
One of the most important problems of the reconstruction
period is the establishment of conditions conducive to industrial
peace. One of the results of the war is the new dignity of the
laboring forces of the world. Never has so much deference been
paid to the will and desires of labor, and at no time has the
mass of workers taken so keen an interest in the destinies of
nations and claimed so great a voice in the determination of
national and international policies. Samuel Gompers, in his
address at Laredo, Texas, put it thus :
' ' The time has come in
the world when the working people are coming into their own.
They have new rights and new advantages. They have made
the sacrifices and they are going to enjoy the better times for
which the whole world has been in a convulsion. ' ' 15 Every-
where labor representatives are presenting new and greater de-
mands, and many defenders of the status quo fear the unleash-
ing of disintegrating forces. Bolshevism, with its reign of terror
and anarchy producing disorder and chaos, has forced the ut-
most precaution in handling the labor problem. A strong desire
prevails to eliminate conditions that lead to industrial unrest
and revolution.
15 Address before the International Labor Conference at Laredo, Texas,
November, 1918.
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Compared with the confusion and the general state of affairs
in Europe, the United States is experiencing few serious difficul-
ties in industrial relations. The proletariat of America has suf-
fered less exploitation and is more intelligent than the masses of
the Old World, and this condition constitutes our safety valve
in the reconstruction period. The wrongs that infest American
industrial life can be remedied through the intelligent use of our
present machinery of democratic government. We have prob-
lems, very serious ones, pregnant with uncertain consequences.
The radical labor movement is gaining strength among the un-
organized groups, which constitute the majority of our gainfully
employed population, and to some extent in the ranks of organ-
ized labor. A labor leader recently stated that many members
of local unions have been carried away by the doctrines of bol-
shevism.16 Similar observations have been made by other labor
representatives. Conservative labor forces are refusing to accept
a reduction in wages without reference to the level of prices,
and are demanding general establishment of the eight-hour day
and other reforms. Moreover, American labor's reconstruction
programs contain definite demands for legislation making it a
criminal offense for employers to interfere with the rights of
employees to organize, for laws limiting the tasks of women
workers, establishment of public ownership of public utilities,
removal of all restrictions on free speech, abolition of child labor,
prevention of unemployment, restriction of immigration, demo-
cratic control of industry, etc.
17 American labor, like labor the
world over, is demanding greater freedom and larger economic,
political and cultural opportunities.
How will American capital accept these larger demands of
labor? Will employers persist in their opposition to collective
bargaining, a shorter work-day, minimum wage scales, abolition
of child labor, etc. ? With the great lesson of cooperation which
the war has taught us, it is difficult to believe that the strong
* Mr. William McHugh, acting president of the Printing Pressmen and
Assistants' Union, at the annual convention of American Newspaper Pub-
lishers' Association, New York City, April 24, 1919.
" See the constitution and platform of the recently organized Labor party
of Cook County, Illinois, and the State Labor Party, published in the New
Majority, January, 1919; also the Eecoiistruction Program of the American
Federation of Labor.
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individualism which has often been the basis of our laws and the
chief determinant of our political and industrial policies will
continue to prevail in industrial relations. Nevertheless, our
traditional adherence to absolute liberty of action will not pass
out of existence immediately. Many employers will still insist
upon the right to run their business as they please, and will
resent all efforts of organized labor and of the government to in-
fringe upon that right. Limitations are repugnant to the
typical American mind this is the psychology underlying our
industrial situation. Business enterprises resent restrictions
whether imposed by the state or by labor organizations. Labor
is equally resentful of limitations imposed by capital and man-
agement. This likemindedness in the matter of personal liberty
is largely responsible for the unpleasant relations that frequent-
ly arise between capital and labor. The truth is that both cap-
ital and labor have recognized and defended their constitutional
guaranties and so called natural rights without taking cog-
nizance of the fundamental obligations and responsibilities that
the possession of these rights impose. Happily, there are numer-
ous evidences of a new conception of rights in regard to indus-
trial relations, one which discards the postulate that rights are
absolute and accepts the interpretation of their relativity. This
new interpretation
18
promises to be the guiding spirit in our
post-war readjustment of industrial control. If it can be made
the working philosophy of industrial relations, as it is being
made the ruling principle for international political relations,
much will have been done to eliminate the causes of unrest and
revolution.
In his address at Rome, January 3, 1919, President Wilson
stated : *'. . . after all, what the world is now seeking to do
is to return to the paths of duty, to turn from the savagery of
interests to the dignity of the performance of right," or, "In
other words, our task is no less colossal than this: to set up a
new international psychology, to have a new atmosphere.
' '
In these expressions the President has suggested for the
political relations of the nations what has long been necessary
*8 We do not mean to imply here that the conception of the relativity of
rights is generally new, but its application to industrial relations is of
recent origin.
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in the relations of management and labor, namely, a turning
away from the savagery of self-interest and the possession of a
new mental attitude, a new psychology, conducive to an atmos-
phere of mutual trust and confidence, which are the foundations
of cooperation and progress. To change men's activities it is
first necessary to change their ideas of conduct. Insistence upon
absolute rights must give place to recognition of the rights of
other members in society and the prerogatives of the group. So
long as capital refuses to appraise properly the dignity and
rights of the laborer and workmen fail to take cognizance of the
rights of capital and management, we shall have industrial
warfare, more continuous and more destructive than interna-
tional conflicts. As already suggested, there are numerous signs
of a new appraisal of human values in the industrial process,
and capital and labor are more and more clearly seen as collec-
tive terms for bodies of human individuals with continuously
increasing wants, cumulative aspirations, and varying emotions,
desirous of greater satisfactions here and now but not neces-
sarily forgetful of the desires of others. This widening circle
of wants and desires is the parent of discontent and ambition,
and these in turn are the antecedent phenomena out of which a
conflict of interests develops in the sphere of industrial relations
as in the world of international political relations.
These are days of a new and broad evolution of the rights of
nations, especially of the weaker ones, and the tendency is
toward the guaranty of independence and full sovereignty for
all peoples capable of self-determination and self-government.
Democracy is the dynamic of present day political and indus-
trial philosophy and action. It has been prescribed for a world
suffering from conflicting political ambitions and for the pre-
vention of war. Everywhere this new sovereignty of democracy
is being proclaimed it is the crystallized thought of what men
proclaim as a new era. Something akin to this sovereignty of
democracy in political relations must be established in the gov-
ernment of industry. Industrial conflict is a symptom of the
disease of self-interest in the operation and management of in-
dustry, and the remedy would seem to lie in democratic control
of the conditions of employment. Conservative labor forces in
the United States deem it "essential that the workers should
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have a voice in determining the laws within industry and com-
merce which affect them, equivalent to the voice which they have
as citizens in determining the legislative enactments which shall
govern them,"
19 and it is "of paramount importance that
Labor shall be free and unhampered in shaping the principles
and agencies affecting the wage-earners' condition of life and
work. " 20 It is no alarmist view, but rather a simple statement
of fact, that confusion and discontent are threatening revolution
and that abuses tolerated yesterday will be intolerable tomorrow,
for awakened peoples are in reality conscious of a new hope for
a larger freedom. If America is to avoid the spread of bolshev-
ism and other forms of anarchistic radicalism in the ranks of her
forty odd millions of gainfully employed persons, a co-equal
voice in the government of industry is a necessary prerequisite.
This is the conclusion not only of the representatives of labor
and capital in the United States but also of other advanced
nations. 21
No better analysis of the problem of industrial relations and
the necessary readjustment along the lines of democratic con-
trol of the conditions of employment has been given to us than
the following conclusion of the President's Mediation Commis-
sion:
Broadly speaking, American industry lacks a healthy basis of relation-
ship between management and men. At bottom this is due to the insistence
of employers upon individual dealings with their men. Direct dealings with
employees organizations is still the minority rule in the United States. In
the majority of instances there is no joint dealing, and in too many in-
stances employers are in active opposition to labor organizations. This
failure to equalize the parties in adjustments of inevitable industrial con-
tests is the central cause of our difficulties. There is a commendable spirit
!9 Reconstruction Program of the American Federation of Labor, p. 2.
20 Ibid., p. 15.
21 For methods of introducing democratic control of industry see the
following: The Personal Relation in Industry, The Colorado Plan, and
Brotherhood of Men and Nations, by John D. Rockefeller, Jr.; Man to
Man the Story of Industrial Democracy, by John Leiteh ; Report of
the Employers' Industrial Commission of the U. S. Department of Labor
on British Labor Problems; English Reconstruction Reports, including the
Whitley Committee Report, Memorandum on the Industrial Situation After
the War (Garten Foundation) ; Reports of the Conferences of Plymouth
and Cornwall; Report of Inquiry as to Works Committees, by the Minister
of Labor; The Shop Committee, by William Leavitt Stoddard.
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throughout the country to correct specific evils. The leaders in industry
must go further, they must help to correct the state of mind on the part of
labor; they must aim for the release of normal feelings by enabling labor
to take its place as a eooperator in the industrial enterprise. In a word, a
conscious attempt must be made to generate a new spirit in industry.22
This new spirit which is being generated in industry is doing
much to eliminate unrest, radicalism, and revolutionary tenden-
cies, and to usher in a new era in industrial relations. Out of
the better understanding between capital and labor which this
new point of view should develop there will inevitably come a
higher participation by labor in the determination of the condi-
tions of employment and in the fruits of its toil.23 This will
make unnecessary a dictatorship by the proletariat and put an
end to the autocracy of capital. Autocratic management of in-
dustry, whether by labor or capital, is undesirable; democracy
is the only solid foundation of permanent industrial peace.
Generally speaking, then, the experience of the United States
in dealing with the important problems of industrial relations
during the world war suggests the following remedies: Contin-
uation of centralized and coordinated labor administration
;
2*
adoption and application of uniform principles and standards
to guide administrative agencies in regulating the conditions of
employment; the introduction of democratic government in in-
dustry with a special plan of representation adapted to the needs
and conditions of given industries and establishments ; 25 provi-
22 Sixth Annual Eeport of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 24.
23 The writer does not mean to imply that democratic control is the final
solution of the labor problem, but he does believe that such control is the
next step in the evolution of industrial relations.
2* Coordination of labor administration should not involve the concen-
tration of control in the hands of the federal government, but rather cor-
relation of effort between the administrative agencies within each division
of government local, state, and national and further correlation and
cooperation between the federal, state and local governmental bodies in mat-
ters that concern labor administration. State and local arbitration boards,
employment services, etc., can cooperate to mutual advantage with the fed-
eral agencies in meeting successfully the problems that arise.
as This does not involve state ownership of industry and industrial man-
agement by the workers as suggested by the Guild Socialists. Conservative
labor forces in America are asking merely for a voice in the determination
and regulation of conditions of employment, and it is in this latter sense
that we have used the term ' ' industrial democracy.
' '
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sion for giving to labor a share in the excess earnings of indus-
try ; free play for the creative impulse in industry ; and the gen-
eration of a new spirit between management and labor a spirit
of cooperation, democracy, and good-will.26
26 These measures have been dealt with in preceding pages, see Chapters v
and vi.
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